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palavras-chave 
 
Parcerias Público-Privadas, Desenho de Contratos, Governança, 
Renegociação.  
resumo 
 
 
Proposta: O acelerado desenvolvimento económico registado nas economias 
emergentes, como o Brasil, vem colocar nos últimos anos uma pressão 
acrescida no desenvolvimento de infraestruturas com impactos relevantes ao 
nível das necessidades de financiamento. A Parceria Público-Privada (PPP) é 
um instrumento, utilizado mundialmente, para contratação pública de projetos 
de grande porte. Sua utilização se dá pela concessão de obra ou serviço público 
a um parceiro privado, por um determinado período de tempo, incluindo 
significativo financiamento do privado. As PPPs são vistas como aceleradoras 
do desenvolvimento, pois se caracterizam como uma maneira rápida de aprovar 
e executar projetos de infraestrutura. No entanto, na América Latina e mais 
especificamente no Brasil, as experiências recentes resultaram num grande 
número de renegociações contratuais que transformam os benefícios sociais e 
econômicos, esperados por parte dos setores público e privado, em prejuízos 
de ordem financeira e atrasos na entrega e operação destas infraestruturas. 
 
O objetivo deste trabalho é revisar a literatura sobre o tema das PPPs, com o 
foco nas áreas de governança e renegociações, e assim analisar e comparar 
com as experiências das PPPs brasileiras, apontando debilidades e sugerindo 
melhoramentos nestes processos que resultem em ganhos de qualidade em sua 
aplicação. 
 
O método utilizado para o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa será: o descritivo, 
conduzido através de revisão bibliográfica de caráter exploratório buscando um 
maior conhecimento sobre o assunto em estudo, seguido de estudos de caso, 
análise dos resultados e a proposição de melhoramentos nestes processos.  
 
Resultados: A investigação apresenta contributos nos processos de 
governança e renegociação das PPPs Brasileiras que resultem em ganhos de 
qualidade, aplicabilidade e viabilidade na aplicação desta modalidade de 
contrato.   
 
Conclusão: A investigação obteve um conjunto de contributos nos processos 
de governança e renegociação de contratos, que auxiliam os setores público e 
privado na otimização dos resultados económicos e financeiros nas PPPs 
Brasileiras. 
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abstract 
 
Proposal: The rapid economic development registered in emerging economies, 
such as Brazil, have in recent years placed increased pressure on infrastructure 
development with significant impacts in terms of financing needs. The Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) is an instrument, used worldwide, for public 
procurement of major projects. Its use occurs through concession projects or 
public service to a private partner, for a specified period of time, including 
significant funding from the private. PPPs are seen as accelerators of 
development, since they are characterized as a quick way to approve and 
implement infrastructure projects. However, in Latin America and more 
specifically in Brazil, recent experiences have resulted in a large number of 
contractual renegotiations that transform the expected social and economic 
benefits of the public and private sectors into financial losses and delays in 
delivery and operation of these infrastructures. 
 
The objective of this study is to review the literature on the subject of PPPs, with 
the focus on the areas of governance and renegotiations, and thus to analyze 
and compare with the experiences of Brazilian PPPs, pointing weaknesses and 
suggesting improvements in these processes that would result in quality gains in 
its application. 
 
The method used for the development of this research are: the descriptive, 
conducted through exploratory literature review seeking a better understanding 
of the subject under study, followed by case studies, analysis of results and 
proposing improvements in these processes. 
 
Results: The research presents contributions in the processes of governance 
and renegotiation of Brazilian PPPs resulting in gains of quality, applicability and 
feasibility in applying this type of contract. 
 
Conclusion: The research obtained a set of contributions in the processes of 
governance and renegotiation of contracts, to assist the public and private 
sectors in the optimization of economic and financial results in the Brazilian 
PPPs. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
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1.1 Preliminary remarks 
1.1.1 The need of infrastructure in developing countries 
The rapid economic development of Brazil in recent years demand costly 
infrastructure investments. Brazil, as well as others developing countries, needs many 
of these projects and demand solutions to make them feasible. The Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) is a tool used worldwide to enable large projects. Its use occurs 
through delegation of the public goods or services to the private sector. In Brazil, the 
insufficient existent infrastructure has limited the volume of private investment and 
slowing the nation's economic growth, compared to other emerging countries such as 
China and India (see Figure 1). The PPPs in this context are presented as an option in 
solving this problem (Frischtak, 2008).  
Figure 1. Infrastructure investment as percentage of GDP 
Source: Adapted from Frischtak (2008) 
PPPs are viewed as accelerators of development, since they are characterized as a quick 
way to approve and implement infrastructure projects. Currently, Brazil has started 
the implementation of this form of contract, demonstrating their interest through the 
implementation of PPP programs in the three spheres: municipal, state and federal. 
According to Radar PPP (2016), there were 86 PPPs contracts signed in Brazil: one is 
15,40%
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5,80%
5,63%
3,60%
2,03%
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Vietnam
China
Chile
Colombia
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under federal jurisdiction, 48 under state jurisdiction and 37 developed by 
municipalities. 
1.1.2 Lack of infrastructure in Brazil: barriers to the growth 
Designed as an alternative to financial inability of governments to invest in 
infrastructure, PPPs have been regulated nationwide for 15 years, by Federal Law no. 
11,079/04 (President of the Republic of Brazil, 2004). Before that, some Brazilian 
states, such as Minas Gerais and São Paulo, had already published their own laws 
establishing the state programs of PPP. São Paulo´s metro yellow line number 4 was 
the first Brazilian project applying PPP, followed by the state of Minas Gerais with the 
PPP of MG-050 highway and the state of Bahia with the project of the outfall sewer. 
Since then, all states, and some wealthier cities, have invested in the idea of PPPs 
contracts for the development of their infrastructures and economies (Radar PPP, 
2016).  
Beyond these infrastructure demands for the growth of investments in the industry, 
there is a growing interest of private companies and public sector in forming 
partnerships that will meet the developing countries demands of infrastructure, such 
large projects. In the Brazilian case, as example, the WORLD CUP 2014 and the 2016 
Olympic Games were recently among the major PPP challenges of civil engineering and 
financial arrangements.  
 
1.1.3 Disadvantages of the PPPs: learning with the mistakes 
PPPs have been devised to serve the public's interest in providing infrastructure to 
improve the quality of life of the citizen and the progress of the nation. In spite of that, 
public power has not always been able to extract from these PPPs the social and 
economic benefits simultaneously. In seeking a solution to this, establish and 
strengthen PPP units are essential in order to help both public and private sector to 
develop and successfully implement PPP projects (Dutz et al. 2006, Istrate and Puentes, 
2011). Brazil, as a developing country, has its budget constrained and cannot afford to 
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have losses from poorly managed contracts that result in financially disadvantageous 
renegotiations.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of the thesis is to review the literature on the subject of PPPs, with 
the focus on the areas of governance and renegotiations, and thus to analyse and 
compare with the experiences of Brazilian PPPs, pointing weaknesses and suggesting 
improvements in these processes that would result in quality gains in its application. 
Narrowing down, it is possible to disaggregate in several smaller objectives: 
• Identify the gaps of PPP management by literature research available on the Web of 
Knowledge, and examine the academy's interest in the subject of PPPs; the most 
searched infrastructure sectors; the most studied subjects within the theme of PPPs; 
• Analyse the Brazilian state PPP units and programs´ development, identifying the 
challenges in the governance of PPPs in Brazil, looking at three main dimensions of 
governance model, PPP infrastructure growth and PPP contract management, pointing 
out the most fragile areas and proposing mitigation strategies; 
• Identify the patterns of PPP renegotiations for infrastructure projects in Brazil, the 
recurring problems of contract renegotiation, who caused, when and the reasons why 
it occurs to suggest improvements on the processes, increasing the chances of 
successful PPPs; 
• Understand, from the previous experience in Latin America, the main drivers for 
Brazilian PPPs renegotiation, what are the main determinants and consequences, in 
order to improve institutional and regulatory framework, decreasing the likelihood of 
renegotiation. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, some targeted research questions 
were developed: 
• Where are the literature gaps? There is growing interest in the subject? Where and 
who has developed the publications on these issues? What are the most searched 
infrastructure sectors? What are the more covered research areas and research topics? 
• Who are the state Brazilian PPP Units? How these PPP Units are organized and what 
the main results they have been? What are the main obstacles of PPPs in Brazil? What 
are the main challenges? What are the solutions and general recommendations to 
overcome these obstacles?  
• What are the main determinants and motives of Brazilian PPP renegotiations? Who 
were responsible for triggering the renegotiation? What are the implications involving 
renegotiations by electoral cycle and political party?  
• How to improve the Brazilian PPP programs, to reduce and minimize the likelihood 
and unwanted consequences of renegotiation? 
 
1.4 Methodological structure 
The current thesis is organized into two parts, with different methodological 
structures. In the initial part, an overview of PPP and Project Finance Initiative (PFI) 
academic researches is investigated and depicted as the thesis background for the 
accomplishment of the research that will be developed in the next chapters. In the 
following part, the contributions to improve the PPPs governance and renegotiation 
processes will be pointed out. 
In a close view, the initial part consists on an exhaustive research of existing literature, 
examining more than 600 papers published in Web of Knowledge journals, between 
1991 and 2014. It was performed a bibliometric analysis, focusing on the fields covered 
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by the papers, the main authors, countries, or sectors, among other types of 
information.  
The contributions part focused on the Brazilian PPP experience, to improve the 
program, in two main areas: governance and renegotiations of contracts. The focus on 
these two areas arises from a crosscheck analysis between the main critical questions 
identified in Part I, the identification of literature gaps, and the considerable evidence 
regarding the difficulty encountered from public and private sectors to create robust 
contracts that reduce renegotiation events, thus achieving the initially wished projects´ 
results. In each area the approach consisted in using real data, developing schemes to 
analyse and compare the data to propose improvements in these processes.  
The methods adopted in each chapter, were selected according to the specificity of the 
questions to be answered, and each methodology will be detailed and explained 
further. In these two areas, it is believed that substantial contributions to the Brazilian 
PPP experience have been made. 
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1.5 General Organization 
The proposed methodology resulted in the following organization of the thesis, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Thesis structure 
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Chapter 2.  
PPP Projects: Literature Review  
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2.1 Introduction1 
PPPs are a procurement model used to deliver public infrastructure and/or services, 
typically in the sectors of transport, energy, environment, health, security or education. 
The economic rationale of the PPP model is that when exposed to risk, or with the 
probability of losses, the private sector can achieve a higher level of efficiency, thus 
increasing the value for money of the projects (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; and Meda, 
2007). PPP development is built upon the possibility of achieving higher efficiency 
gains and the access to private capital in a context of public funding shortage, providing 
an alternative for Governments to develop their infrastructure development plans. But 
these potential upsides are not “free of charge”. There are many costs, or pitfalls, the 
most relevant being the vulnerability to uncertainty of long-term contracts, often 
renegotiated, with severe impacts on the public sector and/or directly on users (e.g. 
increase in fares, decreases in the level of quality of the service, etc.) (Hart, 1988; 
Guasch, 2004).  
PPP have been mentioned in the literature with different acronyms, as example: PPP, 
PFI, P3 or P³. The most popular, and worldwide used, is PPP, although PFI was the very 
first term adopted by British government and the term used in the first published paper 
addressing the subject in 1950, question the role of private financing in hospitals 
(Mignon, 1950). Since then, according to the Web of Science database, less than 70 
papers were published until 1991. Is particularly after 2000 that the literature on PPPs 
has expanded significantly, with a stronger growth rhythm over the last 5 years.  The 
theory has followed the practice in the case of PPPs, considering that it was in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s that the model became more used.  
This chapter intends to provide a unique overview of the evolution and trends of PPP 
papers in the academia. This type of analysis is highly conditioned by the database used 
(existing data bases, simple search over the web, etc.), and it was adopted a well-
established repository – Web of Science – to decrease the discretionary of the search. 
Historically, there have been papers addressing literature reviews on PPPs although 
                                                 
1 The content of this chapter was published in the paper “Bibliometric analysis of PPP/PFI literature: 
overview of 25 years of research”, Journal of Construction and Management ASCE´s journal 142(10). 
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with limit focus (sample), areas and industries, or type of analysis. A summary of these 
papers is presented in Table 1.  
This bibliometric analysis has identified all publications in the Web of Science on PPP 
and PFI, in a total of more than 600 papers, in more than 300 high quality journals, 
since 1990. This provides the largest database ever used. The papers were analysed 
and classified in 14 topics, almost the double of the size of the widest previous 
researchs attempt of previous papers.  
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Table 1. Summary of recent PPP literature reviews 
Literature 
review 
Al-Sharif 
and Kaka 
(2004) 
Weihe´s 
(2008) 
Kwak et al. 
(2009) 
Ke et al. 
(2009) 
Tang et al. 
(2010) 
Papajohn 
et al. 
(2011) 
Marsilio et 
al. (2011) 
Andon 
(2012) 
Garvin and 
Gross 
(2012) 
Chen et 
al. 
(2015) 
Current 
research 
Number of 
journals 
analysed 
4 - - 7 6 - - 
≥ 25 Google 
Scholar 
140 - 310 
Number of 
papers 
34 - - 170 107 - 298 97 278 95 575 
Period of 
analysis 
1998-2003 - - 1998-2008 1998-2007 - 2008 2010 1997-2010 
2002-
2014 
1991-2014 
Research 
categories 
3 
4 
(approaches) 
- 7 - - - - 8 5 14 
Type of 
research 
No 
bibliometric 
No 
bibliometric 
No 
bibliometric 
No 
bibliometric 
No 
bibliometric 
Questionna
rie 
Bibliometric 
analyses * 
Partial 
bibliometric 
analyses** 
Bibliometric 
analyses*** 
Meta-
analyses 
Bibliometric 
analyses * 
Research area 
Construction 
journals 
Not specific Not specific 
Construction 
journals 
Construction 
journals 
Transporta
tion 
Not specific Accounting 
Transportati
on 
Transpor
tation 
All areas 
Geographical 
scope 
Not specific Not specific Not specific Not specific Not specific 
United 
States 
Not specific Not specific Not specific 
Not 
specific 
All regions 
Note: * ISI Web of Science (2015); ** Specific journals and Google Scholars´ search samples; ***Google Scholars.
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2.2 Methodology and data 
The first step of the research was to define which of the existing scientific repository 
to use. Previous works, such as Al-Sharif and Kaka (2004), Ke et al. (2009) and Tang 
et al. (2010) have elected a sample of specific journals while others as Chen et al. 
(2015) preferred to define the sample using their work experience based on journal 
papers, government reports, conference papers, independent studies, dissertations 
and seminar discussion papers. Although there were others academic digital 
database available, the chosen one was the Web of Science database, because its 
comprehensiveness and scientific robustness. Although Andon (2012) and Gavin 
and Gross (2012) have resorted to the Google Scholars database, it was preferred to 
follow Marsilio et al. (2011) experience adopting the Web of Science database. The 
chosen temporal interval was from 1990 to 2014. Appendix S1 and S2 provide the 
list of papers for “PPP” and “PFI” respectively. The last enquiry (Web of Science´s 
webpage) was made in March 6th of 2015.  
After the identification of all papers, a database was created in order to catalogue 
the papers information according the following criteria: date of publication, title, 
authors, journal of publication, research country origin, geographic scope, project 
sector, research area, main findings and research topics. The database analysis 
identified papers without basic information such as, the publications date, author’s 
names, researchers` origins, research areas or even the abstract itself. The database 
includes a total of 626 papers.  However, 51 papers were excluded because they did 
not met the necessary conditions to be selected and analysed, due to several 
reasons: papers double registration in the Web of Science´s webpage; papers not 
related with the research (papers that just mention PPP as the procurement model 
adopted in their searches, without cannot be related to none of the research topics 
analysis). After this, the final sample resulted in 575 papers, 455 for PPPs and others 
120 for PFIs (see Table 2).  
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Table 2. Profile of the analysed publications 
Profile 
Number of 
papers 
Percentage 
(%) 
Total publications in Web of Science with the topics PPP and Public-Private 
Partnership (filter use of the term Article) 
488 78 
Total publications in Web of Science with the topics PFI and Private Finance 
Initiative (filter use of the term Article) 
138 22 
Total of papers before analysis 626 100 
Papers excluded because their abstracts are written in other languages 
different from English 
10 1.60 
Papers excluded because do not have abstracts 14 2.24 
Papers excluded because have been registered twice 06 0,96 
Papers excluded because do not are related with the research area.2 10 1.60 
Papers removed from the initial list because its objectives and/or conclusions 
have not been clearly presented or do not exist 
11 1.76 
Total of papers excluded before analysis 51 8.15 
Total of papers analysed in this research 575 100 
 
2.3 Literature analysis 
The literature analysis will look at the evolution of the quantity of papers, the main 
publishing journals, research areas, research origins (countries where the authors 
are affiliated), geographic scope (data or case study geographic provenience and/or 
location), project sector, research topics (main issue addressed based on proposed 
14-categories classification) and a list of most cited papers.  
                                                 
2 Papers that cited the expressions PPP and/or PFI, but in fact do not explore the theme. It was notice, 
mainly in papers that comes from medical, chemistry, telecommunications and biological areas, 
where they usually made reference to the terms just to point out the sort of model that had financed 
its projects. 
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2.3.1 Number of papers  
The results show that, for both PPP and PFI acronyms, there is a growing number of 
papers as a result of an increasing attention that the academia is devoting to this 
subject (see Figure 3). Since 2002, the growth has been almost exponential and it is 
likely that it will continue over the next decade, despite the slight decrease of the 
number of papers verified in 2014 particularly taking into account that over the last 
10 years the number of projects developed worldwide has increased substantially.  
Figure 3. Number of papers per year 
 The number of publications with the acronym “PPP” has increased consistently, but 
the same does not happen with “PFI”. It would probably be the result of a more 
generalized use of the PPP term for British influenced authors that used PFIs 
acronym in the past and are progressively abandoning the term.  
2.3.2 Journals 
The two most relevant journals publishing about PPPs are the Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management-ASCE that published 33 papers, and the 
Public Money & Management, with 31 papers published. Considering the list of 
research areas catalogued by the Web of Science, the journal in first place belongs to 
“Engineering” area and the second place journal to “Business Economics” area. 
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Other finding is that these 2 research areas dominate the “Top 10” journals ranking, 
each of them with 4 journals with the great number of publications about PPP and 
PFI (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Ranking of top 10 journals publishing PPP and PFI papers 
 2.3.3 Research areas 
As mentioned earlier the 2 leading areas are engineering and public administration, 
with 161 and 144 papers respectively. In third cames business & economics, with 
120 papers. Thenceforth, the other sectors together represent a little more than 1/3 
of the total of papers (see Figure 5). These outcomes evidence the multidisciplinary 
nature of PPP research, involving typically technical contents (engineering), public 
policy concerns given that they are used to develop and manage public services 
(public administration), but also include complex financing mechanisms and 
business models (business & economics).  
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Figure 5. Number of papers in the top 10 rankings by research areas 
 
2.3.4 Research origins 
Between the 72 countries with researchers publishing about the PPPs theme, UK 
stands out at the top of the list with 122 papers. China appears in second place, 
followed by USA, with 72 and 62 papers respectively. Australia is in the fourth place, 
with 34 papers published, followed by Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, 
India, Brazil, Netherlands, Taiwan and Belgium, that published between 15 and 10 
papers each one (see Figure 6). 
161
144
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53
44 43
34
22 20 19
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Figure 6. Number of papers per country 
 2.3.5 Geographic Scope 
Regarding, the scope by country, the UK stands out at the top of the list with 97 
papers. China appears in second place, followed by Korea, with 51 and 38 papers 
respectively. Here, USA was in fourth place, with 32 papers published. After this, 
Australia cames with 22 papers and is worth mentioning India and Brazil with 17 
and 13 papers, followed by Portugal with 12 papers published (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Number of papers by rank of countries´ geographic scope 
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 2.3.6 Project sector 
In this section it is analysed what was the primary sector of the papers. The 13 sector 
classification selected were: Transportation, Health, Environment, Education, 
Housing, Energy, Agriculture, Communication, Security, Tourism, Sports, Urban 
regeneration and Mining. The results show that the 2 leading sectors are 
Transportation and Health, with 98 and 91 papers respectively.  
Over the last two decades, governments have ben investing significantly in roads, 
railways, light rails, ports airports and hospitals, which has justified the academic 
attention to this fields. Transport and health were also the first sectors to experience 
the use of PPPs. In third and fourth Environment and Education, with 52 and 25 
papers respectively. Thenceforth, the other sectors together represent 1/5 of the 
total papers classified (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Number of papers per project sectors 
Projects Sector 
Number of 
papers 
RANKING 
Transportation 98 1 
Health 91 2 
Environment 52 3 
Education 25 4 
Housing 15 5 
Energy 11 6 
Agriculture 10 7 
Communication 9 8 
Security 9 9 
Urban Regeneration 6 10 
Tourism 5 11 
Sports 3 12 
Mining 1 13 
Not identified 249 - 
TOTAL 355 - 
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The total of papers is lower than the full database number because some papers 
were not applied to a specific sector or were essentially conceptual and/or 
theoretical papers. 
2.3.7 Research Topics 
In this section the papers were classified acording to a list of research topics, 
previously elaborated. The idea to classsify the papers in topics, themes or 
categories, was previously used by other researchers. Al-Sharif and Kaka (2004), 
Weihe´s (2008), Ke et al. (2009), Gavin and Gross (2012), and more recently, Chen 
et al. (2015) have also create their own categories and classified their samples 
according it. The number of categories varies from author to author, as presented in 
Table 4.  
In this chapter it was attempted to create a list that could cover the majority of the 
present PPPs´ themes. It was intended to create a list that would exaustively cover 
the various topics of PPP/PFI, and not limit its scope to PPPs researched from the 
construction engineering perspective. The classification resulted in 14 research 
topics depicted in Table 4, based in the literature review of complemented with new 
groups propoused by the author of this thesis.  
The 2 most popular topics are Contract Performance and Qualitative Cost & Benefits, 
with 135 and 115 papers respectively. In third, fourth and fifth positions are 
Contract Design and Risk Sharing, PPP/PFI Political or Institutional Issues and Value 
for Money Tests, respectively. Thenceforth, the other sectors together represent a 
little more than 1/5 of the total papers as shown in Table 4. The total of papers is 
higher than the full number of database because some papers were classified in 
more then one topic.   
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Table 4. Research topics, related description of issues, and number of papers 
Research topics Summary description 
Number of 
papers 
Contract Performance 
Comparative costs, time and client requirements performance 
case studies; Operational performance; Success rate; Projects 
performance; Key performance indicators 
135 
Qualitative Cost & 
Benefits 
 
Applicability of the model; Expected cost and benefits 
examination; Overall opportunities, problems, and challenges 
in the PPP market; PFI´s attractiveness to the private sector; 
Projects sector´s experience reviews; PFI´s effectiveness of 
delivering government objectives; Procurement methods 
mechanisms comparison; Firms challenges participating in 
models 
115 
Contract Design and 
Risk Sharing 
Risk sharing; Design contract achievement of public goals; 
Assessment of risk-related issues; Risk analysis; Risk factors in 
case studies; Procedural fairness and cooperation; Evaluation 
of government guarantees 
95 
PPP/PFI Political or 
Institutional Issues 
Governmental strategies; Legal framework; Governmental 
marketing strategies; PPP regulation; Country political risk 
analyses 
89 
Value for Money Tests 
PSCs past projects analyses; PSCs models; Practices of ex-ante 
evaluation; VFM´s case studies evaluations; Feasibility studies; 
VFM and economic analysis; Problems of VFM analysis; VFM´s 
projects solutions; Concession price determination 
73 
Stakeholder 
Management 
Cooperative relationship; Stakeholder´s engagement and 
compliance culture; Stakeholder´s management; Stakeholder’s 
participation and influence 
41 
Contract Management 
Life-cycle project management; Critical management factors; 
Critical success factors and best practices 
28 
Accountability 
Role and effects of accounting; Accounting issue: record 
information on balance sheet; Public expenditure analysis; 
Taxation issues 
17 
Financing PPP/PFIs 
Projects 
Availability and cost of capital; Financing capacity 19 
Procurement Model 
Bidding process; Information management in tenders, Process 
improvement 
13 
Renegotiation and 
Dispute Resolution 
Drives for renegotiation; Costs of renegotiation; Equilibrium 
models in renegotiation; Dispute Resolution 
10 
Literature Review Literature Review 8 
Environmental Issues Environmental issues 5 
Contract Termination 
Project effect at the contract termination; Early contract 
termination 
2 
TOTAL  650 
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As mentioned previously in this chapter, the top 3 countries contributing to PPP 
research are UK, China and USA respectively. Figure 8 shows these countries 
number of papers per “Research Topic”. Among the topics is Contract Performance 
the most popular between the UK researchers with 32 papers, followed by 
Qualitative Cost & Benefit with 23 and Political and Institutional Issues with 19 
papers. In China, Contract Design and Risk Sharing with 20, Value for Money Tests 
with 15 and Qualitative Cost & Benefit with 12 papers. In USA cases, Value for Money 
Tests with 15, Political and Institutional Issues with 12 and Qualitative Cost & 
Benefit with 12 papers are the most published areas.  
These results also show that all 3 countries have priorized Qualitative Cost & 
Benefit´s studies. The focus of the researches has been more to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of using PPPs, in ex post empirical analysis both on the results of the 
model in terms of delviering expected outcomes, as in the succes in atracting private 
partners. The results also show that UK and USA share the preference for Political 
and Institutional Issues. This category preferency is shown thorught the 
researchers´ increasing interest in study the governmental strategies, legal 
framework and what the countries find relevant to consider in theirs PPPs´ 
regulation.  
Finally, althought Value for Money Tests not appears between the UK´s top 3 theme 
it comes in 4th with 15 papers published, that is the same number of papers 
published in China and USA.  Researchers in these 2 countries are increasingly 
concerned in investigate the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) models and its past 
projects analyses. Value for Money (VFM) it is a popular them between these 
countries´ papers that sought investigate the VFM´s analysis, their problems, case 
studies evaluations and determined concessions prices. 
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Figure 8. Number of papers per topic of United Kingdom, China and United States 
 2.3.8 Most cited papers  
In this section, the idea was to create a list of the most cited papers for “PPP” and 
“PFI” in the literature and the topics of those papers. The classification resulted in 
10 Top papers for each term depicted in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Top 10 papers in number of citations. 
Ranking Papers Authors Journals Topics 
Number of 
citations 
1 
Accountability of networked climate governance: the rise of 
transnational climate partnerships 
Backstrand, K. 
(2008) 
 
Global Environmental 
Politics 
Accountability 80 
2 
Therapy by design: evaluating the UK hospital building 
program 
Gesler, W; Bell, M; 
Curtis, S; Hubbard, P; 
Francis, S. (2004) 
Health & Place 
Stakeholder 
Management 
77 
3 
Public-private partnerships: from contested concepts to 
prevalent practice 
Bovaird, T. (2004) 
International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 
Qualitative Costs & 
Benefits 
76 
4 
Critical success factors for public-private partnerships in 
infrastructure development  
Zhang, XQ. (2005) 
Journal of Construction 
Engineering and 
Management-Asce 
Contract Management 70 
5 Building and managing facilities for public services 
Bennett, J; Iossa, E. 
(2006) 
Journal of Public 
Economics 
Contract Termination 58 
6 The private finance initiative: risk, uncertainty and the state Froud, J. (2003) 
Accounting 
Organizations and 
Society 
Contract Design and 
Risk Sharing 
54 
7 
The new public service ethos: an ethical environment for 
governance 
Brereton, M; Temple, 
M. (1999) 
Public Administration 
Stakeholder 
Management 
49 
8 The economics of the private finance initiative Grout, PA. (1997) 
Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 
Value For Money Tests 49 
9 
Preferred risk allocation in China's public-
private partnership (PPP) projects 
Ke, YJ.; Wang, SQ.; 
Chan, APC.; Lam, PTI. 
(2010) 
International Journal of 
Project Management 
Contract Design and 
risk sharing 
36 
10 
Towards a comprehensive understanding 
of public private partnerships for infrastructure development 
Kwak, YH.; Chih, Y.; 
Ibbs, CW. (2009) 
California Management 
Review 
Contract Performance 36 
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2.4 Research limitations of the literature review 
This type of literature review is not immune to criticism and it contains some 
limitations regarding: the use of Web of Science as the search tool. Although Web of 
Science is considered the world's leading citation databases, offering high level of 
accuracy and detail on a multidisciplinary scale, it does not capture the entire 
diversity of the publications. The search criteria adopted in this chapter bibliometric 
analysis also identified a number of “false positives” which requisite manual analysis 
and some papers´ exclusion. 
 
2.5 Partial conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to undertake a broad literature review of the PPP 
research. The review undertaken in this chapter uses a bibliometric analysis to 
select a sample of more than 600 papers from the Web of Science, considered the 
largest and most reliable source for academic publications. The database of PPP 
papers built is more than double the amount of the widest previous literature 
studies. Despite the slight decrease verified in 2014, the number of publications 
about PPP appears to have a tendency to growth. First, because many authors have 
now established PPPs as their primarily research area and second because the first 
generation of PPPs (early 1990s) is now reaching the end, providing valuable 
empirical evidence of successes and failures. Furthermore, the number of PPP 
projects throughout the world is increasing, with a stronger growth in developing 
economies, eager to access private financing and private expertise to modernize the 
countries’ infrastructure systems. Among the Web of Science’s classification, 
“Engineering” journals have been taking the lead in PPP research, followed by 
“Public Administration” and “Business & Economics”, illustrating the 
multidisciplinary approach to this area. In relation to the Web of Science´s “Research 
Areas” classification, it is notice that, although PPPs have been used in technical 
systems (engineering), there is a strong dimension of public governance and 
administration, and also implications from a financial/economical perspective. 
Other notable conclusion is that considering the papers´ “Research Origins” and 
  
 
26 
 
“Geographic Scope” classification, showing that the European and Asian research 
institutions had written almost 2/3 of the papers, which is approximately the same 
number of papers that had used these geographies as case studies. It would 
demonstrate that there is a tendency for research institutions to investigate projects 
on its own geographical areas. The two lists created - "Project Sectors" and 
"Research Topics" - contributed to highlight the sectors and topics with a higher 
number of papers. PPPs research has been focused on a limited set of topics, which 
together represent almost 80% of the publications. These topics are "Contract 
Performance”, “Qualitative Cost & Benefits”, “Contract Design & Risk Sharing”, 
“Political or Institutional Issues" and "Value for Money Tests". The academia has 
been particularly sharp at contributing to the aspects of contract design, risk 
sharing, analyzing the contract performance and benefits, but has devoted less 
attention to the areas of contract termination and renegotiation. The seminal works 
on PPPs were also aimed at the contract design area (an extremely relevant research 
area per se in the economics field) and in empirical evaluation studies. Given that 
some of the main problems in the use of PPP are emerging during the project’s life, 
the area of contract management, contract termination, renegotiation and even 
contract failure are very likely to grow.  
It has to be highlighted that, after observing a large number of renegotiations, 
identified in the results of this chapter 3 (PPP Units and Renegotiations), the author 
realized the need to investigate these cases more deeply, in the following chapter of 
this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
27 
 
Chapter 3. PPP Units and Governance 
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3.1 Introduction3 
There is a global need for infrastructure but Governments lack behind in raising 
sufficient public capital to meet their needs (Ahmed and Ali 2006, Bhattacharya et 
al. 2012). With the emergence of PPPs, governments were given the opportunity to 
use a model that would, at least in theory, be the fastest and cheaper to help build, 
or rebuild, their infrastructure. Unlike a traditional procurement, in which 
governments need to have public capital to leverage these projects, PPPs are 
attractive by raising private capital. In most PPP contracts, the public partner only 
has to start the payments once the private partner finishes the construction stage 
and starts operating (Istrate and Puentes 2011, Islam 2014, Boardman and 
Hellowell 2016). 
However, governments were not prepared to manage the complexity of this 
challenging procurement model compromising the projects’ performance 
(Mahalingam et al. 2011, Puentes 2012; Regan 2012, Jooste and Scott 2012, Islam 
2014). Private participation relies on borrowing large sums of capital to undertake 
these large-scale contracts. Therefore, the private sector requires a sufficient level of 
trust in the public sector capacity to manage and cope with the financial, technical 
and administrative requirements of the project (Marques and Berg, 2011).  
Much of the private sector expectation is based on the assumption that the public 
partner gathers all legal, managerial and financial conditions to successfully 
accomplish their agreements. Some governments rely on external staff from 
consultants and banks to guarantee proper management of the contract (Cruz and 
Marques 2013). Other governments decided to improve by themselves their 
managerial performance, public management teams, institutional framework, 
legislation and staff qualifications. This is usually done through PPP units. A PPP unit 
can be generically defined as an organization designed to promote and or improve 
PPPs (World Bank 2007). In addition, PPP units were developed from the need to 
form a group to guide policy development and manage projects implementation 
                                                 
3 The content of this chapter is written in the paper “PPP DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN 
LATIN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN STATE PPP UNIT”, submitted in the Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems ASCE´s journal. 
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(Dutz et al. 2006, Sanghi et al. 2007, Istrate and Puentes 2011, Puentes 2012, Regan 
2012, Islam 2014, Jooste and Scott 2012, Chou et al. 2014). 
PPP units´ real capacity of interference in PPPs success is directed linked with its 
appropriate role definition, placement in the governmental structure and political 
support (Dutz et al. 2006, Farrugia et al. 2008, Burger 2009, Istrate and Puentes 
2011, Mahalingam et al. 2011, Islam 2014, Hurk et al. 2015, Boardman and Hellowell 
2016). It is important to mention that the simple concept of success in both the 
analysis of PPP projects and/or PPP units is far from consensual. But for the purpose 
of this research, by success, in terms of PPP projects, it should be understood the “on 
time” and “on budget” delivery of the project as set in the tender documents. In terms 
of the success of the PPP unit, the definition is more blurry, but it could be stated as 
the ability to effectively implement, monitor and manage PPP projects, which is still 
a very subjective definition.  
One of the objectives of this chapter is to provide a clear theoretical background and 
a literature review on PPP units, since the existing literature in this field is still 
scarce. It is also intended to identify conclusions, conflicting evidence and/or trends 
that impact on the PPP units in different countries, and if the PPP units are essential 
to PPP projects success. The first authors to address PPP units focused on 
investigating the role, functions, characteristics, similarities and differences of the 
PPP units studied (e.g. Dutz et al 2006, Sanghi et al. 2007). Some of the main findings 
show that successful PPP projects can be achieved with the interference of 
governmental PPP units. However, PPP unit’s success is not just conditioned to the 
existence of a technically and managerial qualified staff. The second wave of authors, 
such as Farrugia et al. (2008), Mahalingam et al. (2011) and Hurk et al. (2015), were 
more interested in amplifying the discussion organizing and analyzing its PPP units´ 
data in the aspects of governance, project experiences and program results.  
The objective of this chapter is to undertake a comparative analysis of the Brazilian 
PPP units considering their: governance model, PPP infrastructure growth and PPP 
contract management. The analysis was based on publicly available information and 
on a questionnaire that has been sent to all Brazilian State PPP units. After this, a 
final sample resulted in 22 Brazilian department states´ that were analysed, of a total 
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of 27 federative units (26 states and Brasilia, the federal capital of Brazil and seat of 
government of the federal district). A summary of these sample is depicted in Table 
6. 
This provides the very first attempt to investigate State PPP units and, at the same 
time, is the largest database of PPP units used so far, considering the number of 
dedicated units from the previous studies. The chapter is organized as follows: after 
this introduction a literature review identifying all major contributions in the area 
are presented; the third section contains an overview of the Brazilian PPP program, 
followed, in the fourth section, by a presentation of the methodology and data; the 
fifth section presents the comparative analysis, focusing on the differences and 
patterns among the PPP units in 27 states, and a discussion of the main research 
limitations; finally the conclusions and main policy implications are stated. 
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Table 6: Summary of Brazilian´ PPP units 
State PPP Unit´s Nomination 
Subordinate State 
Department 
No web 
page 
PPP Unit´s 
own page 
Dept.´s 
web 
page 
Webpage 
Acre - Not identified X - - - 
Alagoas ** 
Unidade de Parcerias 
Público-Privado -UNIDADE 
DE PPP 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria de Estado do 
Planeamento, Gestão e 
Patrimônio - SEPLAG-AL) 
- - X 
http://www.seplag.al.gov.br/planejamento-e-
orcamento/parcerias-publico-privadas 
Amapá - Not identified X - - - 
Amazonas ** 
Unidade Gestora de Projetos 
Estaduais de Parceria 
Público-Privada - UGPEPPP 
Civil House Department 
(Secretaria de Estado da Casa 
Civil) 
X - - - 
Bahia ** 
Secretaria Executiva das 
Parcerias Público-Privadas 
Treasury Department 
(Secretaria da Fazenda do 
Estado da Bahia - SEFAZ-BA) 
- - X www.sefaz.ba.gov.br/administracao/ppp/index.htm 
Ceará ** 
Secretaria Executiva do 
CGPPP 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria do Planeamento e 
Gestão do Estado do Ceará - 
SEPLAG-CE) 
- - X 
www.seplag.ce.gov.br/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=1805&Itemid=1509 
Distrito 
Federal ** 
Subsecretaria de Parceria 
Público-Privada 
Treasury Department 
(Secretaria de Estado de 
Fazenda) 
- - X 
http://www.fazenda.df.gov.br/area.cfm?id_area=13
02 
Espírito Santo 
** 
Unidade PPP (Gerência do 
Programa de Parcerias 
Público-Privadas) 
Economic Development 
Department (Secretaria de 
Estado de Desenvolvimento – 
SEDES) 
- - X www.ppp.es.gov.br 
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Goiás ** 
Goiás Parcerias (Companhia 
de Investimentos e 
Parcerias do Estado de 
Goiás) 
Treasury Department 
(Secretaria de Estado da 
Fazenda) 
- X - www.goiasparcerias.com.br/ 
Maranhão - Not identified X - - - 
Mato Grosso 
MT Participacões e Projetos 
S.A. 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria de Planeamento e 
Coordenação Geral – Seplan) 
- X - www.mtpar.mt.gov.br/ 
Mato Grosso 
do Sul 
Unidade Central de 
Parcerias Público Privada 
(Escritório de Parcerias 
Estratégicas) 
Government Department 
(Secretário de Estado de 
Governo e Gestão Estratégica – 
SEGOV) 
X - - - 
Minas Gerais 
** 
Unidade PPP-MG (Unidade 
Central de Parcerias 
Público-Privadas) 
Economic Development 
Department (Secretaria de 
Estado e Desenvolvimento 
Econômico - SEDE) 
- - X www.ppp.mg.gov.br/ 
Pará - 
Economic Development 
Department (Secretaria de 
Estado de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico, Mineração e 
Energia – SEDEME) 
X - - - 
Paraíba - 
Planning Department 
(Secretária do Planeamento e 
Gestão do Estado da Paraíba – 
SEPOG) 
X - - - 
Paraná ** 
CPPP - Coordenação de 
Parcerias Públicas Privadas 
Civil House Department 
(Secretaria da Casa Civil) 
- - X 
http://www.planejamento.pr.gov.br/modules/cont
eudo/conteudo.php?conteudo=78 
Pernambuco*
* 
Unidade Operacional de 
Coordenação de Parcerias 
Público-Privadas – Unidade 
PPP 
Governance Department 
(Secretaria de Administração do 
Estado de Pernambuco – SEAD) 
X - - - 
Piauí 
Superintendência de 
Parceria e Concessões 
(SUPARC) 
Government Department 
(Secretaria de Estado do 
Governo – SEGOV) 
- - X www.ppp.pi.gov.br/pppteste/ 
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Rio de Janeiro 
** 
Unidade de PPP (Agência de 
Fomento do Estado do Rio 
de Janeiro S.A.) 
Economic Development 
Department (Secretaria de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico 
Energia Indústria e Serviços – 
SEDEIS) 
- - X 
http://www.rj.gov.br/web/sedeis/listaconteudo?ge
nerica&forward=parceriaspublicoprivadas&label=p
arceriaspublicoprivadas&search-
type=parceriaspublicoprivadas&secretaria=/sedeis 
Rio Grande do 
Norte ** 
- 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria de Planeamento e 
Finanças do Estado do Rio 
Grande do Norte) 
X - - - 
Rio Grande do 
Sul 
Unidade Executiva do 
Programa de Parcerias 
Público-Privadas 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria do Planeamento, 
Mobilidade e Desenvolvimento 
Regional – SEPLAN) 
- - X 
www.planejamento.rs.gov.br/concessoes-e-ppps-
2016-03 
Rondônia 
Gerência do Programa de 
Parcerias Público Privadas – 
GPPPP/RO 
Civil House Department 
(Secretaria da Casa Civil) 
X - - - 
Roraima - Not identified X - - - 
Santa 
Catarina 
SC Participações e Parcerias 
S.A. SCPar 
Government Department 
(Gabinete do Governador do 
Estado) 
- X - www.scpar.sc.gov.br/ 
São Paulo ** 
Unidade de Parcerias 
Público-Privadas/UPPP 
Government Department 
(Secretaria de Estado do 
Governo – SEGOV) 
- - X www.parcerias.sp.gov.br/ 
Sergipe 
Conselho Gestor do 
Programa Estadual de 
Parcerias Público-Privadas 
de Sergipe – PROPPPSE 
Planning Department 
(Secretaria de Estado do 
Planeamento Orçamento e 
Gestão – SEPLAG) 
X - - - 
Tocantins - Not identified X - - - 
Total   13 3 11  
(*) Governmental jurisdiction presented in the Brazilian Federal PPP unit; (**) States with PPP projects contracted
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3.2 Literature review on PPP units and governance 
The academic interest on PPP units has started around 10 years ago, much later than 
the beginning of research on the global subject of PPP itself. One of the reasons is the 
fact that most governments had initiated PPP programs without specialized PPP 
units. The issue of governance appeared much later, and the generalized response of 
governments was the establishment of dedicated public bodies, with variable legal 
and institutional configurations, to manage PPP projects.  A summary of the main 
body of knowledge on PPP units is presented on Table 7. 
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Table 7. Summary of recent PPP units´ academic research 
Authors Type of 
document 
Type of research Number of PPP 
units reviewed 
Research data source PPP Units geographical scope 
Dutz et al. (2006) ** Paper Qualitative 10 Not specified 
India(2x), Canada, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom and 
Australia 
Sanghi et al. (2007) 
** 
Paper Qualitative 8 
PPP units’ documentation and 
staff interviews using semi 
structured questionnaire 
Bangladesh, Jamaica, Portugal, South Africa, Republic 
of Korea, Philippines, United Kingdom and Australia 
Farrugia et al. (2008) 
** 
Working Paper Qualitative 8 
PPP units’ documentation and 
staff interviews using semi 
structured questionnaire 
Australia(2x), Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, 
United Kingdom(2x) 
Burger (2009) ** Book chapter Qualitative 1 Not specified South Africa 
Istrate and Puentes 
(2011) ** 
Report Qualitative 7 Not specified 
U.S.A. states of Virginia, California, Michigan, Oregon, 
Colorado, Georgia and Washington 
Mahalingam et al. 
(2011)** 
Paper Quantitative 3 
PPP units’ documentation and 
unstructured and semi 
structured interviews 
India(3x) 
Tserng et al. (2012)* Paper Quantitative 1 Not specified Taiwan 
Regan (2012)** Working Paper Qualitative 1 Not specified Australia 
Puentes (2012) ** Paper Qualitative 1 Not specified United States of America 
Islam (2014)** Paper Qualitative 1 Not specified Korea 
Hurk et al. (2015)* Paper Qualitative 19 
PPP unit’s documentation and 
staff interviews using semi 
structured questionnaire 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom 
Boardman and 
Hellowell (2016)* * 
Paper Qualitative 9 
PPP units’ value-for-money 
appraisal method 
Australia, British Columbia (Canada), France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Ontario (Canada) South 
Africa and United Kingdom 
*ISI Web of Science. **Google scholar. 
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Dutz et al. (2006) provided the first academic work on PPP units. This paper argues 
that PPP units were essential for governments to learn how to implement PPPs. After 
reviewing 10 national units, the authors assume that there are critical aspects to 
consider in order to achieve PPP units´ success such as correctly set their roles, 
location and capacity to manage conflicts. One year later, Sanghi et al. (2007) 
published a note, based on the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF) and The World Bank (2007) report, changing the focus from the unit's 
success to the units influence on successful PPPs. The authors identified the 
expected PPP units´ contributions to the success of PPP projects, and if so, under 
what conditions. The authors have reviewed eight national PPP units, and concluded 
that PPP units´ inappropriate placement within the government structure and poor 
political support and commitment on PPP program, can strongly affect PPPs´ 
success. Farrugia et al. (2008) applied interviews and reviewed public documents in 
order to access PPP units’ differences and similarities. The authors use a sample of 
eight international units and propose two main types of PPP unit (review bodies and 
full-service agencies) and concluded that the type of units chosen depends on the 
structure, objectives and the governments´ political environment.  
Burger (2009) research looks into the South African PPP unit’s role in the creation 
of PPPs. The authors conclude that this PPP unit is in charge of approving 
agreements and render technical assistance in PPP´s maintenance and creation. 
Nevertheless, the government departments and provinces are reserved to take the 
initiative, final management and PPP´s accountability.  
Mahalingam et al. (2011) compared the performance of three Indian PPP units 
searching for the characteristics of an “effective PPP unit”. The authors also claim 
that PPP units with administrative and specific PPP expertise are necessary but do 
not guarantee the project´s success. The authors conclude that just the involvement 
of PPP units during the project´s life-cycle, with governmental support, can ensure 
effective benefits. Istrate and Puentes (2011) analysed PPP units´ potential to 
develop infrastructure in the United States (U.S.) PPP market. The authors concluded 
that American states should establish and strengthen PPP units in order to help both 
the public and private sector to develop and successfully implement PPP projects. 
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Tserng et al. (2012) research used a theoretical model and empirical data to identify 
the national PPP unit´s role in promoting PPPs. The authors conclude that 
government credibility is essential for PPP programs success and points out that 
efficient institutions (PPP units) minimize countries resources on planning, 
developing and improvement of PPPs. Jooste and Scott (2012) looked into the 
different types of organizations formed by governments to enable and implement 
PPPs. The authors analysed three international PPP units and observed the presence 
of similar actors during the PPPs life-cycle, however presenting different 
characteristics and arrangements from project to project. Regan (2012) investigated 
PPP units´ international best practices and points out that the effectiveness of PPP 
programs can be improved with PPP units, located in the major governmental 
departments, build under a highly-skilled specialist staff, technically prepared to 
assist both public and private sides undertaking PPPs. In other research Puentes 
(2012) reaffirms the same conclusions, but for the establishment of a U.S. Federal 
dedicated PPP unit to improve the PPP process, so protecting the public interest. 
Islam (2014) investigated the Korean´s PPP program progress and PPP unit´s 
contribution. He points the government´s need for economic policy planning and 
coordination, reserving sufficient budget to undertake PPP investments. 
Additionally, to guarantee a professional and transparent decision-making process, 
PPP units´ action under the PPP law will avoid harmful political pressure. The author 
recognizes the Korean´s PPP Unit contribution to their programs’ success, reaching 
its goals on promoting both private financial interest in maximizing its financial 
return, and the country’s population expectations who also seek their social 
demands be attended. Hurk et al. (2015) used a theoretical notion of PPP-enabling 
fields to analyse the functions and roles from 19 European PPP units. The authors 
also search for the potential relation between the nationals´ institutionalized PPP 
support and their number of PPP projects implemented. Boardman & Hellowell 
(2016) presented a different approach from previous studies that had analysed the 
PPP unit´s roles, location and projects´ general performance. They chose to compare 
and evaluate nine PPP units´ documented methodologies of conducting value for 
money (VFM) appraisals. They attempt to describe the most correct way to do it and 
conclude that the public sector comparator (PSC) provides greater VFM.  
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After reviewing the previous literature, it is concluded that although the research 
field is still in a relatively poor level of development and the studies are scattered, 
two broad issues have been raised: 1. The governmental bodies, meaning, specific 
PPP units, would be essential, in order to improve the potential success of PPP; 2. 
The definitions of the role, functions, characteristics, similarities and differences of 
the PPP units studied. Most authors agreed that the interference of governmental 
PPP units can certainly help to achieve successful PPP projects. Nonetheless, the 
simple existence of a technically and managerial qualified staff in the PPP units do 
not ensure neither the PPP units nor PPPs projects success. The PPP units´ 
appropriate roles definition, placement in the governmental structure and political 
support are fundamental to achieve the desirable PPPs.  
After the literature review, the absence of studies on the Brazilian case was 
observed. This emerging country, considered as the eight´s the world economy, the 
largest and richest country in Latin America, faces the challenge of augmenting its 
infrastructures. Therefore, a study using the previous theory background listed in 
this literature review, that have analysed international PPP units´ data in the aspects 
of governance, project experiences and program results, may be justifiable. 
 
3.3 Brazilian´s PPP program review 
In Brazil the first PPP implemented was the Sa o Paulo´s State contract, “yellow 4 
metro line”, in 2004. Sa o Paulo did not have, at the time, a dedicated PPP unit or PPP 
legislation. According to the Brazilian´s federal partnership law n.° 11.079 
(President of the Republic of Brazil 2004) a PPP is defined as an administrative 
contract of concession that could be adjudicated in sponsored or administrative 
modality. The sponsored concession modality consists on the concession of public 
services or public projects in which the private partner remuneration is done by the 
payment of users’ fees complemented by public instalments (Cruz et al., 2015). In 
the administrative concession modality, the private partner´s compensation is given 
exclusively through public payments. The law also establishes a minimum of R$20 
million (about $64 million) and at least a five year period of service provision as 
prerequisites for this type of contract (President of the Republic of Brazil 2004). In 
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2012, the federal law no. 12.766 (President of the Republic of Brazil 2012) amended 
the law n.° 11.079, regarding the provision of resources in favour of the private 
partner. Currently, from the 27 federative units, 25 have published its own PPP laws 
(developed under the federal law and subordinate to it), 19 have a dedicated unit 
divided into three joint capital companies and 16 in internal department agencies. 
These state laws, as a rule, form the PPP programs, defining its principles, guidelines, 
creating the PPP management council in the state, and indicating the state 
department agencies who will chair the council, and manage the PPPs.  
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 defined the limits of their autonomy and 
determined the subjects that can be legislated, and the limits of action of the 
Executive. The different constitutional competencies of the three levels of 
governments may suggest the sectors in which PPPs should be implemented. The 
federal government is responsible for building major infrastructure projects such as: 
interstate highways, railroads, dams, international airports, power generation and 
distribution. In the health sector, it finances the public health system. In the 
educational sector the Federal Government is responsible for higher and technical 
education. In security maintains the armed forces, federal police and higher courts. 
The state governments are responsible for the building of regional transport 
infrastructure and water supply projects. They are also responsible for building and 
maintaining hospitals and high schools, as well as for the fire department and police 
services. The municipalities are responsible for sanitation projects, street lighting 
and paving, municipal highways, public spaces and urban mobility. They also build 
and maintain health posts, kindergartens, elementary schools and civil guard. 
Considering the budgets of governments, and their debt capacity, and the minimum 
threshold to establish PPP contract (above R$ 20 million), only the federal and state 
governments, their capitals, and some wealthier cities, would be able to engage PPP 
projects.  
  
3.4 Methodology and data 
The first step of the research was to decide whether all municipal, state and federal 
governments should be analysed together or separately. According to the 2010 
  
 
40 
 
Population Census (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE 2014), 
Brazil has 202.7 million inhabitants distributed among 5.570 municipalities that 
compose the 27 Federative Units. All states, the Federal District and municipalities 
are members of the Federation and have their administrations with different levels 
of autonomy. According to Radar PPP (2016), the wealthier cities are 26 
municipalities from six states (Pernambuco, Mato Grosso do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), with emphasis on the states of São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro, with 16 and five PPPs respectively, most of them being in the 
environmental sector.  
At Federal level, there is only one project in operation. Despite the fact that Federal 
government has the largest budget capacity to finance PPPs in Brazil, in 12 years of 
history the Federal unit was only able to sign one PPP called “Datacenter Complex” 
(data center of the Bank of Brazil and Caixa Econômica Bank), in 2010 (Ministry of 
Planning, Development and Management– MP 2016). 
According to Radar PPP (2016), there were 86 PPP contracts signed in Brazil. From 
these contracts, one is under federal jurisdiction, 48 under state jurisdiction and 37 
developed by municipalities. Although they represent 43 per cent of the total of PPP 
units in operation, only the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte had more than 
one PPP contract. It was also observed that 65 per cent of the other municipalities 
only signed one contract, usually on projects of solid waste and/or sanitation.  
The majority of PPP contracts were signed (56% of the total) by 13 of the 26 states 
and the Federal District. Except for one of the 13 states, all the others had two or 
more PPPs contracts (Radar PPP 2016). This may provide evidence of the state 
governments interest in this model of procurement, to decrease their public 
infrastructural needs.  
It was chosen to focus on state-level PPP units because: 1. they have the largest 
number of PPP projects; 2. most of the states have formal PPP units implemented 
and PPP laws published, that shows the governmental commitment in developing 
PPP programs; 3. the federal PPP program has only one project in operation and no 
Brazilian municipality has more than two PPPs (with exception of Belo Horizonte 
and Rio de Janeiro), which would offer a short number of PPP units to be analysed.  
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The second step of the research was to identify the states governments’ databases 
that would be adopted. The safest and fastest way to access the PPP units’ data 
would be to collect information from the governments´ website. It was decided to  
follow Farrugia et al. (2008), Mahalingam et al. (2011) and Hurk et al. (2015) 
methodologies that have also reviewed public documents and used these publicly 
available databases, with the objective of analyzing its PPP units´ data in the aspects 
of governance, project experiences and program results . All Brazilian state websites 
were consulted to identify the state department where the dedicated PPP units 
could be anchored. After the identification of all governments’ websites, a database 
was created in order to catalogue the PPP units’ information necessary to reach the 
chapter´s objective of identifying and analyse the PPP units’ experiences, 
governance and program results. The information was accurately organized 
according to the following topics: PPP unit name, sponsoring department, website 
location, uniform resource locator (URL), unit manager, number of staff members, 
contacts, PPP laws, number of PPP projects, projects title, description, grantor 
government department, project sector, type of project, type of concession, public 
calls, terms of authorization, public notices, type of modeling, bidding documents, 
public consultation, public audience, PPP contract value, contract signed data, 
concessionary, contract stage, contractual amendments and contract termination.  
To deal with potentially outdated information and create some redundancy that 
would allow identifying potential inconsistencies, a questionnaire was created, pre-
filled with the information available in their websites, and sent to each state 
department validation. This semi-structured questionnaire model was also used by 
Sanghi et al. (2007), Farrugia et al. (2008) and Hurk et al. (2015). The objective was 
to ask the states sponsoring departments, in charge of the PPPs, to check the 
information written in the survey, confirming, completing or correcting the data. 
The questionnaires (prepared in Portuguese) were sent by email. The first 
questionnaires were sent and answered between June and October 2016. In total, 
21 states responded to the questionnaires and 6 have not answered. 
The analysis of the data identified four basic situations: (i) states without PPP unit´s 
or sponsoring department´s website, absence of PPP project historic or legislation; 
(ii) states without PPP units´ or sponsoring department´s website, absence or 
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insufficient legislation and with some PPP project under study or in progress; (iii) 
states with incomplete PPP units´ or sponsoring department´s website, presence of 
legislation and with some PPP project under study or in progress; (iv) states with 
PPP units´ or sponsoring department´s website, presence of legislation and with 
some PPP project under study or in progress. The final sample resulted in 19 
dedicated PPP units, 22 sponsoring departments, 93 staff members, 25 PPP laws, 
205 PPP projects appraised, 19 different project sectors, 27 types of projects, 49 
contracts signed from 2006 to 2016, 43 contracts operating, five non-operational 
contracts, one contract termination, six states with 14 contracts amended and 48 
contractual amendments (Table 8). 
Table 8. Profile of the analysed Brazilian states´ PPP units 
Profile Number (unid.) 
Dedicated PPP units identified in Brazilian states governments 19 
Sponsoring departments identified in Brazilian states governments 22 
Staff members working in the PPP units or sponsoring departments 93 
Published PPP laws 25 
PPPs projects one day appraised  205 
PPP project sectors  19 
Types of PPP projects  27 
States with PPPs contracts signed from 2006 to 2016  13 
States PPPs contracts signed from 2006 to 2016  49 
PPP contracts operating  43 
Non-operational PPP contracts  05 
PPP contracts amended 14 
PPP contractual amendments 48 
PPP contract termination 01 
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The comparative analysis looks at three main dimensions: governance model, PPP 
infrastructure growth and PPP contract management. It starts analyzing the PPP 
units´ governance, considering: the sponsoring departments at which they were 
subordinated; the website information publicly available; the number of staff 
members; the PPP units´ transparency level; and the PPP´s laws approved per state.  
Next, it was analysed the PPP infrastructure development, considering: the 
identified projects (appraised, in operation, non-operational and terminated) per 
state; the project sectors they belong; and the type of projects and type of 
concessions (administrative or sponsored).  
In the sequence, it was analysed the PPP programs results, considering: the 
publications of the projects unsolicited proposals (USP) or expression of interest 
(EOI); the biddings and contracts signed; and the number of PPPs per stage. Finally, 
the analysis presents the states with contracts amended, respective contractual 
amendments, and contract termination.  
 
3.5 Comparative Analysis  
3.5.1 PPP unit governance 
3.5.1.1 Sponsoring departments 
The sponsoring departments are the states´ departments that traditionally perform 
the central role in the regulation and development of PPPs, and where the PPP units 
usually were created and located (Hurk et al. 2015). In the Brazilian states, the 
sponsoring departments´ mandates are four years and their capacities and 
competences, as well as the field of action, are described in the respective state PPP 
laws. The results show that from the 22 sponsoring departments identified, the 
planning department (the department responsible for promoting and coordinate 
the planning and management of the state, contributing to the integration and 
effectiveness of public policies) stands out at the top list with seven states (Figure 
9). Economic development departments and government departments appear in 
second with four states and chief of staff department and treasury department in 
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third each one with three. These outcomes evidence the multidisciplinary nature of 
sponsoring departments areas, involving typically departments in charge of 
planning costing and investment expenditures (e.g., planning department, economic 
development department and treasury department) or departments under direct 
command of the state governor (e.g., government department, chief of staff 
department and administration department).  
 
 
Figure 9. Number of sponsoring departments responsible for PPP units 
3.5.1.2 Staff 
The staff members are usually the states´ government employees in charge of 
implementation, development and/or PPPs´ project governance. Hurk et al. (2015) 
have also addressed PPP units´ size classifying in ranges instead of an exact number 
of staff members. They used this methodology in order to form a score to link the 
PPP units with PPP activity in the analysed countries. Due to the limited information 
provided by the Brazilian´s departments, future research may draw other 
complementary data to measure the appropriate number of members to efficiently 
manage a PPP unit, rather than the number of projects implemented. The 
experience, education and capability of these staff members may be some of these 
aspects to be studied and compared. From the 19 states that made the information 
available, Piauí stands out at the top of the list with 12 members. Distrito Federal 
and Goiás appear in second, with nine members, followed by Mato Grosso and Santa 
Catarina, with eight members. Minas Gerais is in the fourth place, with seven 
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members and Bahia in the sixth, with four members. The average number of 
members per PPP unit is around five. Table 9 contains the number of staff members 
per PPP unit. 
Table 9. Number of staff members per PPP unit 
State Number of members 
Piauí 12 
Distrito Federal 9 
Goiás 9 
Mato Grosso 8 
Santa Catarina 8 
Minas Gerais 7 
Mato Grosso do Sul 5 
Rio Grande do Sul 5 
Rondônia 5 
Bahia 4 
Paraná 4 
Pernambuco 4 
Rio de Janeiro 3 
Sergipe 3 
Amazonas 2 
Ceará 2 
Espírito Santo 2 
Alagoas 1 
Roraima 0 
Acre; Amapá; Maranhão; Pará; Paraíba; Rio 
Grande do Norte; São Paulo; Tocantins 
* 
Total 93 
Average number of team members reported 4.9 
*Number not informed by the State 
 
 
3.5.1.3 Number of PPP laws  
In Brazil, the publication of the state’s PPP law has been the first step to implement 
its state´s PPP program. Although the mere publication of a state´s PPP laws does 
not ensure that the government obtains successful projects or programs, but the 
publication of these laws may serve to measure a PPP unit maturity level.  
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Regarding the number of state’s PPP laws approved annually, in the period from 
2003 to 2005, there was a growing number of laws being published, up to 10, as a 
result of the increasing interest that state governments had in adopting this 
procurement model. The second wave of 10 publications came from 2006 to 2009. 
In 2010 none of the states published PPP laws. The last wave of five laws published 
came from 2011 and 2012. From 2013 till 2016 only two remaining states (Acre and 
Roraima) still have not published PPP laws.  
This scenario may demonstrate that almost all state governments in Brazil had 
interest in PPP procurement and that the engagement of the last two states should 
be a matter of time, depending mostly on the next state governors´ strategic views 
(Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Number of PPP laws approved per year 
3.5.1.4 Transparency 
Among the 27 federative units analysed in this chapter, 13 have no website to 
provide information about their PPP programs. Only three have their own website, 
independent from the sponsoring departments´ website. It was also noticed that 
these three PPP units are joint capital companies, created by the state governments 
to promote investments in the State through the feasibility and operationalization 
of PPPs. The other 11 PPP units provide information from a sponsoring department 
website´s link. The results also show that, from the 13 states that have PPP contracts 
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signed, three states (Amazonas, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte) have no 
websites available, addressing these states PPPs information (Appendix S3). This 
may be evidence that half of Brazilians’ governments still have to invest in public 
transparency, not only internally among its partners but also in the dissemination 
of these contracts to the population, through the Internet. Although the 
implementation of a PPP unit´s website is an important step towards a government's 
information transparency policy, its full success will depend directly on the 
relevance, reliability, level of detail, updating, quality and ease access to information 
available to citizens.   
Table 10 presents the type of information available on the PPP units´ websites. This 
table classifies the PPP units´ transparency level according to the amount of 
information available. The classification ranges from high, medium, low and very 
low. The transparency level was evaluated by gathering the states that have the 
same characteristics, such as if a website is implemented, legislation published, 
projects contracted (or under evaluation) rating them according to the available 
amount of this information. This is a similar approach to Hurk (2015) that also 
classified 19 PPP units in: “total score of PPP-supporting unit” versus the “degree of 
PPP activity”. This method intended to link the PPP units with PPP activity data. The 
results show that from the six units with the highest degree of transparency (Bahia, 
Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, Piauí and São Paulo), São Paulo, Minas 
Gerais and Bahia are the states with the greater number of contracts in operation 
respectively. These units have already implemented PPP projects and tend to have 
more information available on their websites, thanks to the greater experience, 
administrative capacity and staff experience. On the other hand, the states of Piauí 
and Mato Grosso do not have yet contracts in operation. Despite that, they have been 
cited thanks to their recent work on 13 projects in the process of contracting, and 
their efforts to disseminate the development of their PPP´s programs and the 
structuring and scheduling of their projects. Another finding is that the Rio Grande 
do Sul and Santa Catarina are the only ones, from the eight Medium level states, 
classified, that still have not signed PPP contracts. A final remark is that all 13 states 
considered low and very-low transparency level, representing almost half number 
of the Brazilian states, have no website with PPP information available and 11 out 
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of these 13 states are in the country´s regions with the lowest Gross domestic 
product (GDP) in Brazil: six in the North and five in the Northeast. Surely it is the 
first attempt to measure the Brazilian´s PPP units’ transparency using the database 
available, but to increase the conclusions accuracy, future researches may develop 
other mechanisms rather than measure the public access to information. 
Table 10. Type of information available in the PPP unit’s websites 
Available Information States 
PPP units´ 
transparency 
level 
Number of 
States 
There was a detailed website, available 
legislation and projects contracted or 
under evaluation 
Bahia, Espírito Santo, 
Mato Gross, Minas Gerais, 
Piauí, São Paulo. 
High 6 
There was a website with scarce 
information, available legislation and 
projects contracted or under evaluation 
Alagoas, Ceará, Distrito 
Federal, Goiás, Paraná, Rio 
de Janeiro, Rio Grande do 
Sul, Santa Catarina. 
Medium 8 
There was no website, or it is not 
available. None or insufficient legislation 
and there is some project contracted or 
under evaluation 
Amazonas, Mato Grosso 
do Sul, Pará, Paraíba, 
Pernambuco, Rio Grande 
do Norte, Rondonia, 
Sergipe. 
Low 8 
There was no website, or it is not 
available. None legislation and neither 
project contracted or under evaluation 
Acre, Amapá, Maranhão, 
Roraima, Tocantins. 
Very low 5 
TOTAL -  27 
 
3.5.2 PPP infrastructure growth 
3.5.2.1 Number of PPP projects identified per state  
All projects identified by this research were classified into four categories: i) 
projects appraised, ii) contracted and in operation, iii) contracted and abandoned 
projects and iv) contracts termination. The idea was to present the relation between 
the projects (per state) that have been appraised against the ones who reach the 
stage of being contracted, currently in operation or not (Figure 11). All of these 
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projects are being part of a sample of 205 PPP projects appraised and identified in 
this research (Appendix S3). The finding shows that 49 projects were effectively 
contracted, being 43 of these contracts currently in operation, five were abandoned 
and one contract terminated. The states that have implemented more contracts 
were São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia and Pernambuco, with eleven, ten, six and three 
in operation, respectively. They are followed by the states of Ceará, Amazonas, 
Distrito Federal, Alagoas and Espírito Santo with two contracts each one. Finishing 
the list, the states of Paraná, Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Norte with one 
contract each one. The five contracted and abandoned projects were finished all 
procurement process, but the state governments decided to do not implement them. 
These projects were identified in the states of Ceará with two (Vapt-Vupt and the 
Cable-stayed bridge over the Cocó River), Amazonas with one (Penitentiary 
Complex), Distrito Federal with one (Integrated Management Center) and Goiás 
with one (Goiania Light Rail – Anhanguera). The Integrated Center of resocialization 
of Itaitinga is a PPP contracted by the state of Pernambuco on October 9, 2009, and 
it was declared terminated by expiry reasons in 16 of March of 2016. 
 
Figure 11. Number of projects per stage and state 
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3.5.2.2 Projects sectors 
In this section, the projects contracted and appraised were ranked according to the 
projects´ primary sectors. Figure 12 contains a ranking of the 49 contracted projects, 
divided into seven sectors classifications: transportation, environment, health, 
administration, sports, security, housing and urban development. The results show 
that the top-three sectors are transportation, environment and health with thirteen, 
ten and eight contracts, respectively. As supposed, the number of projects appraised 
is much larger them those that have been contracted, and in the sectors with more 
projects appraised are usually those that have the largest number of contracts 
signed. Over the last 10 years, Brazilian state governments have been investing 
significantly in subways, roads, light rails, sewage and water supply systems, 
hospitals and health centers, which have justified the private partnership and 
interest for this market share. The transportation and the care with the citizens’ 
health were also the first sectors experiences on PPP contracts (Neto et al. 2016). 
The results also depict that the administration and sports sectors together have 
contracted 12 projects, 1 project less than the ranking´s sector leader (transports) 
and 2 projects more than the second (environmental). Projects such as 
administrative centers and citizen services (administrative sector) represent six of 
the 49 contracts signed. In the case of the sports sector, the advent of the 2014 
International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup in Brazil 
motivated the contracting of six stadiums.  
 
Figure 12. Projects contracted or appraised by sector 
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3.5.2.3 Type of projects 
Figure 13 presents the 49 projects contracted and analysed in this chapter divided 
into 14 types of projects: hospitals with seven, followed by sewage systems and 
stadiums with six each one, and citizens services centers and subways with five each 
one. These five top types of projects belong to the top five projects sectors 
(mentioned earlier) of transportation, environment, health, administration and 
sports, but not necessarily in this order. Individually, hospitals and sewage systems 
lead the states attention to increase the supply of public health conditions in Brazil. 
Ratifying what was mentioned earlier, “stadiums” appears as the third most 
contracted project thanks to the advent of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. The 
fourth and fifth most contracted projects belong to the administration and transport 
sectors. Confirming the trend shown in the previous item (top projects sectors) the 
number of projects appraised is always much larger them those that have been 
contracted, but it is not observed that the sectors with more projects appraised are 
those that have the largest number of contracts signed. 
 
Figure 13. Projects contracted and appraised for type of project 
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3.5.2.4 Type of concession 
As mentioned earlier, in Brazil the PPP projects are classified into two types: 
administrative or sponsored concessions. From the 205 projects appraised in this 
chapter 89 were identified (in the websites or in the questionnaires) as 
administrative and 28 as sponsored concessions (Figure 14). Regarding the number 
of contracted projects concessions, 37 were administrative and 12 sponsored 
concessions. The sponsored concessions are four subways, four roads, two light 
rails, one airport and one bridge, all of them from the transportation sector 
demanded and sponsored by the users.  
 
Figure 14. Number of projects per type of concession 
3.5.2.5 Procurement process 
Among the 205 projects appraised presented in this chpater, there was no 
information available (in the PPP units’ website or in the answered questionnaire) 
for all of them, being only 18 projects with USP and 66 projects with EOI information 
available. Even between the projects contracted the information not covers all the 
49 projects, only a total of 30 projects were classified as USP or EOI (Appendix S3). 
The same absence of information was detected for the documentation of the projects 
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regarding the projects contracted, all 49 projects information were available. All 
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PPP contracts signed per year, in 2006, three projects progress from five bidding 
becoming contracts signed. In 2007 no bidding documents were published and only 
one contract was signed. In the period from 2008 to 2010, there were a growing 
number of contracts being signed, up to 12 in this period. In 2011 only one bidding 
document was published and one contract was signed. The biggest wave of contracts 
signed happened from 2012 to 2014, with 27 contracts signed. In 2015 no bidding 
documents were published, and the contract signed dropped to five. Until December 
of 2016, no projects achieved the bidding process or became a contract signed, as a 
result of the political and economic crises established in the country at that time. 
The state's elections in Brazil happen every four years. As mentioned before, the 
years 2007, 2011 and 2015 exhibit the lower number of tenders and contracts 
signed, coinciding exactly with the first year of the new state´s governments. In the 
opposite way, the last year of political mandates typically have the biggest number 
of contracts signed, 2006 with three, 2010 with seven and 2014 with 14, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 15. Number of biddings documents published and contracts signed per 
year 
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bidding, contract signed, contract running and contract termination. A ranking was 
made to evidence the 205 projects appraised (Figure 16). The results show that 66 
projects achieve the EOI stage. The results also show that from the 57 projects 
appraised, 43 are contracts running and 18 USP were authorized, since 2006. In 
terms of PPP project´s life-cycle, it is observed that 41 per cent of the projects 
examined are in the proposal stage (66 projects on EOI and 18 on USP), 28 per cent 
are currently being appraised (57 projects), and 21 per cent are being operated. 
Thenceforth, the other stages together represent less than 10 per cent of the projects 
identified. They are nine projects under public consultation, six bidding processes, 
five contracts signed (waiting to start) and one contracted terminated as the last 
stage. 
 
Figure 16. Number of projects per PPP stage 
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66
57
43
18
9
6 5
1
  
 
55 
 
were: Minas Gerais, Bahia, São Paulo, Amazonas, Paraná and Rio de Janeiro. The 
results show that the three leading states were Bahia, Minas Gerais and São Paulo 
with five, four and two contract amendments, respectively. The same three states 
lead the number of contractual amendments, but the order changes to Minas Gerais, 
Bahia and São Paulo with eighteen, seventeen and seven amendments, respectively. 
The other states have one contract amendment each one with Amazonas leading 
these group with three contractual amendments. Considering the number of 
projects contracted, the state of Rio de Janeiro and Paraná leads with 100 per cent 
of the contracts amended, followed by Bahia with 80 per cent. The lowest proportion 
was in the states of Minas Gerais, Amazonas and São Paulo, with 40 per cent, 33 per 
cent and 18 per cent, respectively. These results may indicate poorly written 
contracts, inappropriate risk allocation, and other managerial or political issues that 
should be deeply investigated in future researches, with a more detailed database. 
As expected, the three state governments that have more investments in PPP 
projects, had the highest number of contracts amendment and contractual 
amendments. However, over these evident PPP Brazilian states, the proportion of 
the number of contracts amended against the projects contracted by the states of 
Minas Gerais and São Paulo is more modest than Bahia, or even the other poorer 
states cited in figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Number of contracts amended and contractual amendments per state  
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3.6 Research limitations of the PPP units and governance 
The type of comparative analysis undertook in this chapter is not immune to 
criticism and it contains some limitations. First, this research sample is limited to 
the Brazilian state government´s level. The federal PPP unit had only one PPP 
contract in operation and the majority of Brazilian´s municipalities operate only one 
PPP in the environmental area, which may demonstrate not enough scale to 
implement a PPP unit. The information from other international experiences was 
limited to the content of previous works analysed in the bibliographic review, and it 
was not possible to draw direct comparisons between other PPP programs around 
the world.  
Secondly, the results were limited by the absence of the questionnaire´s answers 
from some state PPP units or sponsoring departments. Another limitation in this 
research is regarding the PPP units´ websites research and questionnaires applied. 
Sometimes inexperienced teams, or disqualified staff responsible for completing the 
questionnaires, allowed questions not to be answered correctly. There was also the 
problem of non-uniformity of the sponsoring departments. In Brazil, each state has 
its own PPP legislation, based on the PPP national law, but empowering different 
departments in each state. The PPP Brazilian´s state councils are chaired by the 
sponsoring departments. Therefore, a state planning department has a management 
structure and posture to generate PPP units different from other sponsoring 
departments of government, chief of staff or treasury, for example.  
Finally, due to the limited time and databases raised, it was not considered the 
impacts of regional influences such as local government, local economy, enterprise, 
education or natural resources, creating opportunities to further academic research 
that may be done to complement and develop this theme.  
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3.7 Results discussion and partial conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to analyse the Brazilian state PPP units and 
programs’ development. The research presents unique information available from 
the Brazilian state PPP projects appraised and all projects contracted. This analysis 
allows identifying the main gaps and opportunities in the Brazilian states' programs, 
highlighting the main opportunities for future research in this unexplored field.  
Despite the multidisciplinary nature of the top six sponsoring department’s areas, 
all these departments are invariably responsible for the state budgeting and/or for 
the government’s strategic decisions. This may indicate that politicians like to have 
PPP contracts in places of their trust and control of accounts. However, the 
competencies of certain departments to oversee the main PPP processes, or for 
reasons of administrative efficiency, should also be considered in future studies. In 
the PPP life-cycle, the promoting department’s role is mainly to present their 
projects demands to the government (that evaluates which procurement model is 
more adapted for the project) and assist the sponsoring department (or PPP unit) 
with project´s technical information required. In relation to the states PPP units´ 
content location on the internet, it is noticed that only half of the Brazilian states 
have PPP information available on the web, and three of 13 states with contracted 
PPPs have no websites addressing the PPPs information. This may demonstrate that, 
although most governments that already have signed PPP contracts are a concern 
with the need of making this information available. The next step to an effective 
transparency policy depends on its level of detail, reliability, relevance, updating 
and easy access to the population. Another conclusion is that the number of projects 
contracted is not necessarily proportional to the number of staff members per PPP 
units. The PPP units with the largest number of members have not so many projects 
contracted as PPP units with half number of members, which may demonstrate a 
tendency that more condensed teams are more skilled and efficient. However, future 
research analyzing aspects such the composition, organization, training, and 
capacity of these staff members may indicate more accurately the number of 
members to efficiently manage a PPP unit, rather than the number of projects 
implemented. The PPP units´ transparency level list created, contribute to 
highlighting the states with high, medium, low or very low level of information 
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available on the website, legislation, projects contracts or under evaluation. All 
states that already contracted projects have their PPP units classified in high, 
medium and low level. The three states that have more contracted projects also 
appear in the PPP units´ with high-level transparency. Thanks to greater team 
experience and administrative capacity, these units tend to have more information 
available on their websites. The other PPP units have devoted less attention to the 
quality of the information available, being classified as medium or low-level 
transparency. At the end of the list, five states PPP units´ have been considered with 
very-low transparency level, and two states of them (Acre and Roraima) prove their 
lack of interest being the only Brazilian states that have never published a PPP law. 
Another conclusion is that one in every four projects appraised became contracts 
signed, 10 per cent of these contracts signed are non-operational, and only one 
contract was terminated. It demonstrates that, although the proportion of project 
appraised that eventually became contracts is considerable, there are still cases 
where these appraisals did not prevent cases of non-operation or even termination 
of the contract. The sectors that have the highest instances of non-operation and 
termination are the transport with 40 per cent of the cases, and the security sector 
that has one non-operational project and also have the only Brazilian project 
terminated. Most of the PPPs implemented in the Brazilian states were projects in 
the sectors of transport and human health care, thus demonstrating the initiative of 
the public sector to meet this social and economic demand, as well as a private sector 
attraction for this market share. The temporary event of PPPs in the sports sectors 
is explained by the advent of the World Cup and the Olympic Games in Brazil (in 
2014 and 2016, respectively). One-fourth of the 49 PPP projects contracted are from 
the transportation sector, all very costly concessions that require additional 
sponsorship from the citizens. This analysis also allowed identifying the period of 
governments´ administration that is more or less willing to sign PPP contracts. 
Governments have been particularly biased to sign contracts in the last year of 
government and having the opposite tendency in the first year of government. It 
may demonstrate that the PPPs take a considerable time to be implemented and also 
that new governments do not appear to fill comfortable to bid and sign PPP 
contracts not generated in their administrations. Finally, this analysis also exposed 
the connection between the PPP units and the PPP contracts performance. The 
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insights come for instance from the information of the states that have contracts 
amended. The three states with the highest number of contracts amended and 
contractual amendments are the ones that have the most experimented PPP units 
and the most numerous numbers of PPPs contracted. This is a major gap for 
governments that are now being challenged to understand what is going wrong with 
its PPP units and projects performance, and also the private sector that is facing 
difficulties in complying the premises of terms and prices signed in the PPPs 
contracts. The future research on PPP units and PPP projects performance should 
address these issues engage new data also from the federal and municipal 
administrative sphere.  
So, it can be concluded that Brazilian PPP units still have to significantly improve 
PPP public transparency; in Brazil, until now a reduced number of PPP projects is 
implemented; when a new government is elected officials tend to avoid 
implementing PPP projects that have not been initiated in their mandates; and the 
number of renegotiations during PPP contracts is extremely high. 
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Chapter 4. Overview of Brazilian 
Renegotiations 
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4.1 Introduction4 
The use of public–private partnerships (PPPs) has been growing in developing 
countries as a procurement tool, which is used to fill the gap of infrastructure 
delivery and the shortage of public financing to cope with investment requirements 
(Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016). Even in developed economies, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia, governments have used PPPs to 
leverage private capital and to upgrade and maintain their infrastructure assets 
(Hodge, Greve, & Boardman, 2017). In this chapter, it is intended to look on a 
particular topic of PPP renegotiations, under a specific context: the Latin American 
and the Brazilian experience. In this chapter, it is looked at the motives and 
consequences of renegotiations from the Latin American experience, using the case 
of PPPs in Brazil, providing a unique analysis of this case. Brazil is the largest 
economy in Latin America and has been developing an ambitious program of PPP 
projects. It is reviewed 27 projects, with a total of 84 renegotiation events, covering 
sectors such as transport, environment, sports, health, security, and housing. Our 
study intends to understand the main motives of such renegotiations and to try to 
understand potential patterns related to the type of project, nature of shareholder, 
state, sector, or risk allocation, among other aspects. 
Although several definitions exist for PPPs, for the purpose of this chapter, it will be 
used the general definition of a partnership (contractual or institutional) between 
the public and private sectors for building, financing, managing, and operating a 
certain infrastructure, which is typically developed in the following sectors (among 
others): transport, environment, health, energy, and security (Iossa & Martimort, 
2015). Therefore, it is used the general PPP definition of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development: “. . . an agreement between the 
government and one or more private partners (which may include the operators and 
the financers) according to which the private partners deliver the service in such a 
manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the 
                                                 
4 The content of this chapter was published in the paper “Understanding the patterns of PPP 
renegotiations for infrastructure projects in Latin America: The case of Brazil”, Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries 1(26). 
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profit objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment 
depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners.” (2008, p. 17)  
There are several reasons that justify the attractiveness of this procurement model, 
such as mitigating the fiscal constraints allowing for a reduction of the infrastructure 
gap; increase public sector efficiency, providing more value for money; transferring 
risks to the private sector; and allowing public sector to focus on strategy rather 
than operational management and the advantage of contract bundling—a single 
contract with one entity. But two provide the fundamental basis: (i) the ability to 
raise private capital to finance infrastructure development and overcome the 
difficulties of governments to meet the financing requirements (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002, 2005) and (ii) the potential efficiency gains leveraged on the higher level of 
know-how, expertise, and managerial capacity of the private sector (Cruz & 
Sarmento, 2017; Meda, 2007). This trend toward the transfer of traditionally core 
Government functions to the private sector, particularly in economically based 
public services, can be framed within the New Approach to Public Administration 
(see more in Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014).  
Nonetheless, the use of PPPs has also involved a significant level of criticism. Among 
the pitfalls (lack of value for money, affordability, accountability, and the efficiency 
of the use of public resources, among others, see Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2014, for a list of such pitfalls), one is often cited in the literature as being one of the 
largest problems with the use of PPPs—renegotiation (Cruz & Marques, 2013a; 
Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2003; Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 2017). It is used 
the definition of Guasch (2004) that a renegotiation of PPP contracts involves a 
change in the original contractual terms and conditions, as opposed to an 
adjustment that takes place under a mechanism defined in the contract. 
In the case of contractual PPPs, which are the most widely used models, the 
partnership is structured through a contractual agreement that establishes the 
remuneration level, level and quality of service, and the obligations and rights of 
both parties, just to mention the main elements. This contractual agreement is 
supported by several assumptions in terms of revenue and cost forecast, and 
investment levels, thus providing an estimated return for investors. Renegotiations 
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occur in the event of certain changes or new circumstances that might affect that 
level of return, or when Government decides to change project features, or is unable 
to fulfill its obligations, or whether the expected demand/consumption is below a 
predetermined level, or the market conditions change, and so on (Estache, Guasch, 
& Trujillo, 2003). The literature has provided some evidence of the consequences, 
motives, and results of these renegotiations in Latin America (Estache et al., 2003; 
Estache, Guasch, Iimi, & Trujillo, 2009; Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2006, 2007, 2008; 
Guasch & Straub, 2009), Chile (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009), Portugal (Cruz & 
Marques, 2013a, 2013b; Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 2017), France (Athias & 
Saussier, 2018; Chong, Huet, & Saussier, 2006; Squeren & Moore, 2015), and 
Germany (Lohmann & Rotzel, 2014). 
Results from our study show that the Brazilian experience in renegotiating PPPs is 
similar to the Latin American experience provided by the literature. There is some 
evidence (albeit weak) that electoral cycles may impact the occurrence of 
renegotiations. Also, the likelihood of renegotiation is affected by the allocation of 
the demand risk. When allocated to the private sector, it increases the probability of 
a renegotiation event. Also, the presence of the left-wing political party in power 
tends to increase the likelihood of renegotiations. This chapter contribution is the 
following: As the literature on PPP renegotiation has been using mainly, for data set 
purpose, the Latin American experience, this chapter complements the previous 
work done, by looking into the Brazilian experience. Also, the Latin American 
experience was focused on concessions awarded during the 80s and the 90s. Our 
chapter evolves for PPPs (and not concessions) and more recent contracts. The fact 
that our sample is composed by contracts signed in the last decade should provide 
evidence if the lessons from previous concession renegotiations described in the 
literature were used to improve the legal, institutional, and contractual framework. 
Evidence shows that the main triggers for renegotiations described in the literature 
are still responsible for most of the renegotiation events. Finally, as far to our 
knowledge, the Brazilian experience of PPP renegotiation has not been analysed 
before. In this chapter is covered several network industries (roads, water, and 
wastewater), along with nonnetwork industries (prisons, health, and sports). Also, 
it combines economic and policy approaches. 
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This chapter is organized as follow: after this introduction a brief review of the 
literature on PPPs and renegotiations. Methodology and data are presented in the 
third section, with results and discussion in fourth section. The fifth section presents 
the policy implications and the last section concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Literature Review of PPPs and renegotiations 
Research on PPP renegotiations is increasing significantly. Not only is the number 
of existing PPP projects is growing worldwide, but there are also more data on the 
execution of existing contracts. Research on PPP renegotiation has been mainly 
focused on the Latin American experience and Europe. In this section, it is provided 
a brief review of the theoretical ground of renegotiations in the context of PPPs and, 
afterward, for the specific context of PPPs in Latin America.  
Renegotiations are essentially a problem of contract incompleteness (Hart & Moore, 
1988, 1999). Contract theory supports the argument that no contract can be 
considered as a complete contract. A complete contract is the ability to address any 
possible contingency or if an unforeseen event is perceived as being impossible, or, 
at least with prohibitive transactions costs (Hart, 1988). This leads to the question 
of the likelihood of events occurring and changes the scope or definition of contracts. 
This likelihood is perceived to be affected by exogenous determinants, which is the 
context where the contract is established (e.g. political, social, economic, cultural, 
regulatory, etc.) and is endogenous (the project itself, such as scale of investments, 
changes in the market, in technology, users’ preferences, etc.) (Cruz & Marques, 
2013a; Sumkoski, 2016). 
A description of the main body of knowledge on PPP renegotiation’s academic 
research is presented in Table 11.
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Table 11. Synthesis of renegotiations’ academic research 
Authors Topic Type Approach 
Sample 
size 
No. of 
Contracts 
Renegotiated 
Period of 
analysis 
Sector Geographical scope 
Guasch et al. (2003) 
Regulation model; policy 
implications and exogenous 
determinants 
Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
954 (b) 307 
1989-
2000 
Transport and water 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico 
Estache et al. (2003) Price caps, efficiency and payoffs Qualitative Empirical 
954 (a) 
(b) 
- 
1989-
2000 
Telecommunications, 
energy, transport and 
water 
Latin American and 
Caribbean Countries 
 
Guasch et al. (2006) Government-led renegotiation Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
954 (b) 
(e) 
307 
1982-
2000 
Telecommunications, 
energy, transport and 
water 
Latin American and 
Caribbean Countries 
 
Guasch et al. (2006) Regulation model Quantitative Theoretical - - - - - 
Ho (2006) 
Policy implications; model for 
financial renegotiations 
Quantitative Theoretical -  - - - 
Engel et al. (2006) 
Renegotiation and infrastructure 
spending 
Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
16 12 
1998-
2002 
Transport Chile 
Guasch et al. (2008) Determinants of renegotiation Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
954 (b) 307 
1989-
2000 
Transport and water 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico 
Guasch and Straub 
(2009) 
Corruption Quantitative Empirical 954 (b) 307 
1989-
2000 
Transport and water 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico 
Estache et al. (2009) 
Multi-criteria auctions probability 
of renegotiations 
Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
96 - 
1989-
2000 
Transport Latin American 
Engel et al. (2009) Soft-budgets Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 50 
1993-
2006 
Transport, security, 
environment and others 
Chile 
De Brux (2010) Cooperative renegotiation Qualitative Empirical - 2 - Transport 
Kingdom of Cambodia and 
other not identified 
Cruz and Marques 
(2013a) 
Endogenous determinants Qualitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 01 2005 Transport Portugal 
Cruz and Marques 
(2013b) 
Exogenous determinants Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 87 
1984-
2008 
Transportation, roads, 
rails, ports, health, water 
and energy 
Portugal 
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Xiong and Zhang 
(2014) 
Model for financial renegotiations Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 01 - Transport Hypothetical 
Lohmann and Rötzel 
(2014) 
Opportunistic Behavior Quantitative Empirical - 108 - Security Germany 
Zhang and Xiong 
(2015) 
Determinants of renegotiation; 
endogenous determinant and 
opportunistic Behavior 
Qualitative Empirical - 8 (c) - 
Highways, airports, power 
plants, and water supply 
and drainage facilities 
United Kingdom, the USA, 
Argentina, Mexico, 
Cambodia and China 
 
Domingues and 
Zlatkovic (2015) 
Endogenous determinants Qualitative Empirical - 9 - Transport 
Portugal (04), Spain (02), 
Greece, Cyprus and 
Netherlands 
Macário et al. (2015) Analysis of best practices Qualitative Empirical - 1 - Transport Portugal 
Squeren and Moore 
(2015) 
Local elections impacts Quantitative Empirical - 1 
1968-
2008 
Transport France 
Xiong and Zhang 
(2016a) 
Price caps, efficiency and payoffs; 
soft budgets; endogenous and real 
option value renegotiation 
Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 1 - Transport Hypothetical 
Sarmento and 
Renneboog (2016) 
Endogenous determinants Qualitative Empirical - 2 - Transport Portugal 
Domingues and 
Sarmento (2016) 
Exogenous determinants and 
triggers of renegotiations 
Quantitative Empirical - 32 (d) - Road and railway 
13 European countries 
 
Sarmento and 
Renneboog (2017) 
Exogenous determinants and 
triggers of renegotiations 
Quantitative 
Theoretical 
and 
Empirical 
- 35 
1995-
2015 
Roads, railway, ports, 
health, security 
Portugal 
 
(a) This paper uses the Guasch et al. (2003) general data base. 
(b) Data base developed by the World Bank. 
(c) Four are early-termination contracts 
(d) Data base developed by the COST Publications. 
(e) This paper uses the Guasch (2004) data base. 
- Not available
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Applied research in the field of renegotiations with the use of real empirical data 
started in 2003, with the initial paper of Guasch, Laffont, and Straub (2003), where 
almost 1000 concessions were analysed. In this article, the authors found that the 
regulatory framework (existence or not of a sector regulator) and political cycles 
are factors that have a direct influence on the likelihood of a renegotiation. This was 
later expanded by Estache, Guasch, and Trujillo (2003), Guasch, Laffont, and Straub 
(2006), Guasch, Laffont, and Straub (2008), Guasch and Straub (2009), and Estache, 
Guasch, Iimi, and Trujillo (2009). Most of this research was aimed at understanding 
what the main determinants of renegotiation were. The authors intended to identify 
the variables that had the strongest impact on the probability of a certain concession 
being renegotiated. These articles take advantage of this previous Latin American 
data to investigate and approach unpublished renegotiation topics, respectively: 
efficiency and payoffs, government-led renegotiations, determinants of 
renegotiation, corruption, and so on.  
The conclusions of this empirical body of knowledge have been fairly consistent. 
First, there is a strong evidence that the majority of PPP contracts tend to be 
renegotiated. Second, these renegotiations typically happen within the first years of 
contract, often still during the construction phase. Third, the main motives for these 
renegotiations were related to Government actions, either an explicit political 
change of the project or to compensate for insufficient and poor initial planning. 
However, most of the literature also presents the excessive optimism bias regarding 
revenue forecasts as being a relevant cause for renegotiations. This can happen 
because the government was too optimistic with the initial forecast (Roumboutsos 
& Pantelias, 2015) or because the private sector strategically overestimated the 
demand to win the contract (Liu, Gao, Cheah, & Luo, 2017). This phenomenon is 
known in the literature as ‘‘winner’s curse’’ (Iossa, 2015). 
Apart from this empirical-based research, other studies have followed a theoretical 
approach, developing conceptual models for assessing the behavior of the parties 
engaged in contractual relationships. In fact, Guasch et al. (2006) built a theoretical 
model, with predictions that are consistent with the empirical results previously 
found in Guasch et al. (2003). Ho (2006) used a game theory-based model, to 
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investigate when and how government rescue a distressed project, through a 
renegotiation, and what were the impacts of the government’s rescue on PPP 
management and procurement. Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2006) use Chile’s case 
studies and present a model that offers a political economy explanation for 
renegotiations, arguing that these were used by incumbents to anticipate 
infrastructure spending, increasing their probability of winning upcoming elections. 
Table 12 provides an overview of the main determinants of renegotiations in the 
Latin American context.  
Table 12. Determinants of PPP renegotiations in Latin America.ᵃ 
Type of 
determinant 
Determinants 
Impact on 
renegotiation 
probability 
Authors 
Exogenous 
Better government 
efficiency and regulatory 
quality 
Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); 
Guasch & Straub (2009); Estache et al. 
(2009); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Better rule of law and less 
corruption 
Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); 
Guasch & Straub (2009); Estache et al. 
(2009); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Election period Increase 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); 
Guasch & Straub (2009); Bitran et al. 
(2013) 
Endogenous 
Increase in GDP growth Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); 
Guasch & Straub (2009) 
More investment Increase 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); 
Guasch (2004); Guasch & Straub 
(2009); 
Longer contract durations Not significant 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2008); Bitran et al. 
(2013) 
Government guarantees Increase Guasch et al. (2003, 2007) 
Transport sector Increase 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007); Guasch & 
Straub (2009) 
Notes: Gross Domestic Product (GDP); public–private partnership (PPP). 
a This table presents the main literature on the determinants of PPP renegotiations in the Latin American 
context. 
Given this overview, it is understandable why most research addresses 
renegotiations as a problem, rather than an opportunity. As discussed by de Brux 
(2010), the ability to adapt the contract to new circumstances could be viewed as an 
opportunity to improve the contract performance for both parties. However, the 
reality shows that renegotiations are used opportunistically by both governments 
and concessionaires (Liu, Gao, Cheah, & Luo, 2016). 
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4.3 Methodology and Data 
In this chapter, it is used the Brazilian experience in PPPs and contract 
renegotiations to look at the renegotiation motives and consequences from the Latin 
American experience. For this analysis, it was collect data from 42 PPP projects, 
from 2006 to 2016 (database was developed during 2017). These 42 projects 
covered all the PPPs that were developed during that period at the regional (State) 
level. From those 42 projects, it was found that a total of 27 had been renegotiated. 
These 27 projects (covering several sectors, such as transports, environment, 
health, etc.) are the ones included in our database. Table 13 provides an overview of 
the variables collected in our study. These variables were first collected through the 
analysis of publicly available information and were complemented with information 
provided by the regional PPP unit.  
Table 13. Data collected for each concession 
Type of variable 
Variable Description 
General information 
Name of project 
Designation of the project, usually the name of 
the infrastructure 
Sector 
Type of sector: transportation, health, security, 
environment, sports or housing 
State Stage of the process: construction or operation 
Concession 
Data of establishment Date of PPP contract signature 
Duration Duration of the contract 
Investment Initial forecasted investment 
Contracted payments 
Payments due to concessionaire over the 
duration of the contract 
Demand risk 
Demand risk is assumed by the public or 
private sector 
Shareholders Shareholders 
Nature (national or international) of the 
shareholder 
Renegotiations 
Number of 
renegotiations 
How many times has the contract been 
renegotiated 
Data of renegotiation Official date to the change in the contract 
Motive 
Identification of the motive(s) that triggered 
the renegotiation 
 
  
 
71 
 
For the construction of our database, it was first collected the original contracts of 
each PPP that was launched after 2004 (PPPs under the new Brazilian PPP law). 
After that, it was collected all the addendum (‘‘termos aditivos’’) of each contract. It 
was covered, for each contract, a period since the contract year and 2016. Therefore, 
all renegotiations that occurred during that period are included by our database. In 
each addendum, there was information about the motive(s) and the outcomes of the 
renegotiation.      
After the construction of the database, the analysis included the number of PPP 
contracts and renegotiation events per State, as well as the average number of 
renegotiations per State, the number of PPP contracts renegotiated per sector, total 
investment, and duration. Next, the policy implications were analysed, considering 
the following: the number of PPP contracts and renegotiation events per year and 
the number of States governed by the right-wing political parties from the last four 
States’ elections. Furthermore, in the sequence, the contractors’ profile of the 
international and domestic shareholders interest in the Brazilian PPP contracts was 
compared. Finally, the following were presented: the description of the main 
renegotiations motives, the parties that caused the change or triggered by the other 
party, and the number of PPPs; the main motives for renegotiation by sector; the 
total of renegotiation motives per PPP contract and the renegotiated contracts with 
economic and financial re-equilibrium; and the percentage and average number of 
contracts renegotiated per State. 
Despite some limitations concerning data, it was able to run some probit models to 
assess the probability of a renegotiation. In our model, each year (our dependent 
variable) is labeled as either renegotiation or no-renegotiation event year. It was 
tested the following independent variables: ely and elylag, assuming 1 for the 
election year and the year previous election (lag), respectively, and assuming 0 
otherwise; party assuming 1 if the regional government is from the left wing and 0 
if it is from the right wing; natshar assuming 1 if the main shareholders are domestic 
companies and 0 if the main shareholders are foreign companies; and demand 
assumes 1 if the demand risk was allocated to the private sector and 0 if it was 
allocated to the public sector. It was runned State (region), PPP (firm), and year fixed 
effects. 
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4.4 Results and discussion 
Our results and the discussion are based on the 27 PPPs that were renegotiated from 
the total of 42 PPPs and are organized by sector, region (State), years, renegotiation 
motive, type of demand risk and shareholder, electoral cycles, and political parties. 
4.4.1. Renegotiations per sector  
The 27 PPPs renegotiated are from six sectors, namely, transportation (including 
metros, highways, etc.), environment (water and wastewater management), sports 
(essentially football stadiums developed for the 2014 World Cup), health (hospitals 
and diagnosing centers), security (prisons), and housing (social housing). Results 
show that the three sectors most renegotiated are transportation, environment, and 
sports with 58% (7 PPPs of 12), 70% (7 of 10), and 100% (6 of 6) renegotiated 
contracts, respectively. In the health, security, and housing sectors, the number of 
renegotiated contracts was 50% (the total number of projects was 8, 4, and 2, 
respectively). The sports sector involved six football stadiums, which were 
developed within a specific context the holding of the World Cup in Brazil. Even 
though the organization of the World Cup is a specific event, it was included these 
projects in the database because the literature has suggested that the typical 
problems with large-scale projects are not be that different from smaller scale 
projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014). Several delays and changes in the initial projects help to 
explain why all contracts in this sector were renegotiated. This sector’s results are 
consistent with the ones found by Guasch (2004), Cruz and Marques (2013a, 
2013b), and Miranda Sarmento and Renneboog (2017). 
Data on each PPP by sector are presented in Tables 14 and 15. The 27 PPPs that 
were renegotiated registered a total of 84 renegotiation events, with an average of 
3.1 renegotiations per contract (with most renegotiations having occurred very 
early in the contract, the majority within 2 years after the contract was signed), 
within an interval of one renegotiation up to eight renegotiations (Project 7. 
Ribeirao Grande Prison). The security sector exhibits the highest average number of 
renegotiations per contract (‘‘Renegotiations by type of shareholders’’), which is 
essentially due to the project of Ribeirao Grande Prison. In this case, renegotiations 
can be explained by several factors: first, the PPP contract was signed in June 2009; 
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however, the financing for construction and implementation was only closed in 
February 2011. The motive was that the government required a change in the 
number of vacancies, resulting in the payment of a supplementary installment. 
Additionally, the first, fourth, and sixth renegotiation event was due to 
administrative delays of the Minas Gerais regional government. These 
renegotiations, requested by the concessionaire, resulted in the extension of the 
deadline for delivery and the updating of the construction schedule. The fifth and 
eighth renegotiation events were motivated by the need for corrections in the 
contract, such as change in the periods when the performance measurement system 
is supposed to be reviewed and the contract payment mechanism. In the seventh 
renegotiation event, a new service provision was the inclusion of, which resulted in 
a change in project design, which did not result in economic and financial re-
equilibrium. 
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Table 14. Renegotiation events per sector 
 
Panel A – Totals per sector 
Sectors Total of 
PPPs 
contracted 
Total of PPPs 
renegotiated 
per sector 
Total of 
renegotiations 
per sector 
Percentage of PPPs 
renegotiated per 
sector 
Average number of 
renegotiations per 
contract 
Average time to the first 
renegotiation per sector 
(in years) 
Average number of 
remaining years of 
contract 
Transport 12 7 20 60% 2.9 2.4 28.6 
Environment 10 7 21 70% 3.0 1.1 24.0 
Sports 6 6 17 100% 2.8 1.2 26.3 
Health 8 4 12 50% 3.0 0.5 15.7 
Security 4 2 9 50% 4.5 1.5 30.3 
Housing 2 1 5 50% 5.0 0.5 15.0 
Total 42 27 84 60% ---- ---- ----- 
Notes: Database was last revised on 9th of June 2017. 
PPPs titles: 1. Fonte Nova Stadium; 2. Ocean Disposal System Jaguaribe; 3. Subúrbio Hospital; 4. Hospital Couto Maia Institute; 5. Salvador Metro; 6. Diagnostic Imaging of Bahia; 7. 
Ribeirão Prison; 8. Mineirão Stadium; 9. MG-50 Highway; 10. Rio Manso Producer System; 11. São Paulo Metro - Yellow Line; 12. Alto Tietê Producer System; 13. Rodovia Tamoios; 14. 
São Lourenço Producer System; 15. São Paulo Metro - Diamond Line; 16. Maracanã Stadium; 17. PR-323 Highway; 18. North Zone Hospital; 19. Castelão Stadium; 20. Mangueiral 
Housing Project; 21. Serra's Sanitary Sewage System; 22. Agreste Adductor System; 23. Sanitary Sewage of Recife; 24. Pernambuco Stadium; 25. Bridge of Praia do Paiva; 26. Itaitinga 
Prison; 27. Dunas Stadium.
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Table 15. Renegotiation events per sector 
Panel B – Data per PPP 
Sectors PPP’s 
number 
Total of 
renegotiations 
per PPP 
Number of years 
until the first 
renegotiation 
Contract 
duration 
(in years) 
Average 
number of 
remaining 
years of 
contract 
Transport 5 2 2 30 28-6 
 9 6 1 25  
 11 5 1 32  
 13 1 3 30  
 15 1 5 20  
 17 2 1 30  
 25 3 4 33.5  
Environment 2 6 1 18 24.0 
 10 5 1 15  
 12 2 2 15  
 14 1 1 25  
 21 2 1 30  
 22 1 2 30  
 23 4 0 35  
Sports 1 4 0 35 26.3 
 8 4 1 27  
 16 1 1 35  
 19 2 2 8  
 24 4 0 33  
 27 2 3 20  
Health 3 4 0 10 15.7 
 4 3 1 21.33  
 6 1 1 11.5  
 18 4 0 20  
Security 7 8 3 27 30.3 
Housing 26 1 0 33.5 15.0 
 20 5 0 15  
TOTAL  84   23.3 
Notes: Database was last revised on 9th of June 2017. 
PPPs titles: 1. Fonte Nova Stadium; 2. Ocean Disposal System Jaguaribe; 3. Subúrbio Hospital; 4. Hospital 
Couto Maia Institute; 5. Salvador Metro; 6. Diagnostic Imaging of Bahia; 7. Ribeirão Prison; 8. Mineirão 
Stadium; 9. MG-50 Highway; 10. Rio Manso Producer System; 11. São Paulo Metro - Yellow Line; 12. Alto 
Tietê Producer System; 13. Rodovia Tamoios; 14. São Lourenço Producer System; 15. São Paulo Metro - 
Diamond Line; 16. Maracanã Stadium; 17. PR-323 Highway; 18. North Zone Hospital; 19. Castelão Stadium; 
20. Mangueiral Housing Project; 21. Serra's Sanitary Sewage System; 22. Agreste Adductor System; 23. 
Sanitary Sewage of Recife; 24. Pernambuco Stadium; 25. Bridge of Praia do Paiva; 26. Itaitinga Prison; 27. 
Dunas Stadium.
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4.4.2. Renegotiation by Region (State) 
These 27 PPPs which were renegotiated are located in 13 States. Data of 
renegotiations by State are summarized in Table 16. The highest number of PPPs is 
concentrated in four States: Bahia, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco. As 
expected, these States have the highest number of contracts renegotiated, with six, 
five, and four contracts being renegotiated. These same States, including the State of 
Ceará, represent almost three-quarters of the number of PPPs contracted. The same 
four States also lead the number of renegotiation events; however, the order 
changes to Minas Gerais, Bahia, Pernambuco, and São Paulo, with, 23, 20, 12, and 10 
events, respectively. With the exception of the State of Goiás, the other States have 
at least one renegotiation event each, with Distrito Federal leading this group, with 
five renegotiation events. The States of Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, 
and Rio Grande do Norte had 100% of their PPPs renegotiated. The States of São 
Paulo, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, and Alagoas renegotiated just under half of their 
contracts, while the States of Amazonas, Ceará, and Federal District had only one 
contract renegotiated.
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Table 16. Renegotiation events per state 
 
State PPP’s 
number 
Number of 
renegotiations 
events 
Total of 
renegotiations 
events per State 
Percentage of the 
total of renegotiation 
events 
Average number 
of renegotiations 
per State 
Number of years 
until the first 
renegotiation 
Average time to the 
first renegotiation 
per state 
Minas Gerais 1 8 23 28% 5.8 3 1.5 
 2 4 1 
 3 6 1 
 4 5 1 
Bahia 5 4 20 24% 3.3 0 0.8 
 6 6 1 
 7 4 0 
 8 3 1 
 9 2 2 
 10 1 1 
Pernambuco 11 4 12 14% 3.0 0 1 
 12 4 0 
 13 3 4 
 14 1 0 
São Paulo 15 5 10 12% 2.0 1 2.4 
 16 2 2 
 17 1 3 
 18 1 1 
 19 1 5 
Distrito Federal 20 5 5 5% 5.0 0 0 
Amazonas 21 4 4 4% 4.0 0 0 
Ceará 22 2 2 2% 2.0 2 2 
Espírito Santo 23 2 2 2% 2.0 1 1 
Paraná 24 2 2 2% 2.0 1 1 
Rio G. do Norte 25 2 2 2% 2.0 3 3 
Rio de Janeiro 26 1 1 1% 1.0 1 1 
Alagoas 27 1 1 1% 1.0 2 2 
Total 27 84 84 - - - 1.3 
State´s Average number 
of renegotiations 
- - - - 3.0 - - 
 Notes: Database was last revised on 9th of June 2017.
  
 
78 
 
Among the 27 States in Brazil, 13 contracted PPPs and 12 renegotiated PPP 
contracts. This means that, with the exception of the State of Goiás, the rest of the 
Brazilian States have already contracted PPPs, with at least one PPP renegotiated. 
Considering the number of PPPs renegotiated versus the amount of renegotiation 
events, the States of Minas Gerais, Distrito Federal, Amazonas, Bahia, and 
Pernambuco have the highest average number of renegotiation events (Table 16). 
The other five States (Ceará, Espírito Santo, Paraná, Rio Grande do Norte, and São 
Paulo) have two renegotiation events per PPP contract. The States of Alagoas and 
Rio de Janeiro have only one renegotiation event per contract. Although the State of 
Minas Gerais is the third in terms of the number of renegotiated contracts and has 
the highest average of renegotiation events, the States with only one contract 
(Amazonas and Federal District) have a larger number of renegotiation events, 
placing them in second and third place in this ranking. These results may indicate 
different interpretations. On the one hand, more experienced PPP units are able to 
identify problems that exist in contracts, leading to a renegotiation. However, on the 
other hand, an experienced PPP unit that is involved in the project from the start can 
help to mitigate potential contractual flaws. 
4.4.3. Renegotiation by year and motives 
The number of renegotiation events per year has been increasing up to 2014. This 
result is to be expected for two reasons. First, the number of PPP in operation is 
increasing and, therefore, more projects are prone to renegotiation; and, second, 
with the temporal evolution of the project, it is more likely that the project will be 
renegotiated. Figure 18 presents the annual evolution of PPP projects and the 
number of annual renegotiations. Figure 19 presents the accumulated PPPs 
renegotiated and the total number of contracts in each year. It can be seen that up 
to 2014 around 60% of the total PPPs were renegotiated. The number increases up 
to 80% and 90% in 2014 and 2015, respectively, reaching the total subsample in the 
last year (2016). 
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Figure 18. PPPs and renegotiation events per year 
 
 
 
Figure 19. PPPs and renegotiated contracts per year 
 
Motives (i.e. the motive that triggered the renegotiation event) are perceived in the 
literature, as discussed previously, as being a critical aspect in renegotiations. Table 
17 presents the number of renegotiations per each motive, while Table 18 presents 
a more detailed perspective of the motives versus sectors for each project. Table 17 
summarizes a total of 12 motives (one renegotiation can have more than one 
motive), providing a short description of what is involved in each motive and 
presents the party (public and/or private sector) that triggered the renegotiation 
and the total number of renegotiations caused by each motive.  
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Table 17. Renegotiation motives 
Motives Summary description 
Responsible for 
triggering the 
renegotiation 
Total per 
motives 
Change in project 
design 
Change in the scope of the contract. 
Government created new services to be 
implemented or eliminated some services. 
Private/Public 20 
Change in project 
features 
The grantor agency (Government) changed its 
requirements about projects features, for 
technical or political purpose. The private 
partner would also suggest a different 
technical solution to improve the project 
cost/performance. 
Private/Public 9 
Additional work 
Additional investment (cost). Government 
decided (or Private partner claimed) an 
increment in the number of the same works 
and/or services provided. 
Public/Private 8 
Tax benefits 
Adequacy of the Contract to the tax benefits 
offered by the government. 
Public/Private 4 
Administrative 
delays 
Extension of the deadlines for the realization 
of the investments and/or operational 
activities, due to Government (or agencies) 
administrative delays. 
Private 3 
Review of previous 
term 
Government publishes additive term, 
reviewing clauses and/or previous term. 
Public 3 
Analysis of 
contract terms 
Interruption of the contract until the 
government completes the technical analysis 
and economic/ financial feasibility of the 
project. 
Public 3 
Delay in 
expropriation 
The delay or non-expropriation of land. Private 3 
Transfer of 
corporate control 
The concessionaire transfers its interest to 
third parties. 
Private 2 
Change in the risk 
matrix 
Reduction of the contractual guarantees of the 
Government, in case scenario occurs that 
brings financial damage to the private partner. 
Private 2 
Force majeure 
Private partner requests contract extension, 
due to equipment breakdown, strike of 
employees, or events outside the will of the 
parties. 
Private 1 
Specific legal 
changes 
The private partner requests the correction of 
the calculation formula of the instalments, due 
to the alteration of some legislation, which 
impacts its financial results in the contract. 
Private 1 
Corrections in the 
contract 
Inclusion or exclusion of clauses in the 
contract, which do not create contingencies, 
obligations or financial commitments. 
Private/Public 39 
Total   98 
This table presents the main renegotiations motives, related description, parties that cause the change, triggered 
by the other party, and number of PPPs. In some cases, the process of renegotiation was due to more than one 
reason; Database was last revised on 3rd of August 2017. 
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The dominant motives are changes in the project design. This happens when the 
government imposes a change in the initial project design because it changed the 
amount and type of services and/or the infrastructure initially contracted. As an 
example, in the PPP of the Mineirão Stadium (Minas Gerais), the last two 
renegotiations were triggered for the same motive (change in the project design), 
but for opposite reasons. In one, the government decided to create new obligations 
for the concessionary, related to the installation of temporary structures for the 
FIFA Confederations Cup 2013, whereas in the other renegotiation, the parties 
agreed on the reduction of the contracted object, redefining the territorial and 
spatial scope of the concession.  
The second motive is similar and was designated ‘‘change in project features.’’ In 
this case, there is no increase or decrease on the type or quantities of services, but 
rather a change in the technology or technical requirements of the project, which 
might have an effect on costs. One example is the PPP of the Rio Manso Producer 
System (São Paulo), where the concessionaire developed a project for the collection 
unit that allowed the introduction of operational improvements with a greater 
efficiency than the initially proposed project. The third most relevant motive is also 
related to changes in the project and concerns the government’s request for 
increasing the amount of service/infrastructure contracted. There are no changes in 
the type of work or the technology but just an increase in the amount. 
These first three motives are all related to the same overall problem: poor initial 
planning. This also helps to explain why the average time for the first renegotiation 
is so short within the first 3 years. In fact, after the contract is formally established, 
when the detailed project design is executed and/or the construction begins, it 
becomes necessary to adjust the project. This also shows that the Government 
changes the initial assumptions regarding the volume of services and/or 
infrastructure to be provided, which reflects one of two possibilities: either the 
project is poorly planned or the change in political decision makers creates different 
views and perspectives of the objectives of the project, forcing a readjustment.  
The forth motive is renegotiation due to ‘‘tax benefits.’’ The government requested 
the renegotiation of the contract to allow for the introduction of tax benefits in the 
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contract, which would improve the economic performance of the contract. It is 
somehow bizarre to see the public sector requesting a renegotiation that would 
result in a benefit for the private sector without any apparent benefit for the 
government. Our understanding is that in the cases when this occurred, this was 
probably a way of avoiding a posterior claim for renegotiation by the private sector, 
due to unknown reasons. By introducing the tax benefits, the government enabled a 
cost saving for the concessionaire, thus improving its profitability and avoiding 
public payments in the future.  
Several motives exist, such as administrative delays, administrative reviews of the 
terms of reference, interruption of contracts (suspension for a certain period), 
delays in expropriations, and so on. It is important to notice that several of these 
motives exhibit a poor control by Brazilian public authorities. As an example, while 
some renegotiations included a typical economic and financial re-equilibrium, 
recalculating costs, revenues, and expected profitability, others have not involved 
any economic recalculation. This raises several questions: What was the impact of 
the renegotiation? Did the renegotiation affect the expected profitability of the 
concessionaire? What was the impact in terms of future payments for the 
government? There is clear evidence of a lack of structured renegotiation, in the 
sense that the motives are clearly identified, the objectives of the renegotiation are 
clearly stated, and the financial impacts of the renegotiation are quantified. In many 
of these renegotiations, this approach is missing (Table 18).
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Table 18. PPPs renegotiated per State by sector and main motives for renegotiation 
 
  Sectors Motives   
State PPP’s 
number 
Envir
onme
ntal 
Trans
port 
Sport
s 
Healt
h 
Priso
n 
Housi
ng 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
Total of 
motives 
per PPP 
Renegotiation 
with econ. -
financial 
requilibrium 
Bahia 1   X    2*   1         3 6 2 
 2 X       1*     3  1  1   6 1 
 3    X     1*   1       2 4 1 
 4    X   1*    1    1     3 1 
 5  X     1+1* 1+1* 1     1     2 8 2 
 6    X   1* 1*           1 3 2 
Minas Gerais 7     X  1  2*  1        4 8 2 
 8   X    1+1*             2 1 
 9  X      1* 1*     1*     5 8 3 
 10 X      1* 1 1*         1 2 6 2 
São Paulo 11  X     3            3 6 0 
 12 X                   (**) (**) 
 13  X                 1 1 0 
 14 X                  1 1 0 
 15  X     1*            1 2 1 
Rio de Janeiro 16   X    1             1 0 
Paraná 17  X                 2 2 0 
Amazonas 18    X                (***) (***) 
Ceará 19   X       1*         1 2 1 
Distrito Federal 20      X 1* 1* 1*   1*       2 6 4 
Espírito Santo 21 X                  2 2 0 
Alagoas 22 X      1* 1* 1*          1 4 3 
Pernambuco 23 X      1+1*     1       2 5 1 
 24   X       1+1*      2    4 1 
 25  X     1 1   1   1     3 7 0 
 26     X              1 1 0 
Rio G. do Norte 27   X                 (***) (***) 
Total of 
contracts 
27 7 7 6 4 2 1               
 
Total of motives        20 9 8 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 39 98 - 
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Renegotiation 
econ. -financial 
reequilibrium 
(*) 
       11 6 7 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 28 
Notes: In some cases, the renegotiation event was due to more than one reason; Database was last revised on 9th of June 2017; Renegotiation with economic and financial re-
equilibrium (*); The motives were not described in the additive terms (**); The government agency responsible for the project did not provide the renegotiations terms (***). 
PPPs titles: 1. Fonte Nova Stadium; 2. Ocean Disposal System Jaguaribe; 3. Subúrbio Hospital; 4. Hospital Couto Maia Institute; 5. Salvador Metro; 6. Diagnostic Imaging of Bahia; 7. 
Ribeirão Prison; 8. Mineirão Stadium; 9. MG-50 Highway; 10. Rio Manso Producer System; 11. São Paulo Metro - Yellow Line; 12. Alto Tietê Producer System; 13. Rodovia Tamoios; 
14. São Lourenço Producer System; 15. São Paulo Metro - Diamond Line; 16. Maracanã Stadium; 17. PR-323 Highway; 18. North Zone Hospital; 19. Castelão Stadium; 20. Mangueiral 
Housing Project; 21. Serra's Sanitary Sewage System; 22. Agreste Adductor System; 23. Sanitary Sewage of Recife; 24. Pernambuco Stadium; 25. Bridge of Praia do Paiva; 26. Itaitinga 
Prison; 27. Dunas Station. 
Renegotiation motives: 1 - Change in project design, 2 - Change in project features; 3 - Additional work; 4 - Tax benefits, 5 - Administrative delays, 6 - Review of previous term, 7 - 
Analysis of contract terms, 8 - Delay in expropriation, 9 - Transfer of corporate control, 10 - Change in the risk matrix (change in the risk allocation); 11- Force majeure, 12 - Specific 
legal changes, 13 - Corrections in the contract.
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4.4.4. Renegotiations by demand risk 
Demand risk is one of the largest risks (or maybe the core risk) in PPP projects, 
despite the fact that authors tend to consider the allocation of demand risk in PPP 
projects as being very complex (see, for instance, Meda, 2007). In these projects, 
demand risk was classified as being allocated for the concessionaire (e.g. tolls in a 
highway or water consumption revenues in a water project) or being allocated to 
the public sector. In the latter case, payments are usually on an ‘‘availability’’ base. 
In these cases, the public sector remunerates the concessionaire for the availability 
of the infrastructure, but the concessionaire is immune to any variation of the levels 
of utilization of the infrastructure. Roads, hospitals, or prisons are all examples of 
projects where this remuneration model is frequently used. In the Brazilian PPP 
context, the allocation of demand risk is determined in each project by the 
government, being part of the conditions for the tender process. Therefore, the 
private sector, when participating in the bidding, is accepting the allocation of 
demand risk. 
In this section, it is analysed the relationship between renegotiations and demand 
risk (Table 19). Projects where demand risk is allocated to private sector should be 
prone to more renegotiations. If the demand is below the forecast, then the 
concession will enter into financial distress and the concessionaire will be more 
willing to ask for potential renegotiations. It appears to be no significant difference 
between the average number of renegotiations when the private sector holds the 
demand risk (3.16 renegotiations per contract, on average), when compared with 
the cases when the public sector retains the risk (3.09). However, these results must 
be analysed by considering that in our sample, there is a much higher number of 
projects with demand risk being on the public sector (21), compared with demand 
risk on the private sector (6). There seems to be a perception that the private sector 
may not be willing to hold the demand risk. Tackling demand risk involves a mature 
market and a relative level of stability in terms of public policies, in order that the 
private sector may have robust demand forecasts and, therefore, be willing to take 
that risk. Our econometric model may confirm these results later.  
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Table 19. Renegotiations per type of demand risk 
State PPP’s 
number 
Number of 
renegotiations 
events 
Public sector holds 
the risk of demand 
Private sector holds 
the risk of demand 
Bahia 1 4 X  
 2 6 X  
 3 4 X  
 4 3 X  
 5 2  X 
 6 1 X  
Minas Gerais 7 8 X  
 8 4 X  
 9 6  X 
 10 5 X  
São Paulo 11 5  X 
 12 2 X  
 13 1  X 
 14 1 X  
 15 1 X  
Rio de Janeiro 16 1 X  
Paraná 17 2  X 
Amazonas 18 4 X  
Ceará 19 2 X  
Distrito Federal 20 5 X  
Espírito Santo 21 2 X  
Alagoas 22 1 X  
Pernambuco 23 4 X  
 24 4 X  
 25 3  X 
 26 1 X  
Rio G. do Norte 27 2 X  
Total 27 84 21 6 
Average number 
of renegotiations 
- 3.11 3.09 3.16 
 
4.4.5. Renegotiations by type of shareholders 
PPP shareholders (domestic or foreign) and their political connections can impact 
on the occurrence of renegotiations. Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) present the case 
of ‘‘red’’ and ‘‘blue’’ USA firms—firms with Democratic or Republican ties. Miranda 
Sarmento and Renneboog (2017) show that foreign firms can renegotiate more. The 
motives are that foreign companies may not be concerned about domestic market 
and reputational risks as much as domestic firms. However, domestic firms may be 
politically better connected and can use such influence to renegotiate PPP contracts.  
Table 20 shows our data per PPP, in terms of domestic or international bidding. Of 
the 27 PPPs analysed, 15 are controlled by domestic shareholders, and 12 by foreign 
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shareholders. From the total of 81 renegotiation events, the number of 
renegotiations in PPPs controlled by domestic shareholders amounts to 51 events 
(Table 21). PPPs controlled by foreign shareholders account for 30 events. This 
means that there is a prevalence of PPPs controlled by domestic shareholders, with 
an average of 3.4 renegotiation events per PPP, with, in contrast, an average of 2.5 
events for PPPs of foreign shareholders. This is particularly true for Odebrecht, the 
best politically well-connected Brazilian firm, which is responsible for 9 PPPs (one-
third), but is responsible for almost half of the 81 renegotiation events (34 events). 
It will be looked again for this in our econometric results subsection.  
 
Table 20. Renegotiations per type of shareholder: type of shareholder per PPP 
State PPP’s 
number 
Bidding only 
for national 
shareholders 
 
Open bidding for 
international 
shareholders  
 
Change of 
shareholders 
Independent 
Verifier audit 
Number of years 
until the first 
renegotiation 
Bahia 1  X  X 0 
 2 X  X X 1 
 3  X   0 
 4 X  X X 1 
 5 X   X 2 
 6  X  X 1 
Minas Gerais 7  X  X 3 
 8 X    1 
 9 X    1 
 10  X   1 
São Paulo 11  X   1 
 12  X   2 
 13  X   3 
 14  X   1 
 15  X   5 
Rio de Janeiro 16 X    1 
Paraná 17 X    1 
Amazonas 18  X   0 
Ceará 19  X   2 
Distrito Federal 20 X    0 
Espírito Santo 21  X  X 1 
Alagoas 22  X   2 
Pernambuco 23 X   X 0 
 24 X   X 0 
 25 X   X 4 
 26 X   X 0 
Rio G. do Norte 27    X 3 
Total 27 12 15 
 
2 
 
12 
 
- 
Average time  
to the first 
renegotiation 
- - - - - 1.37 
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Table 21. Renegotiations per type of shareholder: renegotiations by type of 
shareholders 
 
Domestic 
shareholder 
Foreign 
shareholder 
Nº of PPPs 
(total: 27) 
15 12 
Nº of 
renegotiations 
(total: 81) 
51 30 
Average 
renegotiation 
per PPP 
3.4 2.5 
 
4.4.6. Renegotiations by electoral cycle and political party 
Previous results show (as also described in the renegotiations literature) that there 
has been a significant interference by political decision makers on changes made to 
the projects. It is intended to analyse whether there is any political bias in the 
changes made to these projects. This means that whether in the proximity of 
elections, or after elections (the electoral cycle, as Brazilian elections at regional 
level occur every 4 years), there is a higher number of renegotiations which might 
provide evidence that these renegotiations are more politically driven, rather than 
just technically motivated, or whether the political party in government at the 
regional level can impact on the occurrence of renegotiations. Table 22 summarizes 
the data on renegotiations and electoral cycles, and Tables 23 and 24 summarize the 
data on renegotiations and political parties.  
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Table 22. Renegotiations during the years of government 
Event Year PPPs contracted Renegotiations 
First year of government 
(3 PPPs contracted – 11%) 
(22 renegotiations – 26% 
2003 - - 
2007 1 5 
2011 1 7 
2015 1 10 
Second year of government 
(2 PPPs contracted – 7%) 
(20 renegotiations – 24%) 
2004 0 0 
2008 1 2 
2012 1 9 
2016 0 9 
Year before election year 
(10 PPPs contracted – 37%) 
(18 renegotiations – 21%) 
2005 0 0 
2009 3 5 
2013 7 10 
2017 0 3 
Election year 
(12 PPPs contracted – 44%) 
(24 renegotiations – 29%) 
2006 3 0 
2010 6 10 
2014 3 14 
2018 - - 
Total  27 84 
As mentioned previously, the electoral years (except for 2014) were the years with 
the greatest number of projects contracted. This shows that the launch of PPPs is 
conditioned by the electoral cycle. There is some evidence that renegotiations tend 
to occur before or during elections. More than 50% of the renegotiation events are 
concentrated in these 2 years. The 2009–2010 electoral period alone accounted for 
a total of 15 renegotiation events and the electoral period of 2013–2014 a total of 
24 renegotiation events. There seems to be a tendency to contract during electoral 
years (or the year before the election) or to celebrate renegotiate contracts during 
the last year of government (or during the first year of a new government). 
Regarding the political status of the party in those States that renegotiated PPP 
contracts, it can be seen the presence of three political parties in Tables 23 and 24: 
right, left, and others (Centre). Rightwing political parties are the mandates of those 
elected State governors that belonged to the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira 
(PSDB; ‘‘Brazilian Social Democracy Party’’) or those political parties were allied to 
the PSDB. The left-wing political parties are the mandates of State governors that 
belonged to the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT; ‘‘Workers’ Party’’), or the political 
parties that were allied to the PT. Finally, the Centre parties are the mandates of 
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those elected State governors that belonged to the other parties that were not allied 
to the PT. This classification took into consideration that the last four elections for 
President of the Republic of Brazil were won by the PT, a major party of reference 
of the left wing in the country. The results show that, from 2002 to 2014, only the 
number of mandates from the left wing increased, while the number of mandates 
from the Centre only decreased. In 2002, the Centre parties totaled seven State 
governments. In 2006, this number dropped to five, in 2010 to four, and in 2014 to 
only one State government. Whereas right-wing governments often have stronger 
ties with the private sector, this is not reflected in our data, as each political party 
seems to renegotiate as often as the other side. 
It is possible to see that political cycles impact on renegotiations. First, tight public 
budgets typically encourage the public sector to pass on large investment 
obligations to the private sector, possibly with governmental guarantees (which 
could lead to the private sector behaving opportunistically, seeking additional 
rents). Elections can lead to governments being more generous and to invest more 
in infrastructures. Incumbent governments invest or renegotiate in order to 
guarantee reelection, and newly elected officials may renegotiate from a political 
ideological perspective, to meet social demands in a way different from the past.  
Table 23. Number of State mandates per type of political party 
Panel A – Mandates by political party 
Election Year 2002 2006 2010 2014 
Years of 
government 
mandate 
1st of January of 
2003 to 31th of 
December, 2006 
1st of January of 
2007 to 31th of 
December, 2010 
1st of January of 
2011 to 31th of 
December, 2014 
1st of January of 
2015 to 31th of 
December, 2018 
Right-wing 
political party 
state mandates 
5 4 4 6 
Left-wing 
political party 
state mandates 
0 3 4 5 
Other political 
party State 
mandates 
7 5 4 1 
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Table 24. Number of State mandates per type of political party 
Panel B – Number of renegotiations by political party 
 Left-wing party 
Non-left-wing party 
(Centre or right-wing 
party) 
Nº 
Renegotiations 
34 47 
 
4.4.7. Econometric analysis 
In order to assess the impact on the probability of a renegotiation event of the main 
variables of this study, it was runned a probit model, with results presented in Table 
25. It can confirm that left-wing parties tend to renegotiate more frequently. Also, 
allocating the demand risk to the private sector, as it increases uncertainty, tends to 
increase the likelihood of renegotiations. Also, political connections from the 
national shareholders tend to increase the probability of a renegotiation. Results 
from the electoral cycle are not conclusive. 
Table 25. Results from the probit modelᵇ 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES reneg 
Ely 0.61 (0.45) 
Elylag 0.13 (0.44) 
Party -1.12** (0.50) 
Natshar 0.49** (0.80) 
Demand 1.98** (0.77) 
Year effects Yes 
Firm effects Yes 
State effects Yes 
Constant 0.05 (0.70) 
Observations 129 
ᵇThis table shows the marginal effects of a random effects 
probit model with the renegotiation/no-renegotiation    event 
as dependent variable. State effects mean fixed effects at the 
regional (State) level. Firm effects mean fixed effects at the PPP 
project level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.1. 
**p < 0.05. 
***p < 0.01.
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4.5. Policy implications 
The results from the previous section provide us with some insights, which can be 
used to draw policy implications from this research. There is some evidence that 
PPPs in Brazil also tend to renegotiate too often and too soon. In fact, most of the 
PPPs launched in Brazil during the last 15 years have been renegotiated, and usually 
more than once. Furthermore, most renegotiation of PPPs occurred during the first 
years of the contract. This shows that the main concerns of literature regarding PPP 
renegotiations (the abnormal frequency of renegotiations events and the 
occurrence of such events in the early stages of the projects) are also present in the 
Brazilian experience. Additionally, the increase in the number of PPPs and the 
passage of time of each contract is increasing the occurrence of renegotiation events, 
as expected. 
Changes in projects and delays in administrative procedures are one of the main 
problems in PPP renegotiations. This was also the case for these PPP projects under 
study, particularly with the occurrence of a mega event, such as the World Cup. The 
first policy implication is that our analysis shows strong weakness in planning. 
Therefore, the public sector in Brazil, at the State level, needs to reinforce the public 
administration capacities for the planning, bidding, and monitoring stages. The best 
approach to improve planning capacity is to ensure that all projects are conveniently 
evaluated and monitored by an independent body. The PPP units could have this 
function, but there seems to be too much political interference in the PPP units. 
These are administratively and financially dependent on the elected official. It is 
believed that is crucial to have an independent technical body to decrease the 
political bias towards project evaluation and, also, to monitor renegotiations. 
The second policy implication is that renegotiations of PPPs seem to be a problem 
across States, showing that they share a common weakness, such as the lack of 
capacities mentioned above and the institutional framework for PPPs contracts. 
There is a need for each State to implement and improve a PPP unit. However, there 
is also scope for better inter-State cooperation in terms of skills and experiences. 
PPPs’ institutional framework in Brazil should also be reviewed, in order to address 
potential problems at State level. The pitfalls presented may reflect a lack of 
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legal/technical ability and foresight on the part of the executive public entities, and 
the prevalence of asymmetric information in the case of the public sector. The best 
practices in PPPs (OECD, 2010) provide evidence for our second policy implication: 
the need for PPP units in each region. There is also a role for a regional level Court 
of Audits to play, as these entities usually play a very important part in the PPP 
process, increasing accountability and transparency and providing better practices. 
Additionally, the public sector, based on a PPP unit, needs to increase access to data 
and information regarding each project. 
The third implication regards the fiscal context. Brazilian public authorities need to 
avoid the use of PPPs for an ‘‘off-budget’’ motive. They also need to address 
renegotiation motives that are related to postponing expenditures. A reinforcement 
of the fiscal rules for PPPs could avoid future renegotiations. 
The fourth policy implication is that, due to the impact of electoral cycles on the 
occurrence of renegotiations events, there is also a need for renegotiations to be 
carried out, or at least evaluated, by an independent authority, where political 
influence is minimized as much as possible. 
Finally, the fifth policy implication regards political connections, for in a country 
such as Brazil, this issue is a major problem. A ban on conflicts of interests by former 
politicians (and by extension, those with experience in the relevant ministries) 
ought to be introduced, even if the political ties had been established in the past.      
 
4.6. Partial conclusions 
This chapter presents the Brazilian experience of PPPs and renegotiations at the 
State (region) level. Our research shows evidence that, similar to other PPP 
experiences, Brazil has also suffered from an abnormal number of renegotiation 
events, together with the first renegotiation event occurring after a short period of 
the start of the contract. Furthermore, as the number of PPP projects increases (and 
as time passes for each contract), renegotiation events occur more often, increasing 
the problem. All States and all sectors that have PPP projects seem to be affected by 
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this phenomenon. The motives are mainly on the public side, such as failures in the 
planning and concept of projects. Electoral periods and the political connections of 
shareholders have a significant impact on renegotiations. Results for the political 
party, national shareholders, and allocation of the demand risk to the private sector 
show an increase in the likelihood of renegotiation. It is drawed several policy 
implications in our chapter. 
This work has some limitations, however. Notably, there is a small period in analyse 
and a small sample of PPPs and renegotiation events. This has created some 
difficulties and does not enable us to provide a more robust econometric analyse. 
Future work on the renegotiation of PPPs in Brazil is much needed, particularly as 
the country is planning hundreds of new projects. More data on a broad set of PPPs, 
covering a broader period, would provide more robust results and deeper 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 5. Renegotiation 
determinants and consequences 
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5.1 Introduction5 
Over the last decades, the private sector has become a key player in developing and 
operating transport infrastructures and services (Berechman et al., 2006; 
Roumboustos, 2015). This is the result of the government’s need to attract private 
financing and expertise, particularly through concessions and PPPs (Chen & Gifford, 
2017; Button, 2016). The provision of public services under concession agreements 
is becoming an increasing area of business opportunity for the private sector, 
although there should be a clear alignment of objectives between the parties, in 
order to ensure the success of PPP projects (Tsamboulas et al., 2013).  
There is a lack of consensus for the definition of PPPs (Miranda Sarmento & 
Renneboog, 2016), however there is a broad and general definition from the OECD 
(2008, pg. 17), which defines PPPs as; “an agreement between the government and 
one or more private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) 
according to which the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that 
the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment 
depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners”. 
One of the main (problematic) issues with PPPs is their frequent renegotiation, 
which can arise at any stage during the lifecycle of a PPP (see Miranda Sarmento & 
Renneboog (2016) for details on how a PPP is managed). PPP renegotiation occurs 
when specific events change the financial conditions of the concession, which mainly 
occurs when the public authority is asked, or proposes to compensate the firm 
managing the project for loss of revenue or un-anticipated costs. Alternatively, 
renegotiation can be initiated by the private sector; this is mainly the case when the 
concession’s financial conditions deteriorate in such a way that the private company 
may fall into financial distress. 
With regards the context of PPPs renegotiation, the seminal work is from Guasch, 
Laffont & Straub (2003) (which they subsequently expanded into several papers: 
                                                 
5 The content of this chapter is written in the paper “Renegotiation of Transport Public Private 
Partnerships: Policy implications of the Brazilian experience in the Latin American context”, 
submitted in the Case Studies on Transport Policy. 
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Guasch, 2004; Guasch et al., 2007, 2008; Guasch & Straub, 2006, 2009), using the 
Latin American experience, with over 1,000 concessions. The Latin American 
experience was also analysed in other studies (Estache, Guasch & Trujillo, 2003, 
2009; Bitran, Nieto-Parra & Robledo, 2013; Moore, Straub & Dethier (2014)) 
Despite more recent studies covering transport PPPs renegotiation in Europe 
(Domingues & Sarmento, 2016), France (De Brux, 2010) and Portugal (Cruz & 
Marques, 2013; Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 2017), the Latin American context 
remains the most relevant in terms of analyzing the main determinants of PPPs 
renegotiation. 
Those authors who have analysed the Latin American experience in PPPs 
renegotiation found that a stronger institutional, political, and legal environment, 
which provides contractual security, reduces the probability of future renegotiation, 
whereas an increase in the level of corruption, elections, and change of government, 
or the need for greater follow-up investments all tend to increase the likelihood of 
renegotiation. 
In this chapter it is used the Brazilian PPPs experience in renegotiation in the 
transport sector. Brazil is one of Latin-American countries with a larger PPP 
program and has been actively engaged in developing PPP programs. Understanding 
the patterns of PPP renegotiations in Brazil can provide valuable policy implications 
for Latin American countries, but also for developing economies. Our sample covers 
seven PPPs projects for a total of 20 renegotiation events, from 2006 to 2016. First, 
it is compared the Brazilian experience with the previous literature on the Latin 
American experience of PPPs renegotiations. Second, it is discussed and explore 
which are the critical factors for the renegotiation of transport contracts in the 
Brazilian context. 
There is evidence of a large number of renegotiation of PPPs in Brazil, with potential 
negative effects for the public interest. It was found evidence of political influence 
on the likelihood of renegotiation and, as expected, the project uncertainty factor 
also plays an important role. This chapter is relevant for academics and 
practitioners in the transport field, as it presents an important experience in a 
developing country. Brazil’s experience can provide a strong case for building policy 
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recommendations in developing countries, where the number of PPPs is expected 
to grow in the medium and long term.  
This chapter is organized as follow: Section 5.2 presents an overview of PPPs and 
renegotiation, focusing on the previous literature regarding the Latin American 
experience. Data and methodology are presented in Section 5.3, and the Brazilian 
PPP experience in transport in Section 5.4. Results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5.5. Policy implications and Conclusions are described in Section 5.6 and 5.7, 
respectively. 
  
5.2 PPPs, renegotiations and the Latin American context 
A PPP renegotiation can be defined as a revision of the concession contract that 
affects and alters the financial balance of the firm managing the project (Guasch et 
al., 2007). However, changes preview in the contract, such as tariff increases or 
adjustments due to inflation should not be considered under the scope of this 
definition. Only substantial departures from the original contract are perceived as 
being renegotiation.  
PPPs are long and incomplete contracts, involving a large investment, and are 
usually in heavily-regulated sectors that are sensitive to political and circumstantial 
changes. All this leads to a high level of uncertainty. Therefore, some authors have 
been arguing that renegotiation could be perceived as being a natural and typical 
aspect of the PPP process (Engel et al., 2009). They can be used to address 
inefficiencies from contract incompleteness and to improve initial forecasts and 
plans. However, the majority of authors view a high frequency of renegotiation 
events as an indication of PPP failure, usually leading to an increase in public 
payments, an increase of the users’ costs, or a reduction of service (or any 
combination) (Guasch, 2004). Frequent PPP renegotiation ought to be avoided, and 
should it occur, then it should only be a response to financial distress or lack of 
efficiency (Guasch & Straub, 2006). Renegotiation is considered to be one of the 
pitfalls of PPPs, for two reasons: the abnormal frequency of renegotiation (especially 
soon after a PPP has been awarded) (Schwartz, Corbacho & Funke, 2008), and also 
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the fact that they are viewed as being a source of distress in the efficiency of PPPs 
(Guasch & Straub, 2006). 
Latin America is still the main experience for the study of PPPs and concession 
renegotiation. Unlike contract renegotiation theory (e.g., Grossman (1986); 
Williamson (1989); Tirole (1999); Hart (1990, 2003)), the literature on PPPs (and 
particularly on renegotiation) is not abundant, as private firms rarely share 
information regarding their agreements, and are even more unlikely to share 
information about their renegotiation decisions and their outcomes. The relevance 
of the Latin American experience also arises from the fact that PPPs renegotiation 
has been more frequent than theory or international experience would predict 
(Bitran, 2013). Studies originate from Guasch’s research, as mentioned previously. 
However, other studies of the Latin American experience of PPPs renegotiation were 
carried out by: Engel et al. (2003) on highway privatization in Latin America; 
Estache et al. (2009) on price cap efficiency; Moore et al. (2014) on the impact of 
capital structure on renegotiations; and Bitran et al. (2013), based on the experience 
of Chile, Colombia and Peru. 
Guasch’s work found that a high level of PPPs had renegotiated their contracts at 
least once. In the specific case of transport, it was found that 55% of all PPPs were 
renegotiated. This is a higher incidence than the average renegotiation (30%), and 
is considerably greater than other sectors, such as electricity and 
telecommunications. PPPs in transport were only renegotiated less than PPPs in 
water and sanitation sector. This could be the result of different degrees of 
competition and regulation, as in most cases, the transport projects were operating 
in a low competition environment (the operator usually being the only one available 
to users). Renegotiation of transport concessions occurred after an average of 3.1 
years, with 60% of renegotiations occurring within the first 3 years of a concession, 
and 85% within the first four years. The private sector demanded renegotiations in 
transport PPPs 57% of the time (with the Government asking for renegotiation 27% 
of the time, and with 16% of renegotiations initiated by both sectors). 
More recently, Guasch et al. (2014) expand their analyses of the Latin American 
experience. The incidence of renegotiated contracts in the transport sector is over 
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75% of all contracts. In several road PPPs projects, the repetition of renegotiation 
events was significant. The authors also found that 78% of PPP contracts for 
transport infrastructure in Latin America were renegotiated fairly quickly after the 
signing of the contract (3.1 years). Furthermore, results from Bitran (2014) come 
from the same direction. These authors also found that almost all PPPs were 
renegotiated. Renegotiation also occurred in most of cases during the first three 
years of a project. 
Renegotiation in the Latin American context provided several outcomes. The most 
common were: delay/reduction in investment; tariff increases, and; extension of the 
contract period or direct (annual or lump-sum) compensations paid to the private 
operator (Guasch, 2004). Bitran et al. (2013) also found evidence of direct fiscal 
costs, higher toll prices, and risks being allocated to the public sector. On the other 
hand, renegotiations costs tend to be deferred as future payments. The main 
determinants of renegotiation in the Latin American experience are summarized in 
Table 26.  
Table 26. Determinants of PPPs renegotiations in Latin America 
Variables 
Impact on 
renegotiation 
probability 
Authors 
Better government 
efficiency and 
regulatory quality 
Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); Guasch & Straub 
(2009); Estache et al. (2009); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Better rule of law and 
less corruption 
Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); Guasch & Straub 
(2009); Estache et al. (2009); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Election period Increase 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); Guasch & Straub 
(2009); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Increase in GDP 
growth 
Reduce 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); Guasch & Straub 
(2009) 
More investment Increase 
Guasch et al. (2003, 2007, 2008); Guasch (2004); 
Guasch & Straub (2009); 
Longer contract 
durations 
Not significant Guasch et al. (2003, 2008); Bitran et al. (2013) 
Government 
guarantees 
Increase Guasch et al. (2003, 2007) 
Transport sector Increase Guasch et al. (2003, 2007); Guasch & Straub (2009) 
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The existence of a regulator and better institutional quality reduce the probability 
of renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2003, 2007, 2008; Guasch & Straub, 2009; Estache et 
al., 2009; Bitran et al. 2013). This can be explained by the fact that a regulator can 
reduce the effect of contract incompleteness by leaving less room for mistakes and 
uncertainties. In addition, better rule of law and lower corruption tends to reduce 
the likelihood of a renegotiation event. This is the result of the extent to which 
disputes can be resolved quickly, reliably, and fairly in a Court of Law. The mere 
possibility (or threat) of renegotiation being negotiated in an efficient court may 
affect renegotiation and its duration (Guasch et al., 2003, 2006). A better economic 
environment, measured by the GDP growth, has an impact in reducing the 
occurrence of renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2003, 2007, 2008; Guasch & Straub, 
2009).  
On the contrary, electoral periods tend to increase the occurrence of renegotiation. 
This could result in political pressure in the face of elections (Williamson, 1989; 
Guasch et al., 2003; Neto et al. 2018), but also opportunistic behaviour (also known 
as “strategic misrepresentation”, see, for instance Osland & Strand, 2010) from both 
sides of the argument (Governments being eager to change contracts to increase 
votes, and firms taking advantage of electoral cycles to increase rents; Guasch et al., 
2007, 2008). Bitran et al. (2013) found that Government-led renegotiation is more 
often associated with electoral periods. This was the result of Governments’ 
opportunistic behaviour in seeking votes and increasing spending limits. However, 
as a result, Governments usually do not permit project failure or the interruption of 
services. Furthermore, tight public budgets typically encourage the public sector to 
pass on substantial investment obligations to the private sector, by means of PPP 
contracts, which can include Government guarantees, which is another determinant 
that is often found to increase the frequency of renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2003, 
2007). 
Projects with more investment tend to increase the likelihood of renegotiation, as 
they represent a higher level of uncertainty (Guasch et al., 2003, 2006: Guasch, 
2004). Furthermore, large projects are more likely to experience cost overruns, 
considering that they are more complex, less standardized, and more prone to 
contingencies (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Moore et al., 2014). 
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Guasch & Straub (2006) and Guasch, Laffont, & Straub (2007) differentiate the 
probability of firm-led and government-led renegotiation, and confirm the 
importance of the above variables. Engel, Fischer & Galetovic (2009) study PPPs in 
Chile, and find evidence that in a competitive market, firms lowball their offers, 
expecting to break even through renegotiation, while governments use 
renegotiation to increase spending and shift the burden of payments to future 
governments. 
In addition, Moore et al. (2014) examine the Latin American experience for the role 
of financial performance in triggering renegotiation. They found evidence that 
financial performance does not increase renegotiation, and that renegotiation does 
not alter the regulatory framework.  
Finally, several studies found that renegotiation is more likely to occur in the 
transport sector (Neto et al. 2016, 2018). This could be due the effect of low 
competition, as facilities and services usually operate in natural monopolies. 
However, this could also be the effect of longer contracts, with higher levels of 
investment. In contrasting to telecommunications, transport operators do not suffer 
from “reputational damage”, and are therefore more able to seek additional rents, at 
the taxpayers’ and users’ expense. 
Despite the abnormal frequency of renegotiation and the benefits for the private 
sector, the PPP program in Latin America has resulted in the construction of 
infrastructures that would not otherwise have been build using public procurement 
(due to fiscal constrains), thus reducing the “infrastructure gap” of the region. 
However, the consequence of renegotiation is that the benefits to the public could 
have been higher if substantial effort had been made to avoid such frequent 
renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2014). 
 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
In order to analyse the Brazilian experience (and compare it with the literature from 
the Latin American experience), it was collected data from 27 PPPs concessions (at 
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the regional level). Data was collected from the original contracts, as were the 
renegotiation terms (called “Termos Aditivos”). All these documents are publicly 
available. From these 27 projects, seven are in the transport sector6. These are 
comprised of three highways, three urban rails and one bridge. These seven 
concessions, from 2007 to 2016, had 20 renegotiation events. 
It was used Probit models on panel data, whereby each year (our dependent 
variable) was labelled as either being a renegotiation, or a non-renegotiation year. 
Specifically, it was assumed that the model takes the form of: Pr  (𝑌 = 1 | 𝑋) =
 𝜙 ( 𝑋´ 𝛽) [1], where Pr denotes the probability, and Φ is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. The parameters β can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood. It is possible to motivate the probit model as a latent variable 
model. If it was supposed there existed an auxiliary random variable: 𝑌∗ = 𝑋´ 𝛽 +  𝜀 
[2], where ε ~ N(0, 1), thus, Y was viewed as an indicator for whether this latent 
variable was positive: 
𝑌 =  
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌∗ > 0 𝑖. 𝑒 −  𝜀 < 𝑋 ´ 𝛽
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  [1] 
It was used random-effects and population-averaged probit models and cluster 
standard errors at the concession (project) level. Furthermore, in order to take into 
consideration the fact that several project characteristics were not included and that 
contract clauses could be endogenous, it was used firm effects. To consider the effect 
of time on the probability of renegotiation, it was used year effects as well. 
In our model, renegotiation events take the value of one, and zero for the non-
renegotiation years of renegotiated concessions (5 of a total of 7, whereby some 
were renegotiated multiple times throughout our period sample), and all the 
concession years of the two concessions that were never renegotiated. In this model, 
it has 20 renegotiation events taking the value of 1, and 34 non-renegotiation years, 
amounting to a total of 54 observations. 
In order to compare with the results from the Latin American experience described 
in the literature, it was used the following independent variables (Table 27): 
                                                 
6 Metro Bahia; Rodovia MG50; Linha 4 São Paulo; Tamoios São Paulo; CTrens São Paulo; Rota 
Fronteiras (Paraná); Rota Coqueiros (Pernambuco).  
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ely represents the election year (at the regional level), and it assumes 1 if the 
renegotiation started in a year with elections, and 0 otherwise. As it has been seen, 
election periods are prone to an increase in renegotiation, due to opportunistic 
behaviour from both parties. It was also used the year lead (elylead) and the year 
lag of each election year (elylag). In order to control for these effects it was used the 
political party that was in power in that region. This variable, party, assumes 1 if the 
regional government is right wing, and 0 if it is left wing. In addition, during 
elections, government can change, and this can impact on renegotiations. To control 
for this, it was used a variable govchange, which assumes 1 if the government 
changed after an election, and 0 otherwise.  
rlaw (rule of law) and corrp (anti-corruption level) are proxies for the quality of 
contract (enforcement) and regulatory quality at the country level (Brazil). These 
variables are dynamic, with the values ranging from 0 to 10, or 0 to 100 (quartile). 
The source of these values is the World Bank. An increase in the score signifies an 
improvement in the country’s situation. Rule of Law represents the quality and 
strength of the legal system. Better enforcement is expected to dissuade or reject 
inappropriate claims for renegotiation. Less corruption is also perceived as reducing 
the likelihood of renegotiation.  If operators believe that governmental decision 
making is subject to influence, the odds for renegotiation as a way of capturing 
additional rents may increase (Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999).  
gdpg is the growth of GDP, whereby it is expected that higher economic growth 
reduces the incidence of renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2006). 
Contract incompleteness and complexity, which present higher uncertainty lead to 
more renegotiation. It was used the investment of each project (logcapex) and also 
cdur for the duration of each contract. Long (and with higher investments) contract 
duration induces higher uncertainty regarding economic, technological, social, or 
political evolutions and is more prone to instability and forecast failure (Guasch, 
2004; Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015; Chong & Hopkins, 2016). 
It was also used natshareh, with 0 if the majority of the equity capital is owned by 
foreign companies, and 1 if the majority is owned by national companies. Political 
connections of the private parties can affect renegotiations (Guasch et al., 2004, 
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Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012), and it is expected that when foreign firms are the main 
shareholders in a concession, that the lack of political ties is negatively related to the 
probability of renegotiation. This is particularly relevant in the Brazilian context due 
to the major scandal of corruption involving government and the main construction 
companies called “lava-jato”. 
With regards to the control for the experience arising from previous renegotiations, 
it was used two following variables yearsreneg is the years since the previous 
renegotiation was started, where it is expected that a higher number of years since 
the previous renegotiation increases the likelihood of a renegotiation). concyear is 
the concession age, whereby it is expected that a longer experience in managing the 
concessions from both parties reduces the occurrence of renegotiation (Domingues 
& Sarmento, 2016). It was knowed that the average concession contract is 
renegotiated multiple times, however it is expected past renegotiation experience 
to reduce the probability of subsequent renegotiation (Ariño et al., 2014). 
Table 27. Variables definition 
Variable Type/unit Level Description 
ely; elylag; 
ely lead 
Dummy Regional 
If the renegotiation started in a year with regional election, or in 
a year previous (lag) or after (lead) an election 
govchange Dummy Regional 1 if the election produced a change in government; 0 otherwise 
party Dummy Regional 1 if the regional government was right-wing; 0 otherwise 
corrp 
Discrete 
(0-100) 
Country 
Measure of the level of the country’s corruption. 100 is the best 
score. An increase in score means less corruption 
rlaw 
Discrete 
(0-100) 
Country 
Measures the efficiency of the judicial and contract system. 100 
is the best score. An increase in score means less corruption 
gdpg Continuous Country The growth of real GDP as a percentage 
cdur Discrete Project The number of years of duration of a contract 
logcapex Log Project The log of the total investment of each project 
natshar Dummy Project 
0 if the majority of the capital is owned by foreign companies, 
and 1 if it is owned by domestic companies 
concyears Discrete Project The number of years of the concession for each observation 
yearsreneg Discrete Project The number of years since the previous renegotiation 
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Table 28 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used. A correlation 
matrix (not formally reported) shows evidence of multicollinearity between 
govchange and eleylead, corrp and gdpg, cdur and natshar, yearsreneg and cyear. 
The Wald test for all variables had a p-value of 0.000. The Ramsey test did not show 
any omitted variable in our models. Furthermore, it was tested for the normality of 
the residuals.  
Table 28. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
reneg 54 0,37 0,49 0 1 
privled 16 0,56 0,51 0 1 
ely 54 0,28 0,45 0 1 
elylag 54 0,17 0,38 0 1 
ely lead 54 0,28 0,45 0 1 
govchange 54 0,17 0,38 0 1 
party 54 0,87 0,34 0 1 
corrp 54 51,29 7,84 41,40 63,00 
rlaw 54 44,52 17,86 41,2 56,3 
gdpg 54 1,36 3,88 -3,90 7,50 
cdur 54 28,72 4,50 20,00 33,00 
logcapex 54 6,30 1,40 4,34 8,19 
natshar 54 0,81 0,39 0 1 
concyears 54 4,80 2,95 1 11 
yearsreneg 54 0,89 1,04 0 4 
 
5.4 The Brazilian experience in transport PPPs  
Despite being one of the largest countries in the world, Brazil has a strong 
“infrastructure gap”, particularly in the road and railway sector (Neto et al., 2018). 
As Brazil is a federal country, infrastructures (and also transportation) are 
developed at the federal, state, and municipal level. However, Brazil has strong fiscal 
constraints, due to a small tax revenue base and increasing pressure on social 
expenses, particularly education, health, and pensions. Therefore, the federal, state, 
and municipal governments struggle to raise capital to cover maintenance 
expenditure and have granted the private sector the right to exploit their 
infrastructures, through concessions.  
In 1995, the general concessions Federal Law No. 8.987/95 was published. In the 
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2000s, there was a need for a new contractual model, which allowed not only 
maintenance, but also the implementation of new infrastructures required to 
promote economic and social development. In 2003, the government of Minas 
Gerais advanced and launched the first law and the first unit of PPPs in Brazil. In 
2004, the state of São Paulo launched the first Brazilian PPP, the "yellow 4 metro 
line”, in the city of São Paulo. In the same year, the Federal Government published 
the Federal Law governing PPPs No. 11.079/04.  
The start of a new era for PPPs began with Federal Law governing PPPs No. 
11.079/04. This law defines two models for concessions: sponsored or 
administrative modality. In the case of administrative modality, the private 
partner´s compensation is provided exclusively through public payments, while in 
the sponsored concession modality, private partner remuneration is carried out by 
the payment of users’ fees, which sometimes is complemented by public 
instalments. These two modalities were designed to cover all infrastructure 
projects. The Brazilian PPP law also define prerequisites of at least a five years 
period of service provision, and a minimum of R$ 20 million (about US$ 6.3 million) 
for this type of contract. Federal Law No. 12.766/12 amended Law No. 11.079/04, 
promoting some improvements to the previous law, making this contractual model 
more attractive to the private partner, whilst allowing the public entity to make 
payments to the private partner during the investment phase, even before the work 
is completed and is operational. 
Thereafter, there is an increasing search for new projects. According to RadarPPP 
(2016), between 2006 and 2016, 121 concession contracts were signed. Of these 
total contracts, 35 were concession contracts bidding under Federal Law No. 8.987 
/ 95, which is called the General Concessions Law. The other 86 contracts were 
signed under Federal Law No. 11.079 / 04 - PPPs Law, of which 71 were 
administrative concession contracts, and 15 were from sponsored concessions. 
Surprisingly, the Federal Government only developed one federal PPP contract - 
“Datacenter Complex”, which is a data centre of the Central Bank and Caixa 
Econômica Bank (RadarPPP, 2016).  
The majority of PPP projects are developed at State and municipal level, with 48 and 
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37 projects respectively. The total investment in these contracts is R$ 147 billion 
(approx. US$ 46 billion). Of this total, R$ 53 billion (approx. US$ 16.5 billion) were 
for projects for the implementation of urban trains, highways, urban mobility, and 
airports. Almost 40% of the total invested in PPPs was for projects in the transport 
sector (RadarPPP, 2016). 
The State and municipal governments have made progress in the publication of PPP 
laws, based largely on the Federal Law, but were often behind schedule in the 
implementation of PPP units and invested little in training and qualification of the 
technical staff of these management bodies.  
In 2016, the Federal Government implemented the Investment Partnerships 
Program-IPP, in order to define the priority services for implementation using the 
PPP model. Faced with the economic crisis, the Federal Government adopted a 
strategy of accelerating common concession projects, an example being the 
concessions of the federal airports of Florianópolis, Salvador de Bahia, Porto Alegre, 
and Fortaleza (ANAC, 2017). For this type of concession there is no immediate public 
investment and the private partner is required to maintain and/or improve the 
public equipment granted since the signing of the contract.   
 
5.5 Results 
Data concerning the 27 PPPs projects and the 81 renegotiation events of all sectors 
is described in Table 29. These projects were implemented in the following sectors: 
transports (7), environment (7), health (4), sports (6 - mainly stadiums for the 2014 
World Cup), prisons (2), and housing (1). These projects represent the regional PPPs 
after the 2007 decision to re-launch concessions to private under PPPs schemes.  
Regarding the transport sector, of the seven projects, six were renegotiated at least 
once (85%), meaning that almost all projects had pitfalls that provoked 
renegotiation. In addition, a substantial number of renegotiations were for projects 
implemented in recent years. As our sample covers the first years of each project 
(with the first project starting in 2006) up until 2016, on average, these seven 
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projects had already run five years since they were contracted. This means that 
during those five years, there was an average of more than three renegotiations. 
Furthermore, after just two years of contract, it was found three renegotiation 
events. The number of events increases to nine after three year’s contract, and 11 
events after four years of contract. The early start of a renegotiation could be the 
result of a contract not being well designed, with pitfalls occurring during the 
bidding process, or political pressure being exerted for the infrastructure or service. 
With a total of 20 renegotiation events, transport accounted for 25% of the total 
renegotiation events (20 out of 81). This represents an average of 3.3 renegotiations 
for each of the six projects. The transport sector did not renegotiate more than the 
environment sector in absolute terms (each sector has seven PPPs, with transport 
accounting for 20 renegotiations, as opposed to 21 for the environment sector). 
When comparing with the Latin American experience describe above, Brazilian 
transport PPPs tend to renegotiate more (as Guasch data only show 55% of PPPs 
being renegotiated). 
Table 29. Sector data 
 Transport Environment Health Sports Prisons Housing Total 
Nº PPPs 7 7 4 6 2 1 27 
Nº PPPs renegotiated 6 7 4 6 1 1 25 
Nº Renegotiations 
events 
20 21 11 17 8 4 81 
% of the total 
Renegotiation events 
25% 26% 14% 21% 10% 5% n.a 
Average number of 
renegotiations by 
PPPs 
2.9 3 2.8 2.8 4 4 3 
 
The detail figures on the 20 renegotiation events for transport are described in 
Table 30. Interestingly, from the 16 renegotiation events that it was identified, that 
triggered renegotiation, 15 were from PPPs with domestic shareholders holding the 
majority of the capital (as, accordingly, it was unable to use that variable in our 
regressions with privled renegotiations). From those 15 events, nine were private-
led, meaning that all our renegotiation events triggered by the private sector were 
from PPPs owned by domestic shareholders. This is strong evidence that domestic 
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firms tend to renegotiate more and with a higher bargaining power. Furthermore, 
renegotiation occurred mainly when right-wing governments were in power. 
However, this could be due to the fact that for most of the time in these regions, the 
right wing was in power. In other words, this could just be the effect of time (which 
is something to be discuss later in our regressions, when using this variable). A 
substantial number of renegotiations occurred during an electoral period (15, if was 
considered not only an election year, but also the lag and the lead). 
Table 30. Transport Renegotiations events 
This table presents the renegotiation events according to several variables used in this chapter. The 
total number of renegotiation events in transport was 20. From these, it was able to collect data of 
who triggered the renegotiation (private or public) for 16. From these, nine were private led and 
seven were public led. 
 
 
Nº Renegotiation 
events (N=20) 
Nº private-led 
events (N=9) 
In an election year 6 4 
In a year previous to an election 3 1 
In a year after an election 6 1 
With a change of government 4 1 
With a right-wing government 18 8 
PPPs with domestic shareholders holding the 
majority of the capital 
15 9 
The motives for Brazilian PPPs renegotiation are described in Table 31. It is 
presented the number of times each motive was used, both for transport PPPs and 
for all sectors. When looking at the transport sector, a significant number of changes 
result from the inclusion or exclusion of clauses in the contract, which do not create 
contingencies, obligations, or financial commitments. However, several 
renegotiations were due to changes in the project design and features, along with 
additional works, showing that initial planning may have some pitfalls. This is 
reinforced by the number of renegotiations that were due to delays in expropriation. 
There is a clear predominance of governmental change of scope (rather than 
private-sector-driven opportunism). In the Brazilian case there seems to be more 
effect of government inefficiency and strategic misinterpretation (or eventually 
opportunistic behaviour from public sector, seeking votes during electoral periods, 
as most of the renegotiation events also happens during electoral years) than 
opportunistic behaviour from private sector.  
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Table 31. Renegotiations motives (in Transport sector PPPs) 
In some cases, the process of renegotiation was due to more than one reason. Source: Authors, 
based on data collected. 
 
Motives Description Who 
caused the 
contract 
change 
Who 
triggered 
the other 
party 
Nº of 
motives in 
Transport 
PPPs 
Total 
Change in 
project 
design 
▪ Change in the scope of 
the contract. Government creates/ 
eliminates services 
Public 
Private/ 
Public 
7 20 
Change in 
project 
features 
▪ The Government 
change its demands about projects 
features, for technical or political 
propose.  
▪ The private partner 
suggests a different technical solution 
to improve the project 
cost/performance. 
Public/ 
Private 
Private/ 
Public 
4 9 
Additional 
work 
▪ Additional investment.  
▪ Government decides 
(or Private claims) to increase 
investment/services. 
Public/ 
Private 
Public/ 
Private 
2 8 
Tax benefits ▪ Tax benefits offered by 
the Government. 
Public 
Public/ 
Private 
0 4 
Change in 
environmen
t 
requiremen
ts 
▪ Necessary changes in a 
project to achieve permission from a 
government environmental agency 
and in order to comply with 
legislation. 
Public Public 0 4 
Administrat
ive delays 
▪ Extension of the 
deadlines for the realization of the 
investments and/or operational 
activities, due to public 
administrative delays. 
Public Private 1 3 
Review of 
previous 
terms 
▪ The Government 
publishes additional terms, reviewing 
clauses and/or previous terms. 
Public Public 0 3 
Analysis of 
contract 
terms 
▪ Interruption of the 
contract until the Government 
completes the technical analysis and 
economic/ financial feasibility of the 
project.   
Public Public 0 3 
Delay in 
expropriatio
n 
▪ The delay or non-
expropriation of land. Public Private 3 3 
Transfer of 
corporate 
control  
▪ The concessionaire 
transfers ownership. Private Private 0 2 
Change in 
the risk 
matrix 
▪ Reduction of the 
contractual guarantees of the 
Government. 
Public/ 
Private 
Private 0 2 
Force 
Majeure 
▪ Acts of God. 
Private Private 0 1 
Specific 
legal 
changes 
▪ Changes in sector or 
project legislation. Private Private 0 1 
Corrections 
to the 
contract 
▪ Inclusion or exclusion 
of clauses in the contract, which do 
not create contingencies, obligations, 
or financial commitments. 
Private/ 
Public 
Private/ 
Public 
17 39 
TOTAL 34 102 
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The results for the probit model of the determinants of renegotiations are presented 
in Table 32. Our results confirmed most of the results from the literature concerning 
the Latin American experience. As expected, political context matters in terms of the 
likelihood of renegotiation. Election periods increase the probability of 
renegotiations. In addition, right-wing parties in regional governments seem to 
renegotiate more (even when controlling for time effects). Lastly, political ties are 
important, as PPPs with national shareholders renegotiate much more frequently 
that PPPs with foreign shareholders, which confirms our previous results.  
Contract uncertainty also seems to increase the likelihood of a renegotiation event 
occurring. It can be seen that longer contracts (cdur) and higher investment 
(logcapex) are significant, with a positive coefficient.  
On the other hand, and in line with the literature, a less corrupted environment 
tends to reduce the probability of a renegotiation event. This is true, even when it is 
controled for GDP growth. A better economic performance is also likely to reduce 
renegotiations. Finally, better experience in the management of PPPs tends to 
reduce renegotiations. The concession age (cyears) is significant, with a negative 
coefficient. 
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Table 32. Probit Renegotiations 
This table presents the results of a probit model with year and firm effects, and renegotiation/no-
renegotiation event (1 in case of a renegotiation) as the dependent variable. It is used alternative 
variables in some models, as it cannot include all variables in the same model due to multicollinearity. 
It is used year effects, country (State effects) and firm effects to control for possible specific effects. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustering of standard errors is at the contract level. *** 
stands for p<0.01, ** stands for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES reneg reneg reneg reneg reneg 
      
Political variables 
ely  2.99**  2.35*  2.07** 0.69  2.99** 
 (1.49) (1.22) (0.94) (1.09) (1.49) 
elylag 0.70 -1.31 -1.23 1.93 0.70 
 (1.04) (0.97) (0.90) (1.41) (1.04) 
elylead -0.17 -0.11  -0.26 -0.17 
 (0.91) (0.91)  (0.86) (0.91) 
party 6.11*** 6.10*** 6.27*** 6.11*** 6.11*** 
 (0.93) (0.98) (1.13) (0.92) (0.92) 
govchange   0.30   
   (0.85)   
Institutional Variables 
corrp -0.52*** -0.04 -0.03  -0.52*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.18) 
rlaw -0.01 0.05** 0.05**  -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
gdpg    -1.01*  
    (0.56)  
Contract variables (control) 
cdur 0.33*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.38***  
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)  
logcapex -2.61* 2.47*** 2.47*** -1.01 -2.87** 
 (1.40) (0.35) (0.34) (1.65) (1.38) 
natshar     3.63*** 
     (0.95) 
Experience variables (control) 
concyears -2.53***   -1.67* -2.53*** 
 (0.80)   (0.92) (0.80) 
yearsreneg  0.70 0.64   
  (0.47) (0.42)   
      
Constant 42.02* -34.15*** -34.72*** -1.00 50.36** 
 (22.64) (5.71) (5.97) (16.18) (21.81) 
      
      
Wald test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.30 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 
5.6 Policy implications 
The results from the previous section provide us with some insights to draw policy 
implications from this research. Failures in project studies and concept and planning 
(in terms of the scope of the project, level of investment, improper and ambiguous 
risk allocation, minimum requirements, selection criteria, and PPP procurement 
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procedures, as well as lack of effective contract monitoring) all tend to increase 
renegotiation. Furthermore, opportunistic behaviour by the public sector (to obtain 
benefits from inaugurating a new infrastructure or service, or a change of conditions 
for users) can also trigger renegotiation, together with opportunistic behaviour 
from the private sector, which, typically, is eager to increase rents. 
Firstly, transport PPPs in Brazil have renegotiated substantially, and it can be 
claimed with an abnormal frequency. Our analyses show strong weakness in 
planning (as many renegotiation events occurred due to contract and project 
changes, together with administrative delays). This means that projects are often 
developed without careful planning, with several administrative processes still not 
being concluded (e.g. obtaining permits and approvals). There is also scope to 
improve the bidding process, as these renegotiations have shown some evidence of 
a lack of transparency and competition during the process. There could be a 
distortion in a public tender, in that the most likely winner is not always the most 
efficient operator but is the most expert/qualified in renegotiation. In addition, 
monitoring the construction and operation of PPPs should be of concern for public 
authorities. This implies that the first policy implication is that Brazilian public 
authorities need to improve the processes of planning and procurement, given their 
impact on the likelihood of renegotiation.  
Our sample covers PPPs in five different Brazil regional states (Bahia; Minas Gerais, 
Paraná; São Paulo, and Permanbuco). From these five regional governments, only 
Bahia has a PPP unit that is centralized at the regional level. The pitfalls presented 
may reflect the lack of legal/technical ability and foresight on the part of the 
executive public entities, and the prevalence of asymmetric information in the case 
of the public sector. The best practices in PPPs (OCDE, 2010) provide evidence for 
our second policy implication: the need for PPPs units in each region. There is also 
a role to be played by a regional level Court of Audits, as these entities usually play 
a very important part in the PPPs process, increasing accountability and 
transparency and providing better practices.  
Public authorities also need to learn more from the private sector, as the increase in 
the number of years of each PPP seems to reduce the occurrence of future 
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renegotiation. There is some evidence of a learning process in the case of them 
private sector. This expertise needs to be shared and captured on the public side. 
For this to happen, an institutionalized body is needed to retain knowledge and to 
consolidate a learning curve. Our third policy implication is that the public sector, 
based on a PPP unit, needs to increase access to data and information regarding each 
project.  
Considering that during elections renegotiation occurs more frequently, and that the 
Government frequently takes the initiative to initiate renegotiation, our fourth 
policy implication is the need for renegotiation to be carried out, or at least 
evaluated, by an independent authority where political influence is minimized as 
much as possible. This could be the above-mentioned PPP unit, although the 
prospect of monitoring and renegotiation by the same entity can also pose some 
risks. In addition, there is a need to set fiscal rules to limit public spending on PPPs. 
Our fifth policy implication regards the political connections, in a country such as 
Brazil, where this issue is a major problem. A ban on conflicts of interests by former 
politicians (and by extension, those with experience in the relevant ministries) 
ought to be introduced, even if the political ties had been established in the past. 
As the Brazilian public sector intends to continue to launch new PPPs projects, 
particularly in the transport field, all these policy implications are extremely 
relevant. The public sector in Brazil needs to evaluate the concept and planning of 
PPPs, otherwise new projects will repeat the same errors as in the past, leading to 
new renegotiation events with an abnormal level of recurrence. 
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5.7 Partial conclusions 
This chapter presents the Brazilian experience of renegotiation for regional (state) 
Public Private Partnerships in transport from 2006 to 2016. There is some evidence 
of a high level of renegotiation, confirming the previous findings of Guasch (2004) 
and Neto et al. (2018). These renegotiations have decreased the initial benefits and 
advantages of the PPP model, also causing a fiscal impact. While some renegotiations 
may have been efficient, this high frequency indicates a degree of opportunistic 
behaviour, particularly from the public side. It was also found that electoral period 
and change in government increase the probability of renegotiation. The likelihood 
of renegotiation is also increased by contract uncertainty (longer and with higher 
investment). On the contrary, a better institutional and economic environment 
decreases the occurrence of renegotiation. 
Renegotiation is probably the greatest risk for the successful development of a PPP. 
Given the long-term nature of these projects, renegotiation will have a profound and 
long-term impact, as well as the potential to erode all the benefits that support the 
case for adopting the PPP model. The lessons from existing processes can provide a 
valuable contribution for developing countries that have, or plan to have, active PPP 
programs.  
Based on our results, it is provided several policy implications which not only are 
applicable for the Brazilian context, but also to a large extent for medium income 
countries, particularly those that are still in the early stages of implementing a PPP 
program. Improving the performance of PPPs and reducing the occurrence of 
renegotiation (particularly when motivated by opportunistic behaviour) can bring 
substantial value to both the public and the private sectors. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
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6.1 General findings 
Developing and emerging countries have a considerable infrastructure deficit 
around the world. With restricted budgets, their governments must decide between 
two options to carry out these expensive projects: i) build these projects themselves; 
ii) or delegate its construction and management to the private sector. The first 
choice obliges governments to have the money during the project construction 
period and to assume the management and maintenance of the infrastructure 
forever. In the second case (PPPs), governments (most of the time) abstain from 
payments during construction, beginning the payment of benefits to the 
concessionaire only from the start of its operation and management. 
The choice of these governments by the PPPs at first sight seems logical: to delegate 
to the private the construction, operation and maintenance of these infrastructures 
and pay in soft installments. However, in order to achieve the economic and social 
objectives to which the project was originally designed, it does not seem like a task 
for beginners. Otherwise, there would not be an endless number of PPP projects 
being renegotiated everywhere.  
In general terms, the main objective of this thesis was to review the literature on the 
subject of PPPs, analyzing it and comparing it with the Brazilian case, seeking to 
identify problems and solutions that would contribute to the improvement of PPPs 
in Brazil. 
The starting point (Chapter 2) was to know and review the academic literature on 
PPPs. In the bibliometric analysis from the Web of Science, more than 600 papers 
were analysed over a period of 25 years. This work pointed out that the growing 
interest of the academy by theme. This reinforces the trend of increasing the number 
of PPP projects each year, with the strongest growth in developing countries.  
This chapter also presented important conclusions to indicate the contents to be 
studied in the following chapters of the thesis. Firstly, the two tables created by us 
showed that the projects sectors with the greatest number of published papers were 
transportation and health and environmental care. This result would be repeated in 
the chapter dealing with Governance and PPP Units (Chapter 3), where the project 
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sectors with the highest number of PPPs in Brazil are exactly the same. Another 
relevant conclusion was that the research topics that had the least number of 
published papers were the termination and renegotiation of contracts. After 
observing the intriguing number of renegotiations revealed through the data 
obtained in this chapter 3 (PPP Units and Renegotiations), it was realized the need 
to thoroughly investigate these cases, having dedicated the last two chapters of the 
thesis to the subject of renegotiations. 
 
6.2 PPP Governance 
A consensus statement within the theme´s researchers is that the success of PPPs is 
directly linked to the degree of experience and knowhow of governments to manage 
the projects life-cycle from its conception, planning, project design and contract 
management. Few papers have been written about PPPs in Brazil and even less 
about their programs. The challenge then was to collect the data available on the 
internet and, when possible, to confront information directly hosted by government 
departments. In Chapter 3 it was analysed the Brazilian PPPs units and programs. 
The survey collected data from the 27 federative units, where more than 200 
projects were identified in their most different stages. 
Looking at the Brazilian governance model, it was concluded that the sponsoring 
departments were the same ones that responded for the state budgeting and/or the 
governments´ strategic decisions. This may indicate that governors prefer that PPPs 
be in places that they trust and have easy and immediate access. Evidence found that 
the units with the largest staff were not proportional to the number of projects 
contracted. However, in relation to the contract management of these PPPs, it was 
noticed that the most experienced units with the highest number of contracted 
projects were, as a rule, the same ones with the highest number of renegotiated 
projects.  
In Brazil, it was observed that the first state governments movement towards the 
implementation of PPP programs was through the publication of their state´s PPP 
law. Of the 27 federative units, 25 had already published these laws, which 
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demonstrates the governments growing interest in these contractual models, during 
these 15 years of PPP´s Federal Law no. 11,079/04, was published. However, state 
governments do not seem to show the same interest in promoting transparency, as 
only half of them provide information about their PPP programs and projects on the 
Internet. Here the most experienced PPP units, and with the greatest number of 
projects, are the ones that provide the greatest number and detail of this 
information. 
It was noticed the growth in the number of Brazilian´s PPP projects, with emphasis 
on transportation sector, where one-fourth of the 49 projects were contracted. 
These expensive projects require the financial contribution of the users. Next came 
the environment and health sectors, which confirms the worldwide trend previously 
identified in Chapter 2 (Literature Review). It was also realized that governments 
were more likely to sign PPP contracts in the last years of government than in the 
early years. This may reflect that the PPP implementation time is relatively large 
and/or that new governments are not comfortable signing PPP contracts that have 
not been generated within their administrations. 
 
6.3 Renegotiations 
Renegotiations of PPP contracts can have undesirable effects on both partners. 
Sometimes the repercussion is so representative that it can result in the partial 
annulment of the social benefit expected by the public sector. In the case of the 
private sector, the reduction of payments can have such a large impact that it can 
make the projected financial return unfeasible. In emerging countries like Brazil, 
governments cannot afford to take the risk of having such high investments not 
completed or completed at an unrealistic cost, eliminating its value-for-money. 
If the challenge of finding articles on PPP program management was hard, finding 
scientific articles on the renegotiations of Brazilian PPPs even more difficult. 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in finding information made available by 
governments, or sometimes because of the quality and quantity of available 
information, or because the subject is relatively recent. In chapter 4 it was analysed 
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all 42 Brazilian state PPPs, since 2006, in the most diverse sectors. Of these, 27 had 
been renegotiated at least once. Such a large number of cases aroused our interest 
in finding out if there was a pattern in these renegotiations. All the information 
available on the internet, and on the websites of the public bodies, as well as the 
private sectors, were confronted with the answers of a questionnaire, previously 
prepared, sent to each state PPP unit or body responsible for PPPs in these states. 
It was concluded that, in most cases, the first renegotiation event occurred within a 
short period after the start of the contract. With the increase in the number of 
projects, and with the progress of each contract, renegotiations occurred more 
frequently. It was noticed that in most cases the motive was on the side of the public 
sector, due to failures in planning and contract design. It was also noted that 
electoral periods and political connections between partners had a significant 
impact on renegotiations. Aspects such as government political party in the 
mandate, nationality of the consortium, and allocation of risk of demand to the 
private increased the likelihood of renegotiations. These conclusions lead us to 
write chapter 5, where it was investigated even more deeply the political 
implications in the renegotiations, using as sample the Brazilian PPPs of the 
transport sector. 
The case of renegotiations in the transportation sector in Brazil (Chapter 5) 
confirms previous conclusion of chapter 4, that PPPs tend to be renegotiated too 
often and too soon. Other similar conclusion reinforced in this chapter is the that 
failures in the design and planning of these projects occurred due to negligence in 
the preparation of its scope, level of investment, improper and ambiguous risk 
allocation, minimum requirements, selection criteria, and PPP procurement 
procedures, as well as lack of effective contract monitoring. It was also perceived the 
opportunistic behavior of the public sector has also been confirmed, which in the 
impetus to obtain the sympathy of the population with the inauguration of a new 
infrastructure or service, or a change of conditions for the users, can provoke a 
renegotiation along with opportunistic behavior of the private sector, which, usually 
eager to increase rents. 
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Finally, confirming the indications in chapter 3 (PPP Units and Governance), it was 
verified the need for PPP units in all regions, as well as increase access to data and 
information of their projects. In addition, there are a need for renegotiations to be 
carried out, or at least evaluated, by an independent authority, where political 
influence is minimized as much as possible. Renegotiations have reduced the 
benefits and advantages initially foreseen in the contractual model of PPPs. On the 
other hand, improve institutional and regulatory framework, will decrease the 
occurrence of renegotiation. 
 
6.4 Further developments 
During the curse of this research, several interesting and unanswered questions 
have emerged along the several chapters. The issues not refereed in detail in the 
thesis will be presented next. 
It was observed that in the Brazilian experience, a multidisciplinary in the nature of 
the sponsoring departments ´areas in charge of managing the state PPPs. However, 
there are still relevant gaps in questions such as: What would be the most 
appropriate department to host a PPP unit? What should be the size, composition, 
organization and training of this staff? What skills would be needed by the staff of 
this department to oversee the main PPP processes. Future studies could also 
analyse the next steps for an effective policy of public transparency, analyzing what 
kind of information should be made available by PPP units, their level of detail, 
relevance, updating, and ease of access to the population. There is also another 
question related to PPP units that still lacking an analysis: Can they have an 
independent technical body to decrease the political bias towards project evaluation 
and, also, to monitor renegotiation? In order to fully understand the Brazilian 
experience, other complementary research on PPP units and renegotiation should 
address new robust data also from the federal and municipal sphere. 
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IJTLD 
424 2005 Criteria for selecting the private-sector partner in 
public-private partnerships 
Zhang, XQ. JCEM 
425 2005 Public Contracts related to Privatization of 
Governmental Functions：Focusing on 
Contracting-Out & Public Private Partnership 
* ALJ 
426 2005 Critical success factors for public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure development 
Zhang, XQ. JCEM 
427 2005 Paving the way for public-private partnerships in 
infrastructure development 
Zhang, XQ. JCEM 
428 2005 Activating on Public-Private Partnership in Land 
Management 
* JKSC 
429 2005 A Study on the Public Private Partnership in the 
Urban Renewal- Focused on the District of 
OtemachiㆍMarunouchiㆍYurakucho in Tokyo 
* JUDIK 
430 2005 Success Factors of Public-Private Partnership for 
e-Government- Based on the ESD Life of Hong 
Kong e-Government - 
* E-BS 
431 2004 Private and public interests in water and energy Hall, D.; Lobina, E. NRF 
432 2004 Public-private partnerships: from contested 
concepts to prevalent practice 
Bovaird, T. IRAS 
433 2004 Public-private partnership in France: a 
polymorphous and unacknowledged category of 
public policy 
Sadran, P. IRAS 
434 2004 Financing and planning of public and private not-
for-profit hospitals in the European Union 
Thompson, CR.; McKee, M. HP 
435 2004 Concessionaire selection: Methods and criteria Zhang, XQ. JCEM 
436 2004 From 'our air is not for sale' to 'airtrack': The part 
privatization of the UK's airspace 
Majumdar, A.; Ochieng, W. TR 
437 2004 Public private partnership as negotiated order. 
Negotiation processes between public and private 
in the German Development Cooperation 
Manning, S. BJFS 
438 2004 A building maintenance decision tool for PFI 
projects 
Khosrowshahi, F; Howes, R.; 
Aouad, G. 
CDVEP 
439 2004 The challenge of inter-administration e-
government 
Lutz, G.; Moukabary, G. EGP 
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Number Year Title Author(s) Journal 
440 2004 Analysis on the Incentive Systems and Public 
Private Partnership of Redevelopment Project in 
the Core Area of Tokyo 
Nam, J.; Lee, S. KPA 
441 2004 Development Scheme of Transport Infrastructure 
in Poland as the European Union Member by 
Public Private Partnership 
Barbuzynski, S.; YONG, KS.; Lee, 
Y. 
KJCEM 
442 2004 The effect of public or private structures in 
wastewater treatment on the conditions for the 
design, construction and operation of wastewater 
treatment plants 
Grunebaum, T.; Bode, H. WST 
443 2003 Private finance initiative and public-private 
partnerships - Abstracts 
** PICE-T 
444 2003 Public-private partnerships in Ireland: Policy and 
practice 
Reeves, E. PMM 
445 2003 PFI, public-private partnerships and the neglected 
importance of process: Stakeholders and the 
employment dimension 
Fischbacher, M.; Beaumont, PB. PMM 
446 2003 A financial analysis of the National Air Traffic 
Services PPP 
Shaoul, J. PMM 
447 2003 Public-private partnership in the water supply and 
sanitation sector: The experience of the Republic 
of Yemen 
Sahooly, A. IJWRD 
448 2003 Scenarios for public-private partnerships in water 
management: A case study from Jordan 
Al-Jayyousi, OR. IJWRD 
449 2003 Part privatization of United Kingdom's airspace - 
National Air Traffic Services' experience one year 
on 
Majumdar, A.; Ochieng, W. ATC 
450 2003 PPP insights in South Africa. du Toit, J. WHHS 
451 2002 A financial appraisal of the London underground 
public - Private partnership 
Shaoul, J (Shaoul, J) PMM 
452 2001 Procurement protocols for public-private 
partnered projects 
Zhang, XQ.; Kumaraswamy, MM. JCEM 
453 2001 Rainwater drainage management for urban 
development based on public-private partnership 
Matsushita, J.; Ozaki, M.; 
Nishimura, S.; Ohgaki, S. 
WST 
454 1999 Past abuses and future uses of private finance and 
public private partnerships in transport 
Glaister, S. PMM 
455 1991 Decision-support methodology for planning and 
evaluating public-private partnerships 
Crosslin, RL. JUPD 
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S.2 PFI papers identified in the bibliometric analysis from 1991 to 2014: 
 
Number Year Title Author(s) Journal 
1 2014 Whole life project management approach to 
sustainability 
Wang, NN; Wei, KN; Sun, H. JME 
2 2014 Public enterprises in the healthcare sector - a case 
study of Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Greenwich, 
England 
Lethbridge, J. JEPR 
3 2014 Comparative performance of healthcare and 
transport PFI projects: empirical study on the 
influence of key factors 
Henjewele, C; Sun, M; Fewings, 
P. 
IJPM 
4 2013 PFI redux? Assessing a new model for financing 
hospitals 
Hellowell, M. HP 
5 2013 An evaluation tool for design quality: PFI sheltered 
housing 
Giddings, B; Sharma, M; Jones, 
P; Jensen, P. 
BRI 
6 2013 Avoiding performance failure payment deductions 
in PFI/PPP projects: model of critical success 
factors 
Oyedele, LO. JPCF 
7 2013 PPP and PFI: the political economy of building 
public infrastructure and delivering services 
Hare, P. OREP 
8 2013 Performance assessment of a private finance 
initiative road project 
Akbiyikli, R. TRANSPO
RT 
9 2013 Analysis of the capability of korean construction 
companies for international investment 
development business 
Kim, H. JKIBC 
10 2013 A study on the role and implications of PFI prisons 
in Japan 
* KSSR 
11 2013 A study on the co-operative construction project 
for the national and/or public youth facility in 
Korea 
* YFE 
12 2012 Public-private partnerships/private finance 
initiatives in Portugal theory, practice, and results 
Silvestre, HC; De Araujo, JFFE. PPMR 
13 2012 Achieving sustainable construction within private 
finance initiative (PFI) road projects in the UK 
Akbiyikli, R; Eaton, D; Dikmen, 
SU. 
TEDE 
14 2012 Is the jury still out on PFI contracts? Baillie, J. HE 
15 2012 Accounting-related research in PPPs/PFIs: present 
contributions and future opportunities 
Andon, P. AAAJ 
16 2012 A study on the PFI for social infrastructure and 
fundamental rights 
* SAC 
17 2011 Evaluating success of public private partnership 
projects 
Kusljic, D; Marenjak, S. GRADEVIN
AR 
18 2011 Risk allocation in the operational stage of private 
finance initiative projects 
Wang, NN. JPCF 
19 2011 Financing road projects by private finance 
initiative: current practice in the UK with a case 
study 
Akbiyikli, R; Dikmen, SU; Eaton, 
D. 
TRANSPO
RT 
20 2011 Housing regeneration and the private finance 
initiative in England: unstitching the neoliberal 
urban straitjacket 
Hodkinson, S. ANTIPODE 
21 2011 Private finance initiative (PFI) for road projects in 
UK: current practice with a case study 
Akbiyikli, R; Dikmen, SU; Eaton, 
D. 
PTT 
22 2011 Stakeholder engagement and compliance culture 
an empirical study of Scottish private finance 
initiative projects 
Foo, LM; Asenova, D; Bailey, S; 
Hood, J. 
PMR 
23 2011 Building schools for the future': reflections on a 
new social architecture 
Mahony, P; Hextall, I; 
Richardson, M. 
JEP 
24 2011 The private finance initiative in English council 
housing regeneration: a privatization too far? 
Hodkinson, S. HS 
25 2011 A study on introduction and status of private 
prison in Japan 
* KJCD 
26 2011 A study on the causal loop analysis and the 
economics of BTO and BTL system of PFI 
Choi, N. KSDR 
27 2011 A case study of Glasgow’s use of the prudential 
borrowing framework (PBF) for schools 
rationalisation 
Bailey, SJ; Asenova, D. LGS 
28 2011 A study on the validity and value for money (VFM) 
of the railway build-transfer-lease (BTL) project: 
based on the case comparison of the BTL trunk 
line projects 
You, N. KAPS 
29 2010 Localism and energy: negotiating approaches to 
embedding resilience in energy systems 
O'Brien, G; Hope, A. EP 
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30 2010 Corporate and political strategy in relation to the 
private finance initiative in the UK 
Ruane, S. CSP 
31 2010 Regulating employment conditions in a hospital 
network: the case of the private finance initiative 
Bach, S; Givan, RK. HRMJ 
32 2010 Employing the net present value-consistent IRR 
methods for PFI contracts 
Chiang, YH; Cheng, EWL; Lam, 
PTI. 
JCEM 
33 2010 Public sector comparators for UK PFI roads: inside 
the black box 
Bain, R. TRANSPO
RTATION 
34 2010 PPPs in health: static or dynamic? Blanken, A; Dewulf, G. AJPA 
35 2010 Public-private partnerships: governance scheme 
or language game? 
Hodge, G; Greve, C. AJPA 
36 2010 Managing multiple markets: big firms and PFI Leiringer, R; Schweber, L. BRI 
37 2010 Costs, outputs and outcomes in school PFI 
contracts and the significance of project size 
Demirag, I; Khadaroo, I. PMM 
38 2010 The royal infirmary of Edinburgh: a case study on 
the workings of the private finance initiative 
Cuthbert, M; Cuthbert, J. PMM 
39 2010 An empirical study of factors facilitating private 
finance initiatives (PFI) of social overhead capital 
in local governments - focusing on actors in local 
PFI projects - 
* KPAJ 
40 2009 Delivering innovation in hospital construction: 
contracts and collaboration in the UK's private 
finance initiative hospitals program 
Barlow, J; Koberle-Gaiser, M. CMR 
41 2009 Perception of financial institutions toward 
financing PFI projects in Hong Kong 
Chiang, YH; Cheng, EWL. JCEM 
42 2009 The evaluation of value at risk in build transfer 
lease project 
Choi, SJ. JKAICS 
43 2009 Local government’s contract law & private finance 
initiative law in “regional development” context 
Daein, K. LGLJ 
44 2009 Exporting public-private partnerships in 
healthcare: export strategy and policy transfer 
Holden, C. PS 
45 2009 Legal analysis on private finance initiative for 
social infrastructure project 
Daein, K. PLLR 
46 2009 The private finance initiative Wall, A; Connolly, C. PMR 
47 2008 Ex-ante evaluation of PFIs within the Italian 
health-care sector: what is the basis for this PPP? 
Barretta, A; Ruggiero, P. HP 
48 2008 The private finance initiative, project form and 
design innovation - the UK's hospitals programme 
Barlow, J; Koberle-Gaiser, M. HP 
49 2008 Participation, barriers, and opportunities in PFI: 
the United Kingdom experience 
Carrillo, P; Robinson, H; Foale, 
P; Anumba, C; Bouchlaghem, D. 
JME 
50 2008 Has the nao audited risk transfer in operational 
private finance initiative schemes? 
Pollock, AM; Price, D. PMM 
51 2008 Trust in project financing: an Italian health care 
example 
Barretta, A; Busco, C; Ruggiero, 
P. 
PMM 
52 2008 The cost of using private finance to build, finance 
and operate hospitals 
Shaoul, J; Stafford, A; Stapleton, 
P. 
PMM 
53 2008 A study on the Japanese PFI prison and its 
applicability to Korea 
Park, S. CR 
54 2008 Managing risk and regulation within new local 
'health economies': the case of NHS lift (local 
improvement finance trust) 
Aldred, RE. HRS 
55 2008 Problems and solutions of LCC analysis in BTL 
project for education facilities 
Taek, HC; Hong, T; Lee, H. KJCEM 
56 2008 Police, governance and the private finance 
initiative 
Johnston, L; Button, M; 
Williamson, T. 
PS 
57 2008 Value for money in PFI proposals: a commentary 
on the UK treasury guidelines for public sector 
comparators 
Coulson, A. PA 
58 2008 Education, education, education: the third way and 
PFI 
Connolly, C; Martin, G; Wall, A. PA 
59 2007 Managing contracts under the UK's private finance 
initiative: evidence from the national health 
service 
Lonsdale, C; Watson, G. PP 
60 2007 Private sector participation in health and social 
care services in Scotland: assessing the risk 
Asenova, D; Stein, W; McCann, 
C; Marshall, A. 
IRAS 
61 2007 The private finance initiative in the UK - a value 
for money and economic analysis 
Ball, R; Heafey, M; King, D. PMR 
62 2007 Alternative approach to credit scoring by DEA: 
evaluating borrowers with respect to PFI projects 
Cheng, EWL; Chiang, YH; Tang, 
BS. 
BE 
63 2007 An examination of the UK treasury's evidence base 
for cost and time overrun data in UK value-for-
money policy and appraisal 
Pollock, AM; Price, D; Player, S. PMM 
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64 2007 Effectiveness of private finance initiatives (PFI): 
study of private financing for the provision of 
capital assets for schools 
Kakabadse, NK; Kakabadse, AP; 
Summers, N. 
PAD 
65 2007 The UK's prudential borrowing framework: a 
retrograde step in managing risk? 
Hood, J; Asenova, D; Bailey, S; 
Manochin, M. 
JRR 
66 2007 Analysis on key influence factors for the activity in 
the BTL system 
Koo, K; Hong, T. JAIKSC 
67 2007 A value-for-money model of BTL projects for 
educational facilities by system dynamics 
Kook, D. JAIKSC 
68 2007 A study on VFM solution for sewage treatment 
facilities 
Rhee, J. KPA 
69 2007 A survey on the persons in charge for economic 
estimation analysis and improvement of BTL 
projects 
Lee, CK; Keun, PT; Bongho, C. KJCEM 
70 2007 Item establishment and importance analysis for 
qualitative VFM of BTL system 
Yong, KS. KJCEM 
71 2007 A study on the minimization of problems of the 
direct payment for subcontractor's work in public 
construction project 
Cho, Y. KJCEM 
72 2007 A implication from study of Japanese PFI system * PPR 
73 2007 A study on the UK’s PFI system and the 
improvement of Korean BTL programme 
* KSPR 
74 2006 Building and managing facilities for public services Bennett, J; Iossa, E. JPE 
75 2006 Portsmouth’s pioneering highways management 
contract, UK 
Finch, A. PICE-ME 
76 2006 Opportunities for nurses in a private finance 
initiative 
Gittoes, P; Trim, JC. NT 
77 2006 A study on the legislation and the reform of legal 
system for revitalization of project financing 
Park, S. JCPL 
78 2005 Does the private finance initiative promote 
innovation in health care? the case of the British 
national health service 
Petratos, P. JMP 
79 2005 Costs and benefits of private finance initiative 
schemes. 
Gittoes, P; Trim, J. NT 
80 2005 Can integrated solutions business models work in 
construction? 
Brady, T; Davies, A; Gann, D. BRI 
81 2005 Operational experience from a small footprint 
lamella and baff plant in Aberdeen 
Jolly, M. WEJ 
82 2005 Independently verified reductionism: prison 
privatization in Scotland 
Cooper, C; Taylor, P. HR 
83 2005 Risk transfer and the UK private finance initiative: 
a theoretical analysis 
Lonsdale, C. PP 
84 2005 Post-contractual lock-in and the UK private 
finance initiative (PFI): the cases of national 
savings and investments and the lord chancellor's 
department 
Lonsdale, C. PA 
85 2005 An institutional theory perspective on the UK's 
private finance initiative (PFI) accounting 
standard setting process 
Khadaroo, MI. PMR 
86 2005 Public contracts related to privatization of 
governmental functions：focusing on contracting-
out & public private partnership 
* ALJ 
87 2004 Room for improvement. Rayfield, J. HE 
88 2004 Therapy by design: evaluating the UK hospital 
building program 
Gesler, W; Bell, M; Curtis, S; 
Hubbard, P; Francis, S. 
HP 
89 2004 Reporting PFI in annual accounts: a user's 
perspective 
Hodges, R; Mellett, H. PMM 
90 2004 A building maintenance decision tool for PFI 
projects 
Khosrowshahi, F; Howes, R; 
Aouad, G. 
CDVEP 
91 2003 Private finance initiative and public-private 
partnerships - abstracts 
** PICE-T 
92 2003 The private finance initiative: risk, uncertainty and 
the state 
Froud, J. AOS 
93 2003 Controlling the PFI process in schools: a case study 
of the pimlico project 
Edwards, P; Shaoul, J. PP 
94 2003 PFI, public-private partnerships and the neglected 
importance of process: stakeholders and the 
employment dimension 
Fischbacher, M; Beaumont, PB. PMM 
95 2003 Information, trust and the private finance 
initiative in social housing 
Grubnic, S; Hodges, R. PMM 
96 2003 Downsizing of acute inpatient beds associated 
with private finance initiative: Scotland’s case 
study 
Dunnigan, MG; Pollock, AM. BMJ 
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97 2003 A study on the introduction plan of "private 
finance initiative (PFI)" for a controversial 
solution of public works 
* HS 
98 2002 Private financing of transport infrastructure - an 
assessment of the UK experience 
Debande, O. JTEP 
99 2002 Establishing a contract for a pacs managed service Pilling, JR. CR 
100 2002 The private finance initiative and public sector 
finance 
Ball, R; Heafey, M; King, D. EPCP 
101 2001 Learning through partnership: private finance and 
management in the delivery of services for London 
Wakeford, J; Valentine, J. PMM 
102 2001 Substance, form and PFI contracts Kirk, RJ; Wall, AP. PMM 
103 2001 Private finance initiative - a good deal for the 
public purse or a drain on future generations? 
Ball, R; Heafey, M; King, D. PP 
104 2000 Acquiescence and opposition: the private finance 
initiative in the national health service 
Ruane, S. PP 
105 1999 PFI in the sky, or pie in the sky? - privatising 
military space 
McLean, A. SP 
106 1999 The Nottingham express transit PFI project Armstrong, PJ. PICE-ME 
107 1999 Past abuses and future uses of private finance and 
public private partnerships in transport 
Glaister, S. PMM 
108 1999 Infrastructure shortfall in the United Kingdom: the 
private finance initiative and government policy 
Clark, GL; Root, A. PG 
109 1999 Commercialising the management and 
maintenance of trunk roads in the United Kingdom 
Haynes, L; Roden, N. TRANSPO
RTATION 
110 1999 The new public service ethos: an ethical 
environment for governance 
Brereton, M; Temple, M. PA 
111 1999 Pump-priming the PFI: why are privately financed 
hospital schemes being subsidized? 
Gaffney, D; Pollock, AM. PMM 
112 1998 The private finance initiative and the changing 
governance of the built environment 
Kerr, D. US 
113 1998 The private finance initiative - public private 
partnerships 
Grubb, SRT. PICE-CE 
114 1998 The private finance initiative: local authority 
transport programmes 
Hagan, A. PICE-ME 
115 1998 PFI - the last chance saloon? Tiffin, M; Hall, P. PICE-CE 
116 1997 The economics of the private finance initiative Grout, PA. OREP 
117 1997 Accounting for the private finance initiative Heald, D; Geaughan, N. PMM 
118 1997 A commissioner's tale: avery hill student village, 
university of Greenwich 
McWilliam, J. PMM 
119 1996 The private finance initiative - overdue reform or 
policy breakthrough? 
Terry, F. PMM 
120 1995 The private finance initiative Hancock, D. PICE-ME 
  
* author´s name written in other language 
  
  
** anonymous 
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S.3 Summary of Brazilian´ PPP projects.  
PPP projects identified in the Brazilian states governments, classified by title, project sector, type of 
project, type of concession and actual phase. 
The projects were sorted from the Brazilians´ states alphabetic order: 
 
Number State Title Project Sector Project Type 
Concession 
Type 
Project Phase 
1 Alagoas Sistema Adutor do 
Agreste 
Environment Water Supply 
System 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
2 Alagoas Centro Integrado de 
Ressocialização 
Security Prison Units Administrative EOI 
3 Alagoas Facilita Cidadão Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative USP 
4 Alagoas VLT Região 
Metropolitana de 
Maceió 
Transportation Light Rails ? USP 
5 Alagoas Sistema Adutor do 
Agreste 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
6 Alagoas Veículo Leve sobre 
Trilhos – VLT 
(Maceió – Aeroporto) 
Transportation Light Rails Sponsored EOI 
7 Alagoas Sistema de 
Esgotamento Sanitário 
no Município de 
Maceió 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative USP 
8 Amazonas Hospital da Zona 
Norte de Manaus 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
9 Amazonas Complexo Presidiário Security Prison Units Administrative Contract Signed 
but Non-
Operational 
10 Amazonas Central de Material 
Esterilizado 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
11 Bahia Arena Fonte Nova Sports Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
12 Bahia Hospital do Subúrbio Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
13 Bahia Instituto Couto Maia Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
14 Bahia Projeto Emissário 
Submarino 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
15 Bahia Metrô de Salvador e 
Lauro de Freitas 
(SMSL) 
Transportation Subway Sponsored Contract in 
Operation 
16 Bahia Plataforma Logística 
São Francisco 
Transportation Ports and 
Waterways 
? Project Appraisal 
17 Bahia Diagnóstico por 
Imagem 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
18 Bahia Projeto Sistema 
Rodoviário BA052 
(Estrada do Feijão) 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? Project Appraisal 
19 Bahia Procedimento de 
Manifestação de 
Interesse para Gestão e 
Gerenciamento de 
Resíduos Sólidos 
Urbanos 
Environment Sewerage system ? USP 
20 Ceará Central de Cogeração 
de Energia para o 
Centro de Eventos do 
Ceará 
Energy Power Generation 
Plants 
Administrative EOI 
21 Ceará Estádio Castelão Sports Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
22 Ceará Hospital Regional 
Metropolitano do 
Ceará 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Contract Signed 
but Non-
Operational 
23 Ceará Arco Rodoviário 
Metropolitano de 
Fortaleza 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
24 Ceará Metrô de Fortaleza - 
Linha Leste 
Transportation Subway Sponsored EOI 
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25 Ceará Terminal Intermodal 
de Cargas do Porto do 
Pecém 
Transportation Ports and 
Waterways 
? EOI 
26 Ceará Centro Cultural Tourism Building 
management 
? EOI 
27 Ceará Complexo de Alta 
Segurança do Estado 
do Ceará 
Security Prison Units Administrative EOI 
28 Ceará Rodovias Estaduais 
CE-040, CE-060, CE-
085 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
29 Ceará Trem do Cariri Transportation Railways Sponsored EOI 
30 Ceará Unidades 
Socioeducativas para 
Adolescentes em 
Conflito com a Lei 
Security Prison Units Administrative EOI 
31 Ceará Vapt-Vupt Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
32 Ceará Ponte Estaiada sobre o 
Rio Cocó 
Transportation Bridges, Tunnels 
and Viaducts 
Administrative Contract Signed 
but Non-
Operational 
33 Distrito 
Federal 
Jardins Mangueiral Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Housing Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
34 Distrito 
Federal 
Centro Administrativo 
do Distrito Federal 
Administration Building 
management 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
35 Distrito 
Federal 
CGI Centro de Gestão 
Integrada 
Security Building 
management 
Administrative Contract Signed 
but Non-
Operational 
36 Distrito 
Federal 
Saída Norte Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Administrative EOI 
37 Distrito 
Federal 
Programas 
Habitacionais: Setor 
Meireles e Jardins 
Mangueiral - parte II 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Housing Administrative EOI 
38 Distrito 
Federal 
Estacionamentos na 
Região Central de 
Brasília (Subterrâneos 
na Esplanada dos 
Ministérios) 
Transportation Parking and Garages Administrative EOI 
39 Distrito 
Federal 
Resíduos Sólidos 
Urbanos - Brasília 
Urban services Urban Cleansing ? Project Appraisal 
40 Distrito 
Federal 
Sistema Adutor 
Paranoá 
Environment Water Supply 
System 
? Project Appraisal 
41 Distrito 
Federal 
Centro Esportivo de 
Brasília 
Sports Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
? EOI 
42 Distrito 
Federal 
Centro Médico da 
PMDF 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
43 Distrito 
Federal 
Infraestrutura viária, 
aeroportuária, de 
mobilidade urbana e 
de logística 
Transportation Airports ? Project Appraisal 
44 Distrito 
Federal 
Saúde Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Bidding 
45 Distrito 
Federal 
Relógios Digitais Urban services Urban Furniture ? Bidding 
46 Distrito 
Federal 
Centrais de 
Atendimento 
Integrado de Serviços 
Públicos aos Cidadãos 
do Distrito Federal - 
Na Hora 
Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
47 Distrito 
Federal 
Sistema Penitenciário 
do Distrito Federal 
Security Prison Units Administrative EOI 
48 Distrito 
Federal 
Transbrasília Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Administrative EOI 
49 Distrito 
Federal 
Parque da Cidade 
Dona Sarah 
Kubitschek 
Tourism Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
50 Distrito 
Federal 
Torre de TV de 
Brasília 
Tourism Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
51 Distrito 
Federal 
Mirante Flor do 
Cerrado 
Tourism Building 
management 
? USP 
52 Distrito 
Federal 
Centro de Convenções 
Ulysses Guimarães 
Tourism Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
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53 Distrito 
Federal 
Iluminação Pública Urban services Urban Furniture ? EOI 
54 Distrito 
Federal 
Jardim Zoológico de 
Brasília 
Tourism Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
55 Distrito 
Federal 
Shopping Popular Business Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
56 Distrito 
Federal 
Parque de Exposições 
Agropecuárias da 
Granja do Torto 
Business Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
57 Distrito 
Federal 
Parque Tecnológico 
Capital Digital 
Economic 
Development 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
58 Espírito 
Santo 
Esgotamento Sanitário 
do Município de Serra 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
59 Espírito 
Santo 
Sistema Hidroviário 
no Estuário da Baía de 
Vitória 
Transportation Ports and 
Waterways 
? Public 
Consultation 
60 Espírito 
Santo 
Hospital Estadual 
Infantil 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
61 Espírito 
Santo 
Identidade ES Security Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Public 
Consultation 
62 Espírito 
Santo 
Núcleos 
Administrativos do 
Governo do Espírito 
Santo 
Administration Building 
management 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
63 Espírito 
Santo 
Rede Faça Fácil Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
64 Espírito 
Santo 
CEMMC Centro de 
Eventos Multiuso das 
Montanhas Capixabas 
Tourism Building 
management 
? EOI 
65 Espírito 
Santo 
Prip (Programa de 
Reestruturação dos 
Imóveis Públicos) 
Administration Building 
management 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
66 Espírito 
Santo 
Unidades Escolares Education Teaching Units Administrative EOI 
67 Goiás VLT Goiânia - Eixo 
Anhanguera 
Transportation Light Rails Sponsored Contract Signed 
but Non-
Operational 
68 Goiás Complexo Prisional 
Odenir Guimarães 
Security Prison Units Administrative Public 
Consultation 
69 Goiás Rodovias GO-020, 
GO-060, GO-070 e 
GO-080. 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored EOI 
70 Goiás Vapt Vupt Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
? USP 
71 Mato 
Grosso 
Hospital Infantil do 
Mato Grosso 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Public 
Consultation 
72 Mato 
Grosso 
Ganha Tempo 
(Identificação Digital) 
Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Bidding 
73 Mato 
Grosso 
GESTÃO  
ESCOLAR 
Education Teaching Units Administrative EOI 
74 Mato 
Grosso 
Complexo 
Penitenciário 
Security Prison Units ? EOI 
75 Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Aquário do Pantanal Tourism Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
76 Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Hospitais na Área de 
Fronteira Internacional 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
? Project Appraisal 
77 Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Presídios Security Prison Units ? Project Appraisal 
78 Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Unidades de 
Conservação 
Tourism Conservation units ? Project Appraisal 
79 Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Rede de esgoto nos 
municípios de Mato 
Grosso do Sul 
atendidos pela Sanesul 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative EOI 
80 Minas 
Gerais 
Complexo Penal de 
Ribeirão das Neves 
Security Prison Units Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
81 Minas 
Gerais 
Novo Mineirão Sports Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
82 Minas 
Gerais 
Rodovia MG-050 Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored Contract in 
Operation 
83 Minas 
Gerais 
Unidades de 
Atendimento 
Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
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Integrado (UAI) - Fase 
I 
84 Minas 
Gerais 
Ampliação do Sistema 
Produtor Rio Manso 
Environment Water Supply 
System 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
85 Minas 
Gerais 
Aeroporto da Zona da 
Mata ARZM 
Transportation Airports Sponsored Contract in 
Operation 
86 Minas 
Gerais 
Centro Empresarial 
Gameleira 
Economic 
Development 
Building 
management 
Administrative Public 
Consultation 
87 Minas 
Gerais 
Entorno Viário da 
Cidade Administrativa 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Administrative Public 
Consultation 
88 Minas 
Gerais 
Campus da UEMG Education Building 
management 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
89 Minas 
Gerais 
Contorno 
Metropolitano Leste 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
90 Minas 
Gerais 
Contorno 
Metropolitano Norte 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored Bidding 
91 Minas 
Gerais 
Sede do 
DETRAN/MG 
Transportation Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
92 Minas 
Gerais 
Pátios DETRAN/MG Transportation Removal and 
storage of vehicles 
Administrative EOI 
93 Minas 
Gerais 
Fábrica de Placas 
DETRAN/MG 
Transportation Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Public 
Consultation 
94 Minas 
Gerais 
CFCri-Centor de 
Ciências Forenses 
Criminais de Minas 
Gerais 
Transportation Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
95 Minas 
Gerais 
Resíduos Sólidos Environment Sewerage system Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
96 Minas 
Gerais 
UAI Fase II Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
97 Minas 
Gerais 
UAI Fase III - Praça 
sete 
Administration Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
98 Minas 
Gerais 
Sistema de 
Esgotamento Sanitário 
de Divinópolis 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative Contract in 
Operation 
99 Minas 
Gerais 
Expominas II Business Building 
management 
Administrative Bidding 
100 Minas 
Gerais 
Projeto Nova 
Metrópole: 
Transportation sobre 
Trilhos 
Transportation Railways Administrative EOI 
101 Minas 
Gerais 
ROTA LUND Tourism Conservation units Administrative Bidding 
102 Minas 
Gerais 
Centro de Terinamento 
Aeroespacial - CTCA 
Education Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
103 Minas 
Gerais 
Escolas Estaduais Education Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
104 Minas 
Gerais 
Aeroporto Usiminas Transportation Airports Sponsored Public 
Consultation 
105 Minas 
Gerais 
Estradas Estaduais Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
106 Pará Plataforma Logística 
do Guamá 
Transportation Ports and 
Waterways 
? USP 
107 Pará RODOVIA 
LIBERDADE 
Transportation Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored USP 
108 Pará SANEAMENTO 
REGIÃO 
METROPOLITANA 
DE BELÉM 
Environment Sewerage system ? USP 
109 Pará IMPLANTAÇÃO DE 
ESCOLAS 
Education Teaching Units ? Project Appraisal 
110 Pará CENTRAL DE 
DIAGNÓSTICOS 
POR IMAGEM 
Health Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
? USP 
111 Pará SANEAMENTO 
REGIÃO 
METROPOLITANA 
DE BELÉM 
Environment Sewerage system ? USP 
112 Paraíba Centro Administrativo 
da Paraíba 
Administration 
Building 
management 
? USP 
113 Paraíba 
Arenas Multiuso Sports 
Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
? Project Appraisal 
114 Paraíba Centros de 
Ressocialização 
Security Prison Units ? Project Appraisal 
115 Paraíba Complexo Rodoviário 
João Pessoa - BR-101 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? Project Appraisal 
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116 Paraíba Condomínios e 
Complexos Industriais 
Economic 
Development 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
117 Paraíba 
Infraestrutura Turística Tourism 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
118 Paraíba Novo Porto Marítimo 
(offshore) 
Transportation 
Ports and 
Waterways 
? Project Appraisal 
119 Paraíba Perímetros Irrigados 
para o Agronegócio 
Agriculture and 
Irrigation 
Irrigation ? Project Appraisal 
120 Paraíba 
Porto de Cabedelo Transportation 
Ports and 
Waterways 
? Project Appraisal 
121 Paraíba Porto Seco da Região 
do Compartimento da 
Borborema 
Foreign trade 
Ports and 
Waterways 
? Project Appraisal 
122 Paraíba Requalificação da 
Malha Ferroviária 
Estadual 
Transportation Railways ? Project Appraisal 
123 Paraíba Sistemas de Água e 
Esgoto 
Environment 
Water Supply 
System 
? Project Appraisal 
124 Paraíba 
Terminais Rodoviários Transportation 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
125 Paraíba Trens Urbandos da 
Grande João Pessoa 
Transportation Light Rails ? Project Appraisal 
126 Paraíba 
Unidades Hospitalares Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
? Project Appraisal 
127 Paraíba Zona de 
Processamento de 
Exportações Campina 
Grande 
Foreign trade 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
128 Paraná 
Rodovia PR-323 Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
129 Paraná Corredores Integrados 
do Norte 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
130 Paraná 
Caminhos do Sudoeste Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
131 Paraná Ampliação da rede de 
distribuição da 
COMPAGÁS 
Gas Gas supply ? EOI 
132 Paraná Sistema de Controle e 
Monitoramento de 
Veículos 
Transportation 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? EOI 
133 Paraná Centrais de 
Abastecimento do 
Estado (CEASA) 
Food Supply 
Building 
management 
? EOI 
134 Paraná 
Projeto “Tudo Aqui” Administration 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? EOI 
135 Paraná RECUPERAÇÃO, 
MODERNIZAÇÃO E 
OPERAÇÃO DOS 
CEASAS 
Food Supply 
Building 
management 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
136 Paraná IDENTIFICAÇÃO 
VEICULAR 
Transportation 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
Sponsored Project Appraisal 
137 Paraná CORREDOR 
SUDOESTE - PR280 - 
LOTE 11 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored Project Appraisal 
138 Paraná SISTEMA 
INTEGRADO DE 
INTELIGÊNCIA E 
CONTROLE 
Security 
Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
139 Paraná PROJETO PPP 
HOSPITAL DA 
POLÍCIA MILITAR 
Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
140 Paraná TREM PÉ-
VERMELHO 
Transportation Railways Sponsored EOI 
141 Paraná PPP DE 
DIAGNÓSTICO POR 
IMAGEM 
Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
142 Pernambuc
o 
Complexo Viário da 
Praia do Paiva 
Transportation 
Bridges, Tunnels 
and Viaducts 
Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
143 Pernambuc
o 
CIR Centro Integrado 
de Ressocialização de 
Itaquitinga 
Security Prison Units Administrative 
Contract 
Termination 
144 Pernambuc
o 
(Programa Cidade 
Saneada) Sistema de 
Esgotamento Sanitário 
da RMR e Goiana 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
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145 Pernambuc
o 
Arena Multiuso da 
Copa 2014 
Sports 
Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
146 Pernambuc
o 
Campus Integrado da 
Universidade de 
Pernambuco 
Education 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
147 Pernambuc
o 
Sede da Polícia 
Científica da Capital 
Security 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
148 Pernambuc
o 
Litoral Norte - 
Duplicação da PE-001 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored EOI 
149 Pernambuc
o 
Nova Sede do 
Tribunal de Justiça do 
Estado e Fórum 
Criminal do Recife 
Justice 
Building 
management 
? EOI 
150 Pernambuc
o 
Rota do Capiberibe - 
Radial da Copa 2014 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
151 Pernambuc
o 
Autoprodução de 
Energia Elétrica na 
Administação Pública 
Energy 
Power Generation 
Plants 
? Project Appraisal 
152 Piauí 
Rota da Soja Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored USP 
153 Piauí 
Anjo da Guarda 
Research and 
Technology 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? EOI 
154 Piauí Central de 
Abastecimento do 
Piauí – Teresina 
Food Supply 
Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
155 Piauí Complexo Turístico 
Litoral do Piauí 
Tourism 
Building 
management 
Administrative EOI 
156 Piauí 
Nosso Shopping Administration 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? USP 
157 Piauí Novo Centro 
Adminstrativo 
Administration 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
158 Piauí Plataforma Logística 
Multimodal 
Transportation 
Building 
management 
? USP 
159 Piauí Samenamento - 
municípios (Em breve) 
Environment Sewerage system ? Project Appraisal 
160 Piauí 
Piauí Conectado 
Research and 
Technology 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? USP 
161 Rio de 
Janeiro 
Complexo do 
Maracanã 
Sports 
Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
162 Rio de 
Janeiro 
Linha 3 - Rio de 
Janeiro 
Transportation Subway ? Project Appraisal 
163 Rio de 
Janeiro 
Saneamento nas 
Regiões da Baixada 
Fluminense/Bacia do 
Guandu e Região do 
Leste Metropolitano 
Fluminense 
Environment 
Water Supply 
System 
? EOI 
164 Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Arena das Dunas Sports 
Stadiums and Sports 
Facilities 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
165 Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Aterro Sanitário do 
Vale do Assu 
Urban services Urban Cleansing ? EOI 
166 Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Centrais de 
Abastecimento do 
Estado (CEASA) 
Food Supply 
Building 
management 
? Project Appraisal 
167 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Anel Rodoviário 
Metropolitano entre 
Porto Alegre e Novo 
Hamburgo 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? USP 
168 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Rodovia ERS-010 Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
169 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Complexo Prisional da 
Região Metropolitana 
Security Prison Units ? EOI 
170 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Modernização do 
Centro Administrativo 
Fernando Ferrari 
Administration 
Building 
management 
? EOI 
171 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Irrigação da Bacia do 
Rio Santa Maria 
Agriculture and 
Irrigation 
Irrigation ? EOI 
172 Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Saneamento da Bacia 
do Gravataí  
Environment Sewerage system ? EOI 
173 Rondônia HEURO Hospital de 
Urgência e 
Emergência de 
Rondônia 
Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
174 Rondônia Saneamento Básico Environment Sewerage system Administrative EOI 
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175 Santa 
Catarina 
Acesso à Ilha de Santa 
Catarina - BR 101 
Transportation 
Bridges, Tunnels 
and Viaducts 
? EOI 
176 Santa 
Catarina 
Melhoria da 
Mobilidade Urbana e 
de Acesso a 
Florianópolis 
Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
177 Santa 
Catarina 
Centrais de 
Atendimento ao 
Cidadão 
Administration 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
Administrative EOI 
178 Santa 
Catarina 
Tecnologia Digital na 
Rede Estadual de 
Ensino 
Education Educational support ? USP 
179 Santa 
Catarina 
Sistema de BRT Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
? EOI 
180 São Paulo Metrô de São Paulo - 
Linha 4 - Amarela 
Transportation Subway Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
181 São Paulo Metrô de São Paulo - 
Linha 8 - Diamante 
Transportation Subway Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
182 São Paulo Sistema Produtor do 
Alto Tietê / ETA Tietê 
Taiaçupeba 
Environment 
Water Supply 
System 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
183 São Paulo Sistema Produtor de 
São Lourenço 
Environment 
Water Supply 
System 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
184 São Paulo Metrô de São Paulo - 
Linha 6 - Laranja 
Transportation Subway Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
185 São Paulo Complexos 
Hospitalares 
Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
186 São Paulo 
Habitação - Lote 1 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Housing Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
187 São Paulo FURP – Planta de 
Produção Américo de 
Brasiliense 
Health Housing Administrative 
Contract in 
Operation 
188 São Paulo 
Rodovia dos Tamoios Transportation 
Highways and 
Urban Roads 
Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
189 São Paulo SIM - Sistema 
Integrado 
Metropolitano da 
RMBS (modal VLT) 
Transportation Subway Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
190 São Paulo Metrô de São Paulo - 
Linha 18 - Bronze 
Transportation Subway Sponsored 
Contract in 
Operation 
191 São Paulo Linha 08 Diamante e 
Linha 09 Esmeralda de 
Trens metropolitanos 
Transportation Subway Sponsored Project Appraisal 
192 São Paulo 
Parceria Habitação 
Fazenda Albor 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Housing Administrative 
Public 
Consultation 
193 São Paulo PPP para Provisão de 
Habitações de 
Interesse Social e 
Habitações de 
Mercado Popular no 
Centro da Cidade de 
SP 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Housing Administrative Project Appraisal 
194 São Paulo Complexos Prisionais Security Prison Units Administrative Project Appraisal 
195 São Paulo Construção e Gestão 
de Fóruns 
Justice 
Building 
management 
Administrative Project Appraisal 
196 São Paulo Expresso ABC - Linha 
10 Turquesa 
Transportation Subway Sponsored Project Appraisal 
197 São Paulo Expresso Bandeirantes Transportation Railways Sponsored Project Appraisal 
198 São Paulo 
Identificação Digital Security 
Citizens Services 
Centers 
? Project Appraisal 
199 São Paulo Metrô de São Paulo - 
Linha 20 - Rosa 
Transportation Subway Sponsored Project Appraisal 
200 São Paulo Trens Intercidades Transportation Railways ? Project Appraisal 
201 São Paulo 
Pátio Veicular Integral Administration 
Removal and 
storage of vehicles 
Administrative EOI 
202 São Paulo Portal São Paulo - 
Requalificação do 
Acesso ao Aeroporto 
de Guarulhos 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development 
Urban Development Sponsored Project Appraisal 
203 São Paulo Saneamento no Vale 
do Juqueri 
Environment Sewerage system Administrative Project Appraisal 
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204 Sergipe 
PPP da Área de Saúde Health 
Hospitals and Health 
Centers 
? EOI 
205 Sergipe PPP do Centro 
Administrativo 
Administration 
Building 
management 
? EOI 
(?) Projects that the type of concessions was not informed by the PPP units in the questionnaires answers or not available in 
their websites´ database. 
 
